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JUDITH RESNIK*
Procedure is a mechanism for expressing political and social rela-
tionships and is a device for producing outcomes. The purpose of this
article is to clarify the value-laden aspects of courts' procedures, to sur-
vey interrelated changes in civil and criminal procedure over the past
twenty years, and to analyze how the evolving procedural doctrines are
linked to value choices.
I use the term procedure to include both the formulation of rules
that govern litigants and the decisions to provide single or multiple op-
portunities to litigate. That procedures are used to obtain outcomes (in
a narrow sense) in specific disputes is uncontroversial. But procedure
also embodies deeply held, albeit often unarticulated, views of human
relationships, of the importance and difficulty of passing judgments on
individuals' conduct, and of the place of government in citizens' lives.'
One example illustrates this point. Two years ago, when having to
decide whether to incarcerate a convicted defendant for twenty or for
thirty days, a trial judge flipped a coin. His audience was incensed, and
the judge was subsequently censured.z
What was so offensive? The coin flip produced an outcome, inex-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Southern California. B.A., Bryn Mawr Col-
lege, 1972; J.D., New York University School of Law, 1975.
I wish to thank David Alkire, Scott Bice, William Genego, David Rudenstine, Alan
Schwartz, Robert Thompson, and members of the University of Southern California Law Center
Faculty Workshop for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Special thanks are
also owed to Robert Bone and Dennis Curtis, who thoughtfully reviewed revisions, to James Mc-
Cafferty and Sam May, to Laurie Hasencamp, an unusually talented research assistant, and to the
Southern California Law Review staff.
I. See P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL 8-9 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as JUSTICE ON APPEAL] (importance of ritual and "process imperatives" in pro-
cedure); R. CovER & 0. Fiss, THE STRUCTURE OF PROCEDURE (1979) (procedure as a social,
cultural institution); 18 NoMos: DUE PRoCEsS (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1977) (collection
of essays exploring nature and rationale of procedural fairness); Mashaw, The Supreme Courtr
Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors In
Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. Cm. L. Rav. 28, 49-52 (1976) (importance of dignity con-
cerns); Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: he Right to Protect One'r
Rights-Part I, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1153, 1172-77 (dignity, participation, deterrence, and effectuation
as litigation values).
2. Shipp, Friess Is Barredfrom Ever Being New York Judge, N.Y. Times, Apr. 7, 1983, at
B3, col. 1.
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pensively and quickly. Moreover, the judge's critics did not claim that
the decision itself incorrectly reflected either law or fact, or that the
time ultimately to be served by the defendant was unjustly long or
short.
The complaint was about process. The coin flip offended this soci-
ety's commitment to rationality. The open embrace of chance as deter-
minative was frightening The decisionmaking procedure was also
uncomfortably commonplace; people flip coins to decide who must
wash dishes or go first in a game. State-backed orders to incarcerate
are more seemly if made in a way that differentiates them from those
involving dishwashing. The import of the judge's decision, that a per-
son had to spend many nights in a cell, was not reflected in the proce-
dure. The community's outrage expressed feelings that some decisions
should be treated specially, perhaps garbed in ritual, and certainly
made to appear rationally and carefully chosen.
But it was not only the citizenry that was outraged. It was a com-
mission of judges and lawyers, as well as citizens, who censured the
judge for undermining the appearance of rationality.' Whether a
judge's internal mental process, when pronouncing a sentence of
twenty or thirty days, actually amounts to anything more than a coin
flip, the community wishes judicial rulings at least to appear to be the
product of contemplative, deliberative, cognitive processes.5 The com-
mission punished the judge for breaking ranks, for undermining the
function of procedure to legitimate and to maintain the coercive pow-
ers of the state.
While it is relatively easy to discern procedure's legitimating func-
tions (after all, with only an odd set of behaviors denominated "trial"
or "plea," the state incarcerates people or executes them-without in-
tolerable social upheaval), it is more difficult to examine procedure's
value-expressive functions. Given the heterogeneity of the United
States and the multiplicity of traditions, it is even problematic to speak
of shared cultural values. Moreover, there is constant change, both in
3. The commission that censured the judge concluded that "[a] court of law is not a game of
chance." Id.
4. "Abdicating such solemn responsibilities, particularly in so whimsical a manner. . . is
inexcusable .. " The commission report, quoted by Shipp, id.
5. "The public has every right to expect that a jurist will carefully weigh the matters at issue
and, in good faith, render reasoned rulings and decisions." The commission report, quoted by
Shipp, id
6. See Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreward" Nomos andNarrativf4 97 HARv.
L. REV. 4, 7, 9-10 (1983) (meaning of law determined by differing "interpretive commitments");
1984]
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society and in the operating rules of courts. Procedural rules are not
crafted in a vacuum. Decisions about procedure are influenced by
judgments about the disputants, the dispute, and the proper role of
government in responding to conflicts.
With those substantial caveats in mind, I wish to explore the role
procedure plays in this multifaceted society. I elaborate my views of
procedure's normative content by first describing twelve valued fea-
tures of procedure in this country. The relative weights assigned to
these features determine the makeup of procedural models and of the
structure for court decisionmaking. Thereafter, I relate these elements
to diverse models of procedure. I discuss reasons for and against intro-
ducing complexity into procedure by adding layers of decisionmaking,
by permitting reconsideration of decisions already rendered, and by
authorizing different actors to make decisions afresh. I explore a range
of procedural models, from a simple one, such as a single judge issuing
a final decision, to a complex one, such as six courts, at different levels,
each authorized to make or to remake decisions in particular cases.
All the models discussed find their counterparts within the United
States, which is rich in examples of procedural diversity. The jurisdic-
tions of state courts and federal courts sometimes overlap,7 at other
times are mutually exclusive,' and occasionally are in hierarchical for-
mation.9 Administrative agencies and courts are also in varied rela-
tionships. Both may be available to litigants,' 0 agency determination
may be a prerequisite to court review,'1 or agency decisionmaking may
preclude court review.'?2 Of the multiple examples possible, I concen-
trate upon procedural schemes involving either state and federal courts,
courts and agencies, or repetitive court adjudication.
Garet, Comparative Normative Hermeneutics: Scriture, Literature, Constitution, 58 S. CAL. L.
Rnv. (1985) (forthcoming).
7. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982) (requirements for diversity jurisdiction in federal
courts are that litigants be citizens of different states and amount in controversy be over $10,000).
8. See, eg., id. § 1333 (federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over admiralty and mari-
time cases); C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 25, at 143-45 (4th ed.
1983) (states have exclusive jurisdiction over domestic law and probate matters).
9. See, eg., id. § 2254 (prisoners convicted in state courts may, after exhausting state judi-
cial remedies, fie habeas corpus actions in federal courts).
10. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1982) (Title VII claimant may complain to both state and
federal agencies).
11. See, e.g., McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193-96 (1969) (explaining the rationales
for exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine). Exhaustion is mandatory, for example, under
the Federal Torts Claim Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (1982).
12. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 8128(b)(2) (1982) (Secretary of Labor's allowance or denial of
worker's compensation not reviewable in federal court).
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I discuss in detail the development of federal habeas corpus for
state prisoners and habeas corpus for federal prisoners-two models of
potential procedural redundancy that have recently been sharply lim-
ited. Habeas corpus is a genre of process that has long drawn the atten-
tion of commentators. The "Great Writ" places the tension among
diverse values of dispute resolution systems in a poignant context. It is
assumed by critics as well as supporters of habeas corpus review that
some compromise of the oft-stated desire for finality is appropriate
when a person claims illegal deprivation of liberty.13 The dispute is
over what kinds of compromises should be made. The expansion and
narrowing of habeas corpus provides insight into changing emphases
on the various purposes of procedure.
Next, I examine how the value choices made in habeas cases are
paralleled in other complex litigation schemes, such as civil rights liti-
gation filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and employment discrimina-
tion litigation brought under Title VII. 14 42 U.S.C. § 1983 prohibits
those acting under color of state law from depriving citizens of civil
rights. Since the Supreme Court has interpreted section 1983 actions as
"supplementary" to remedies provided by states for such injuries,15
both federal and state courts are available for adjudication. Congress
was more explicit about dual decisionmaking in Title VII of the Equal
Employment Opportunities Act. That civil rights statute gives both
state and federal agencies, as well as federal courts, responsibilities to
enforce antidiscrimination laws.
16
Finally, I review two purely federal schemes-magistrate adjudi-
cation and appeal in the federal courts. In recent amendments to the
Magistrates Act, Congress gave magistrates greater independence to
author decisions but also reserved an oversight role for federal
judges. 7 And, although Congress has long authorized federal appel-
late courts to review decisions of trial judges, even the relatively simple
13. See, e.g., Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corausfor State Prisoners,
76 HARv. L. REv. 441, 446-48 (1963) (finality must sometimes give way to permit error correc-
tion); Cover & Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J.
1035, 1045-46 (1977) (redundancy appropriate in protection of federal rights); Friendly, Is Inno-
cence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CH. L. Rav. 142, 149-50 (1970)
(finality should have less weight in criminal proceedings than in civil proceedings); Peller, In
Defense of Federal Habeas Corpus Relitigation 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 579, 582 (1982) (Bur-
ger Court unjustified in placing restrictions on scope of habeas review).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
15. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961).
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4, 2000e-5 (1982).
17. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (1982).
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model of one appeal as of right may, of late, have been eroded by limi-
tations placed upon the scope of appellate review.18
Recent Supreme Court discussions of all six of the foregoing statu-
tory or rule-based schemes reveal the interrelationship between the
procedural preferences and the value choices of the Justices. A major-
ity of this Court seeks finality, defers to the authority of first tier deci-
sionmakers, and is deeply concerned about resource conservation.
Generally, the Court discusses procedure as if outcome production
were its only purpose. Once an initial decision has been made, whether
by an agency official, a magistrate, a trial judge, or a jury, a majority of
the Court believes that the decision should be difficult to undo. The
Court appears attracted to a simple model of procedure-a single judge
issuing a final, authoritative decision. The Court's current value pref-
erences, for closure, economy, and power-concentration, stand in con-
trast to the decisions of other eras. Other justices, legislators, and
commentators, weighting the value features differently, favored dupli-
cative decisionmakers to permit greater expression of their concerns,
namely, supervision of first-tier decisionmakers, diffusion of judicial
power among decisionmakers, and the use of procedure to underscore
the promise of individual rights.
I. PROCEDURE: ITS PURPOSES, TECHNIQUES,
AND VALUES
As demonstrated by the coin-flipping judge, government-empow-
ered actors may not simply pronounce victory for one litigant over an-
other. Rather, we deem legitimate and accord political authority only
to those resolutions that comport with shared views about how to
adjudicate.
What values inform the judgment to reject the coin flip? It is
tempting to retreat to the two obvious overarching themes-justice and
efficiency-to aid in identifying values. Such a formulation, however,
would be at a level of abstraction that would obscure important con-
cerns bearing heavily upon procedural modeling. Moreover, employ-
ing the justice/efficiency dichotomy may misleadingly suggest that the
two themes are distinct and always at odds.
A second, superficially appealing delineation would be to distin-
guish those features of our procedural system embodying "instrumen-
18. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 (1982) (limited appellate review available on
questions of discriminatory intent).
HeinOnline -- 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. 844 1983-1984
TIERS
tal" concerns from those relating to "intrinsic" concerns. The
drawback here is that the instrumental/intrinsic distinction is usually
accompanied by the assumption that procedural features are "instru-
mental" because they relate to outcome production. One could, how-
ever, easily describe as "instrumental" those features of a procedural
system that further nonoutcome-related purposes, such as underscoring
the dignity of individuals.
Rather than pursue a quest for neat packaging or take flight to the
highest levels of abstraction, I think it more fruitful to identify basic
aspects of procedure in the United States, aspects I have denominated
"valued features." By that term, I mean to convey that these "features"
are identifiable elements of the procedural terrain; they are particular-
ized and readily recognizable aspects of institutional arrangements. In
addition to their descriptive power, these "valued features" incorporate
normative themes. That is, frequently, when judges, legislators, and
commentators discuss whether to provide a given procedure, they make
reference to values that the features embody or are used to express.
I set forth twelve "valued features" below. Although I believe that
I have captured the major elements, I do not claim to have provided an
exclusive or exhaustive list.' 9 Moreover, I do not insist on the bounda-
ries between each. Rather, the features fall into clusters, which I have
organized by first discussing those features relating to litigants, then to
decisionmakers, and finally to the decisionmaking process. But there is
some overlap, and each feature can be conceptualized at varying levels
of abstraction.20
A. THE VALUED FEATURES
1. For Litigants
a. Litigants'autonomy: Despite the multiple ways in which polit-
ical activity in the United States is dependent upon organizations and
despite the rise of the bureaucratic state, judicial procedures are rooted
in the values of individualism. Courts still assume that the individual is
19. Compare my list to those values described by others. See, e.g., JUSTICE ON APPEAL,
supra note 1, at 8-11 (identifying "process" and "systemic" imperatives); 1 THE POLITICS OF IN-
FORMAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 7-13 (R. Abel ed. 1982) (describing values of
formal and informal legal institutions) [hereinafter cited as INFORMAL JUSTICE]; Getman, Labor
Arbitration and Dispute Resolution, 88 YALE L.J. 916, 916 (1979) (finality, obedience, guidance,
efficiency, availability, neutrality, conflict reduction, and fairness).
20. Cf. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 93 (1977) ("background" rights and "in-
stitutional" rights or "abstract" versus "concrete" rights).
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the relevant unit. Courts require that victims21 and harmdoers 22 partici-
pate in lawsuits. Courts are deeply suspicious of claims made by
groups, rather than individuals, and various procedural rules ignore the
reality that insurance companies, governments, associations, and other
entities are the "rear' parties to many lawsuits.
Individuals command attention from judges. Unlike the require-
ments of substantial wealth or group action that are predicates to legis-
lative or executive receptivity, even poor pro se litigants can obtain
official responses from courts. Moreover, the judiciary itself incorpo-
rates the values of individualism. Single judges have an independence
not permitted other members of complex, hierarchical institutions.23
Courts are keyed to individuals, and we self-consciously praise our
system for vesting decisionmaking power in individuals. Our process
permits litigants to make their way alone24 or to enlist advocates. 2
Further, litigants are relatively free to define the parameters of their
disputes and to select the kinds of relief sought. Thus far, we have
rejected a civil law model of state-controlled pretrial preparation in
favor of an individualistic, party-initiated approach.26 While we have
procedural doctrines, such as election of remedies, forfeiture, and
21. See, eg., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 103 S. Ct. 1660, 1667 (1983) (showing of future
injury required for standing); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727,734-35 (1972) (injury in fact to
party seeking review required as prerequisite for a "case" in federal court).
22. See, eg., Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 331-32 (1980) (individual alleged to have en-
gaged in tortious conduct, and not insurance company who would compensate the victim, is the
requisite defendant).
23. See Fiss, The Bureaucratization of the Judiciary, - YALE L.J. - (1983) (forthcoming)
(term "bureaucracy," in traditional sense, not fully applicable to federal courts); Wald, The Prob.
lem with the Courts: Black-Robed Bureaucracy or Collegiality Under Challenge?, 42 MD. L. REV.
766, 767 (1982) (vertical structure of federal judiciary "does not function in the hierarchical fash-
ion of a typical bureaucracy").
24. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818 (1975) (the right to proceed pro se). Cf.
McKaskle v. Wiggins, 104 S. Ct. 944, 950 (1984) (appointment and participation of standby coun-
sel did not violate the right to appearpro se, which "exists to affirm the dignity and autonomy of
the accused").
25. For some kinds of cases, litigants may be provided with attorneys paid by the state.
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340,344 (1963). Indigents represented by state-funded attor-
neys do not have much choice over which attorney represents them. Morris v. Slappy, 103 S. Ct.
1610, 1617 (1983). In other kinds of disputes, litigants must rely on their own resources. See, e.g.,
Lassiter v. North Carolina, 452 U.S. 18, 24-32 (1981) (no absolute right to free legal assistance
when state seeks to terminate parental rights).
26. Cf. Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. Rav. 394,424-31 (1982) (efforts to diminish
party control of the pretrial process underway in federal courts); Richey, A Modern Management
Technique for Trial Courts to Improve the Quality of Justice: Requiring Direct Testimony to Be
Submitted in Written Form Prior to Trial, 73 GEo. L.J. 73, 73-74 (trial judge requires submission
of written direct examination questions in advance of trial).
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waiver, that impose some constraints on litigants' choices,2 7 we have
generally remained loyal to litigants' autonomy.2"
Implicit in litigants' autonomy is concern about respect for indi-
vidual dignity. To enhance dignity, government should provide indi-
viduals with choices about protection and assertion of their rights. But
autonomy has purposes beyond valuing individuals. Since the individ-
ual is assumed to be the best able and the most appropriate voice of
self-interest, litigants' autonomy is often justified as leading to more
"accurate" or better outcomes.
Autonomy also provides a basis for legitimation of the coercive
power of the state. As discussed in detail below,2 9 litigants may not in
fact have much control in lawsuits. Litigants who lack ability, opportu-
nities, or resources are not, in any genuine sense, autonomous. The
rhetoric of autonomy, however, serves to support an assumption of vol-
untary participation and control by individual litigants and then of
consent to exercises of state power.30 Individuals who protest are often
told they are being unduly demanding: they have had their choices
and they "deserve" the results.
b. Litigants'persuasion opportunities: Connected with litigants'
autonomy is this second valued feature, which reflects a belief that dis-
pute resolution should occur only after the parties have had an oppor-
tunity to be heard by a third party (or parties) authorized by the state to
resolve the dispute. Over time, we have defined the "opportunity to be
heard"'" notion; frequently, it is viewed as embodying so-called
"rights" to present evidence and to cross-examine adverse parties.
32
Upon occasion, persuasion opportunities also include state funding of
attorneys for litigants engaged in specific kinds of disputes.33 Whatever
the constellation of associated rights, the basic premise of "an opportu-
nity to be heard" has become talismanic.
27. See, e.g., Brilmayer, State Forfeiture Rules and Federal Review of State Criminal Convic-
tions, 49 U. Cm. L. REv. 741, 759-60 (1982) (describing effect of waiver rules).
28. See Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1013 (1976) (death-sentenced litigant's decision to
decline review honored). Butsee Commonwealth v. McKenna, 476 Pa. 428, 439-40, 383 A.2d 174,
181 (1978) (validity of death penalty considered on appeal regardless of litigant's desires).
29. See infra notes 206-18 and accompanying text.
30. See M. EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC FUNCTIONS OF POLITICS 12 (1972) (discussing sym-
bolic value of political institutions in democracies).
31. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970) (quoting Grannis v. Oredean, 234 U.S. 385,
394 (1914)).
32. Id at 260.
33. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340 (1963).
19841
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Litigants' persuasion opportunities express many values. First,
persuasion opportunities provide an information basis for case disposi-
tion. If one assumes the possibility of "correctness," of results that ac-
curately reflect fact and law, then the information obtained through
persuasion enhances decisionmakers' abilities to base their conclusions
on the "true" facts, to apply the law "correctly," and to provide the
"right" remedy. However, given the problematic task of reconstructing
past events, the indeterminacy of social rules, and the lack of social
consensus on appropriate outcomes, sanctions, or rewards, it is difficult
for many, myself included, to embrace such a theory of "correct"
decisions.
But one need not believe in determinate correctness to have a the-
ory of error. That is, the coin-flipping judge was deemed "wrong" not
because the outcome was incorrect but because the process was wrong.
Further, had the judge, after solemn deliberation, sentenced the misde-
meanant to forty years instead of twenty days, I could comfortably call
the decision "wrong" or "inaccurate"-without any conviction that I
could claim that twenty days would have been "correct." Thus, short
of a belief in correctness, persuasion opportunities are still desirable if
decisionmakers use the information provided to affect decisions and if,
as a result, the decisions are "better"-that is, more rational, less arbi-
trary, and closer to social norms.
Litigants' persuasion opportunities are a valued feature not only
because of their relationship to outcome production, but also because
they express values about the relationship between individuals and
government. Like autonomy, persuasion opportunities reflect concern
about individual dignity; persuasion opportunities are occasions for in-
dividuals to participate in decisions that affect their lives.34 Like auton-
omy, persuasion opportunities are linked to political theories-to a
contractual basis of the polity and its dependence upon consent,35 to a
view that dialogue is an appropriate predicate for decisions and a pre-
requisite for compulsion.
36
Persuasion opportunities also serve a symbolic legitimating func-
34. See Michelman, supra note 1, at 1172, 1174 (discussing "participation values"); Tyler,
The Role of Injustice in Defendants' Evaluations of Their Courtroom Experience, 18 L. & Soc'Y
REv. 51, 71 (1984) (major determinant of satisfaction with legal authorities was "perceived
fairness").
35. See M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 104-33 (1982) (discussion of
various theories of social contract).
36. B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 374-78 (1980); Fiss, The Supreme
Court, 1978 Term--Foreward" The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 13-14 (1979).
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tion. The ritual surrounding the instruments of persuasion (whether
written brief or oral argument, both of which are shrouded in conven-
tion) assuages anxiety about the decisions made.37 Some comfort is
provided as we are led to believe in a participatory decisionmaking
process.
Despite the many similarities in the ways they function, litigants'
persuasion opportunities are distinct from litigants' autonomy. While
the two features are linked in contemporary litigation schemes, they
need not be. That is, we could deprive litigants of their autonomy, of
their control over procedural choices from initiation through appeal,
and yet we could still provide and insist upon litigants' persuasion
opportunities.
2. For Decisionmakers
a. Concentration ofpower: The state vests judges and jurors with
the power to act, and their acts have potent effects. Juries generally
have final authority over most factual findings, and jury nullification
stands as a possible check on government officials. Trial judges are
also equipped with substantial powers: to make some types of deci-
sions free from appellate review; to implement (absent a stay) even
those decisions that are appealed; to find disobedient parties in con-
tempt; to run courtrooms with little supervision; and in the federal sys-
tem to enjoy life tenure.
Judicial decisionmakers---either individually or in very small
groups-have power, and we value their possession of power. Power
gives decisionmakers the ability to produce outcomes. Power may also
make these outcomes "better," in the sense that power may insulate
decisionmakers from undue influence.
Particular power allocations are reflective of political theories.
Giving power to jurors is a decision to democratize the decisionmaking
process, to provide an alternative to the perceived autocracy of judges.
Giving power to single judges is a bow to individualism; one person
can have great force in the society. The power given by life tenure for
37. For discussion of the role of ritual in interpersonal relationships, see E. GOFFMAN, IN-
TERACTION RrruAL (1967). See also Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal
Process, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1329, 1391 (1971) ("[Mluch of what goes on in the trial. . . is partly
ceremonial or ritualistic .. "); Tyler, Rasinski & Spodick, The Influence of Voice upon Satisfac-
tion with Leaders. Exploring the Meaning of Process Control, paper delivered at the Midwestern
Political Science Ass'n, April 1983 (on file at the Southern California Law Review).
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federal judges reflects concern about the ability of Congress and the
executive branch to undermine or to control the judiciary.
Power serves symbolic legitimacy purposes as well. Vesting power
and authority in identifiable decisionmakers enables the state to per-
sonify its authority, thus making the state more readily understood, ac-
cepted, and obeyed. The grant of power to the jury gives meaning to a
promise of democracy: the people are the state. Despite criticism that
the jury is inefficient and life tenure for judges undesirable,38 we re-
main committed to employing lay decisionmakers and to insulating
federal judges.
b. Diffusion and reallocation ofpower: Concentration of author-
ity is both linked to and in tension with a fourth valued feature, the
diffusion and reallocation of authority. The very existence of the jury
system is an example of the perceived desirability of circumscribing the
power of the judiciary. A second example is the appellate system, the
imposition of a second layer of judges empowered to review and to
revise the lower tier's work. Yet another familiar illustration is the
supremacy clause of the Constitution, limiting the authority of state
judges by imposing federal law upon them.
In individual cases, we limit the authority of judges by restricting
the permissible bases of their decisions. Although juries are free to
render decisions without explanation and can be overridden only on
very narrow grounds, judges are limited by the record (as the only
source of decision), by the obligation on some occasions to provide rea-
sons, and by the requirement that they act within public view. Thus,
while we value giving decisionmakers the power to decide disputes, we
also value controlling, limiting, and diffusing that power. We have
constructed hierarchical and vertical dispute resolution systems, and
have distributed authority for decisionmaking to a variety of different
actors, including agency adjudicators, jurors, and many tiers of state
and federal judges.
Not only do we diffuse power, in some instances we reallocate it.
For example, when a second set of decisionmakers has the authority to
make decisions afresh, or "de novo," power is reallocated from the first
decisionmakers to the second, who may even be kept ignorant of the
38. See H. CHAsE, FEDERAL JUDGES: THE APPOINTING PROCESS 194 (1972) (proposing
compulsory retirement for all federal judges); H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 4
n.2 (1966) (a sampling of praise and criticism of the jury system).
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first decisions. Power is also diffused because, generally, de novo con-
sideration occurs only at the behest of a litigant.
Diffusion and reallocation have outcome-related functions. The
division of power is aimed at the production of acceptable or "correct"
results. The limitation on individuals' power, the shifting of that power
to others, and the involvement of multiple decisionmakers are all
linked to a belief that the involvement of more people will yield better
results.
Diffusion and reallocation also serve to express political morality.
Decentralized decisionmaking limits the amount of power vested in a
single individual. State decisionmaking remains personified; identifi-
able individuals hold power but sometimes yield to politically superior
judges, or in the case of juries, judges must yield to the voice of the
"people." Once again, the coercion of the state is legitimated by the
limitations on concentrations of power.
c. Impartiality and visibility: This feature also serves to constrain
decisionmakers' power. Decisionmakers are obliged to reach conclu-
sions impartially, free from bias against the parties and without pre-
judgment of the issues, and to make their decisions public.
While impartiality has long been valued as the sine qua non of
judicial decisionmaking, methods of ensuring impartiality have varied
considerably. At some points in our history, the same judges were per-
mitted to preside both at trial and on appeal.39 Yet, at other times, be-
39. In its infancy, the federal system provided no review at all for some kinds of cases.
When review was authorized, the very judge who issued the challenged decision could conduct the
review. This self-review occurred when the district judge sat as a circuit judge in circuit court and
the Supreme Court justice assigned to that court failed to attend the session. F. FRANKFURTER &
J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT. A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM
87 (1927). But see Moran v. Dillingham, 174 U.S. 153, 158 (1899) (vacating Circuit Court of
Appeals decision on grounds that same judge sat at both appellate and trial levels); The Judiciary
Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 4, 1 Stat. 73, 75 (stating "[t]hat no district judge shall give a vote in any case
of appeal or error from his own decision; but may assign the reasons of such decision"); P. BATOR,
P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURT AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1 (2d ed. Supp. 1981) [hereinafter cited as HART & WECHSLER] (stating
that the comment, in the Second Edition, that judges reviewed their own decisions was erroneous).
While the commentators disagree about whether district judges in fact reviewed their own
decisions, it is not disputed that, when a Supreme Court justice participated in a circuit decision,
the justice thereafter could and did sit on the case if it went to the Supreme Court. F. FRANK-
FURTER & J. LANDIS, supra, at 19. Unlike section 4 of the Judiciary Act, which prohibited district
judges from voting in cases they had decided, no similar statutory bar precluded Supreme Court
justices from sitting on the appeal of a prior, circuit court decision. In 1891, however, when the
Evarts Act was passed, the prohibition from sitting on the appeal of one's own decision was ex-
tended to embrace all federal judges andjustices. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 517, § 3, 26 Stat. 826.
19841
HeinOnline -- 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. 851 1983-1984
SOUTHERN CALIFORAT.IA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:837
cause of the fear of prejudgment flowing from prior exposure to the
same disputes, judges have been barred from that practice.40 Similarly,
in different eras, we have both condoned and condemned jurors' extra-
judicial knowledge of disputes. 41 Finally, while we have condemned
"star chamber proceedings," we are still struggling to define which ju-
dicial procedures must be open to the public and why.42 But, regard-
less of the technique for expression, we remain committed to
impartiality and visibility as essential to the judicial system.
Our insistence upon impartiality and visibility is linked to several
themes described earlier. We assume that bias disables judges and ju-
rors from attending to the information litigants present; bias interferes
with the issuance of "correct," acceptable, or just results. Openness, of
the process and of the decision, serves to check bias and to limit the
opportunities for corruption. 3 Impartiality and visibility help both to
produce outcomes and to legitimate those outcomes.
Legitimation comes not only from beliefs that the outcomes
achieved by impartial decisionmakers, functioning in view of the pub-
lic, are better, but also from beliefs that impartiality and visibility make
the process better. Only impartial decisionmakers can value individu-
als' claims and dignify them. Only if the process is public can we affirm
decisionmakers' obligations to the participants and to the society.
d. Rationality and norm enforcement: Decisionmakers are also
constrained by this fifth valued feature. As the example of the coin-
flipping judge illustrates, we insist upon deliberate, rational dispute
resolution.
40. See Ratner, Disqualification of Judgesfor Prior JudicialActions, 3 How. L.J. 228, 229-38
(1957) (some state statutes provide that ajudge's participation in one stage of a case precludes that
judge, if reversed on appeal, from making additional decisions in the same case).
41. Kershon, Vicinage, 30 OKLA. L. REv. 1, 139-42 (1977).
42. The Supreme Court has not yet held that all court proceedings must be open, but the
language mandating open criminal proceedings appears to embrace civil cases as well. See Rich-
mond Newspaper, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575-81 (1980) (discussing public's right of access
to court proceedings). See also Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 104 S. Ct. 819, 823, 824
(1984) (voir dire in criminal trial must be open unless "closure is essential to preserve higher values
and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest"); In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petro-
leum Products Antitrust Litigation, 101 F.R.D. 34 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (balancing public access to
civil pretrial materials against interests of confidentiality).
43. In Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 104 S. Ct. 819, 823 (1984) (emphasis in origi-
nal), the Supreme Court explained: "The value of openness lies in the fact that people not actu-
ally attending trials can have confidence that standards of fairness are being observed; the sure
knowledge that anyone is free to attend gives assurance that established procedures are being
followed and that deviations will become known."
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Our insistence upon rationality comes in part from concern about
outcomes. We believe that the dispute resolution system should an-
nounce, enforce, and appropriately apply substantive norms. Individu-
als who obey the rules set forth by legislatures and courts are supposed
to be rewarded, the disobedient sanctioned, and those considering devi-
ance deterred. Courts are supposed to voice public values and to im-
plement them in individual cases. The articulation and enforcement
process is keyed to a rational system, making decisions self-consciously
and in accordance with identified rules, principles, and politics. 44 Even
without a belief that we can achieve "correctness," we still insist upon
rationality.
Of course, the assumptions of rationality and of norm enforcement
serve to legitimate courts' decisions. Courts' lawmaking powers are
both constrained and masked as judges describe themselves as imple-
menting normative decisions made by others, such as legislators and
the founding fathers. Rationality also functions to underscore individ-
ual dignity. The objection to the coin-flipping judge was based both on
the evident arbitrariness of his decisionmaking process and on his ir-
reverent attitude towards the question of another person's incarcera-
tion. We value the judgment process itself.
e. Ritual and formality: This feature, like the preceding three,
serves to constrain decisionmakers. This feature is also both a descrip-
tive and a normative element of decisionmaking. To some extent, pro-
cedure is ritual-albeit of varying degrees of formality.
Rituals pervade the adjudicatory process. The participants are
given special ("plaintiff," "defendant," "movant," "judge"), sometimes
honorific ("your honor," "learned counsel," "my worthy opponent")
titles. Decisionmakers often wear odd dress and sit on elevated plat-
forms (the bench) or in segregated areas of courtrooms (the jury box).
Commencements and conclusions of written and oral exchanges are de-
lineated-from "greetings" and case captions to "respectfully submit-
ted" or "it is so ordered,"-from "oyez, oyez" to the "court is now
adjourned." In a country which has a decidedly casual style, and one
in which political leaders often appear deliberately "folksy," the court
system retains an austere, ceremonial pose. Although the veneer of rit-
ual and formality thins in noisy, dirty criminal and family courts and
thickens in the ornate halls of many appellate tribunals, the circus-like
44. See generally Fiss, supra note 36, at 12-17.
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atmosphere of the former is deplored,45 while the quiet solemnity of the
latter is celebrated.
Ritual and formality serve multiple ends. To the extent ritual and
formality dictate undertaking a certain, careful process in every case,
better outcomes may result. Ritual and formality also give decision-
making an appearance of "correctness," and thus legitimate the deci-
sions rendered. Further, ritual dignifies those who undertake it.16 The
state confirms individuals' worth by employing its ritual in response to
claims of wrongdoing; the moments of hearing and deciding are solem-
nized. In addition, ritual links past and future. For example, as we
open court with words used decades ago, we associate ourselves with
those who have said and those who will say the same words. In this
way, ritual unites us with others who share the same ritual. When rit-
ual is highly formalized, it serves to constrain individuals' power and,
in some sense, to diffuse that power to the many persons who have
created, observed, and enforced the ritual.
Although we are ambivalent about the degree of formality that
legal ritual should entail, and too much pomp produces protest,47 we
do preserve some ritual, formality, and structure to remind ourselves of
the import of the decisions made.
3. For Decisionmaking
a. Finality: The tension between concentration and diffusion of
authority is mirrored in the tension between finality and revisionism.
Finality is a normative conclusion that complements authority. We
hold dear the notion that our dispute resolution system can, without
undue delay, issue a decision that will close debate. Finality is an ex-
pression of a desire to limit the time between the eruption of a dispute,
45. See, e.g., Margolick, In Search of Efficient Justice: Reforming the Criminal Court, N.Y.
Times, July 2, 1983, at Al, col. I (surveying suggestions for court reform); Shipp, The Failure of
Criminal Court: 8 CrucialAreas, N.Y. Times, June 30, 1983, at AI, col. 3 (discussing backlogs and
congestion in New York City criminal courts); Turnstile Justice/The Breakdown of Criminal Court,
N.Y. Times, June 28, 1983, at B2, col. 1 (describing a typical work day for judges, prosecutors,
and defense attorneys); The Criminal Court: A System in Collapse, N.Y. Times, June 26, 1983, at
Al, col. 1 (describing a typical day in court); cf. Feron, In an Upstate City Court, a Feeling of
Quiet, Efficient Justice, N.Y. Times, July 2, 1983, at B4, col. 1 (contrasting Saratoga Springs, New
York, criminal courts that "work").
46. See generally M. EDELMAN, supra note 30, at 1-21 (role of ritual and symbolism in polit-
ical life); B. MYERHOFF, NUMBER OUR DAYS 21 (1978) (role of religious ritual in daily life).
47. See, eg., INFORMAL JUSTICE, supra note 19, at 8 (some evidence that people seek formal
exercises of authority rather than informality); Ferguson, To Robe or Not to Robe?-A Judicial
Dilemma, 39 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y 166, 170-71 (1956) (discussing controversy over whether
state judges should wear robes).
HeinOnline -- 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. 854 1983-1984
its resolution, and the implementation of a solution. Practically, both
the system and the litigants must be able to turn attention and energies
elsewhere. Psychologically, there is a need for repose. Politically, there
is a belief that state intervention in individuals' lives should generally
come to an end. Further, there is a view that fluidity, flexibility, and
open-endedness work injustice, lead to instability, and undermine the
rule of law. Like the other features described, finality is linked both to
outcome and non-outcome related purposes. Finality is the means of
achieving an end, and the fact of ending is viewed as good not only for
its ability to produce an outcome, but also because ends are desirable in
themselves.
b. Revisionism: The importance placed on the ability to revise
decisions comes from several sources: the hopes of correcting error; of
altering outcomes based upon changed circumstances; of imbuing some
decisions with more meaning by having them made repeatedly and
sometimes by prestigious actors; of giving individuals a sense of having
been fully and fairly heard. Thus, revisionism is related to outcome
production but also serves other functions.
The perception that humans are fallible suggests that decisions
rendered by the first person to rule on a dispute may be in error. The
hope is that later, the same person or another person with a different
vantage point, may be able to find and rectify errors.48 Thus, under
certain circumstances, finality bows to error correction.
Error correction is one reason for revisionism, but a problematic
one. Given contemporary sensibilities about the indeterminate nature
of law and fact, there may be little basis upon which to believe in
"truth" and to assume a second decisionmaker "correct" and a first
erroneous. We do, however, have a series of justifications for prefer-
ring second decisionmakers' views over those of the initial judge. First,
the second individual, or group of individuals, may in fact possess or
may be believed to possess special expertise, experience, wisdom, or
clairvoyance that entitles their views to greater weight. Federal appel-
late judges, for example, obtain their presumed "correctness" from the
48. See Wald, supra note 23, at 771 (D.C. Circuit reverses district court about 18% of the
time: "We see just enough cases where a mistake has been made at the trial court level, and a
genuine injustice done, to reject any proposals to limit or forfeit any part of our appellate jurisdic-
tion."). See also Roper & Melone, Does Procedural Due Process Make a Difference4 65 JUDICA-
TURE 136, 141 (1981) (of 1159 federal cases studied, in which all had been remanded after an
appeal, 51.1% resulted in different decisions in a second proceeding; arguing from this data that
"mistakes" uncovered by the appellate process result in more "correct" outcomes).
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solicitude with which they are chosen, the tradition of quality associ-
ated with their work, and their practiced judgment in specialized areas
of law, gained by virtue of their limited jurisdiction.49 Appellate judges
also lay claim to correctness through their numbers. The second judg-
ment rendered by most appellate benches is a product of at least two
views, that of the judge below and of the court above. Typically, the
second judgment is a collective one, in which at least two appellate
judges join. The intuition is that two thinkers are less likely to render
poor decisions than is one.
Another reason for preferring a second decision to a first comes
from the passage of time. In the interim between the first and second
decision, the decisionmaker may, sua sponte, gain new insight. Alter-
natively, during the intervening period, the parties may produce more
facts or the legislature or other courts more law that will lead to a "bet-
ter" disposition.
A third possibility is that the decision to revise may be the product
of a different process than that which produced the first; the new proce-
dure may serve to legitimate the result. A second procedure could be
more elaborate than the first; an informal evidentiary hearing may be
replaced by a courtroom trial, or a litigant may gain the assistance of
an attorney rather than making a pro se presentation. With additional
process, the outcome may be better.50
Correction of error is not the only explanation for revisionism.
Another rationale is change. Legal decisions are made under dynamic
circumstances; both the legal norms and factual premises may shift, be
enlarged, or be reappraised over time. A first decision may have been
correct when rendered but may subsequently need to be revised.
Yet another rationale is political. In a hierarchical system, some
decisionmakers are preferred to others. Finality sometimes yields to
revisionism simply because we prefer decisions authored by revising
judges over those issued by a first judge, and the revising judge gets his
or her authority by outranking others. Further, as noted above, revi-
sionism is a mechanism by which to diffuse power; by giving one or
49. See Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal Court Jurlsdiction, 83
YALE L.J. 498 (1974) (discussion of federal judges' expertise).
50. Another rationale for assuming that a revised decision is "correct" or better is finality
itself. We are eager to perceive the system's final pronouncement as the "correct" one because we
want to believe that our dispute resolution system "works," and that outcomes are related to facts
and law. As Justice Jackson explained, "We [the Justices] are not final because we are infallible,
but we are infallible only because we are final." Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jack-
son, J., concurring).
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several individuals the power to overturn decisions of others, we dimin-
ish the authority of any single individual.
Revisionism also serves a psychological need not to "lock the door
and throw away the key." The rhetoric of cultural values, political
campaigns, and the "land of opportunity" seeps into the courts via pro-
cedures that give chances for change and offer individuals hopes for a
better future.
Finally, revisionism permits individuals to compel several govern-
ment officials to consider allegations of other decisionmakers' mistakes
or misdeeds. Revisionism thus is an expression of the state's taking an
individual seriously, of valuing the claimed denial of rights, and of un-
derscoring an individual's worth. In this way, revisionism is a measure
of the society's resources--of its ability to fund the many state officials
who spend time on individuals' problems.
c. Economy: A tenth procedural feature, in tension with revi-
sionism and in tandem with finality, is that the system produce results
with the least expenditure of dollars, energy, and time possible. Econ-
omy is that part of efficiency that relates to resource conservation and
to the view that a functional system must produce results speedily and
with minimal cost. Economy is used here in the narrow sense of low
direct costs. At times, when courts appear either overused or under-
productive, the concern for economy, often discussed as "administra-
tion of justice," is heightened.51 In such times, efforts are made to deter
litigation or to divert litigants to places other than courts. Court struc-
ture and case processing receive renewed attention-all in the hope of
finding shortcuts, reducing caseloads, and rationalizing the system.
Economy, like all these valued features, is related to outcomes and
serves other functions as well. Economy legitimates outcomes on the
ground that the decisions are produced with both the individual's and
society's needs in mind. Decisions about whether and how to econo-
mize often occur at points of tension between individuals' and the pub-
lic's needs. For example, to reduce costs may mean sacrificing other
valued features-such as eliminating jury trials and thereby concen-
trating power in professional decisionmakers, or dispensing with writ-
ten appellate opinions and thereby reducing visibility of decisions and
ofjudges. Symbolic valuing of the individual may be diminished in the
name of economy. Of course, cost-control actions could be justified as
51. See, e.g., Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with theAdministration of Justice,
29 A.B.A. REP. 395 (1906); Resnik, supra note 26, at 395-99.
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necessary to preserve the court system. When procedures are extrava-
gant, no individuals will be valued because no one will be able to be
heard.
d. Consistency: Procedural systems are supposed to treat like
cases alike; consistency is the systematic analogue to the impartiality
feature demanded of individual decisionmakers. The many sovereign-
ties and the geographic expanse of the United States make consistency
particularly problematic. Although the Supreme Court is envisioned as
the unifying force, the Court reviews such a small fraction of the cases
decided that the Court cannot impose uniformity. Moreover, doctrines
such as the "independent and adequate state ground rule"52 presuppose
enclaves of state law, insulated from higher authority. But even within
the federal system, the obligation of consistent treatment has never re-
sulted in circuit judges giving precedential weight to decisions rendered
in other circuits. Consistency has never been so persuasive as to com-
pel either the abolition of state sovereignties or the many federal appel-
late courts. Rather, we tolerate an impressive quantity of frank legal
discord.
Despite its empirical absence, consistency remains a valued fea-
ture. It is deemed essential to planning and to assisting individuals and
groups in conforming their behavior to legal norms. Consistency is
also viewed as justifying and legitimating decisions. Uniform applica-
tion of legal rules may prove their "correctness"; if the same result al-
ways appears, it may after all be "right." For the skeptics, consistency
assuages anxiety about arbitrariness. Even if the result is not correct, at
least everyone is treated the "same." Consistency promotes equal treat-
ment of individuals, thereby expressing the rhetoric of democracy, of
"equality before the law."
e. Dffierentiation As alluded to in the discussion of consistency,
we do not treat all disputes alike. Even though we espouse the notion
that all litigants deserve equal access to the courts, we have long toler-
ated restricted access and different treatment for different kinds of dis-
putes. Some cases are sent to administrative agencies, others to state or
federal courts. Some disputes receive expedited review by the United
States Supreme Court; others have little chance of ever being decided
by any federal judge. Disputes are distinguished in terms of dollar
value, legal claim, and possible remedy or sanction; criminal defend-
ants have some rights that civil defendants do not. The enormous vari-
52. E.g., Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983).
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ation in decisionmaking procedures gives expression to a belief that not
all disputes are of equal concern, not all decisions are of equal weight,
not all norms are of equal importance, and not all decisionmakers are
of equal competence. In effect, these different procedures reflect the
varying degrees of seriousness that we accord the rights at stake.
Differentiation enables us to express how much we care about cat-
egories of disputes. Legitimacy is derived from conferring decision-
making authority over certain issues to special subsets of
decisionmakers. Differentiation helps both to identify important
claims and to sanction the outcomes as either "correct" or better.
These twelve valued features of procedural systems in the United
States-litigants' autonomy, litigants' persuasion opportunities, deci-
sionmakers' power, the diffusion and reallocation of that power, deci-
sionmakers' impartiality and visibility, rationality and norm
enforcement, ritual and formality, finality, revisionism, economy, con-
sistency, and differentiation-are not, indeed could not be, always
viewed as equally important. There are tensions among features; giv-
ing expression to one often limits another. At times, some features are
in ascendancy, and others in eclipse. Moreover, to say that the proce-
dural system has these features and that the features are valued is not
to claim that when fashioning procedural systems and rules, legislators
and judges always refer specifically to these features and to the under-
lying norms.
Decisions about procedure are bound up with decisions about the
particular individuals or disputes affected. For example, procedures
for habeas corpus express views about what procedural features are im-
portant and also about the moral worthiness of prisoners; procedures
for civil rights litigation embody value choices about the substantive
outcomes as well as the structure for achieving those outcomes. Exam-
ining which features of process are employed and which are neglected
illuminates the underlying political and social judgments.
B. MODELING PROCEDURES TO EXPRESS VALUES
A dispute, disputants, and a state-empowered decisionmaker are
the necessary elements of a government-authorized dispute resolution
system. Acceptable methods for resolving disputes depend upon which
of the basic features predominate and how tensions among the features
are resolved. Below, I describe six procedural models (all of which did
or do exist somewhere in the United States) to illustrate how the selec-
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tion of a procedural model is a choice among valued features and in
turn among competing political and moral claims.
1. The Single Judge/Finality Model
This first, simple model provides disputants a single opportunity to
present their claims before an individual who renders a final decision.
I refer to this model as the Single Judge/Finality Model and to the first
decisionmaker, whether trial judge, administrative law judge, magis-
trate, arbitrator, juror, or whomever, as the "first tier."
This model's most salient features are concentration of power, fi-
nality, and economy. The model centralizes power in its only tier of
decisionmakers and implements their power by making their decisions
final. The Single Judge/Finality Model is sleek; it conserves its re-
sources by limiting the number of decisionmakers available to hear liti-
gants. While persuasion opportunities prior to the entry of a decision
may be minimal or generous, the issuance of a decision concludes the
process; it is a "one shot" deal.
The Single Judge/Finality Model thus has limited techniques by
which to differentiate among categories of cases. All the model can do
is vary ritual and formality or the quantum of predecision persuasion
opportunities. In this model, ensuring consistency, rational norm en-
forcement, and impartiality is difficult. The only mechanisms available
are training of first tier members and obliging them to make public
their process and decisions. The legitimacy of decisions produced by
the Single Judge/Finality Model must rest upon one of five assump-
tions: that the first tier generally renders "correct" or acceptable deci-
sions and therefore that additional decisionmaking is unnecessary; that
additional decisionmaking would not significantly improve the quality
of the first decisions and therefore that the costs of increasing the
number of decisionmakers outweigh the benefits; that the procedures in
the Single Judge/Finality Model are sufficient to express society's con-
cern about the individuals and the disputes; that more decisionmakers
do not provide a better process by which to value individuals; or that
individuals and their disputes are not worth valuing more.
The federal judiciary used to have several examples of the Single
Judge/Finality Model. The Judiciary Act of 1789 permitted review
in civil cases only where the amount in controversy exceeded a specific
sum,53 and the Act made no provision for appeals in criminal cases.54
53. The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 21-22, 1 Stat. 73, 83-84. To obtain review in the
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Federal appellate courts, as we know them today, did not come into
existence until 189 15 and retained most of their original jurisdiction
until 1911.56 Some states still do not provide for appeals in every
case." As late as 1956, the Supreme Court declined to hold that the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment required appeals to be
available in all cases.58 Even in cases where appeal is available, many
of the decisions of the first tier are given great deference. 9
Despite the absence of a stated "right to appeal," many of the pro-
cedural innovations of the last two hundred years in the United States
have gradually moved the system away from the Single Judge/Finality
Model to a form that includes a second tier that reviews, and thereby
undermines the finality of, the first tier's decision. While not formally
included in the Supreme Court's articulation of due process, appeal as
of right has been a fixed feature of the federal system for almost one
circuit courts in an admiralty action, the matter in controversy had to exceed $300. In most other
cases, the amount in controversy had to exceed $50.
The linking of the value of a case to the right to receive appellate court review was, in part, a
response to the "excessive expense of appeals from colonial courts to the Privy Council" in Eng-
land. Apparently, the transaction costs were thought in some cases to outweigh the worth of
obtaining a second decision. R. POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES 146-47 (1941).
For later justifications of a jurisdictional amount on appeal, see Spear, The Court ofAppeals Bill,
27 ALB. L. REV. 46, 48-49 (1882).
54. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 39, at 1265; F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note
39, at 109.
55. SeeThe Judiciary Act of 1891 (Evarts Act), ch. 517, § 2, 26 Stat. 826, discussed in Budd,
The United States Circuit Courts of.4ppeal, 9 LAW Q. REv. 51, 56-59 (1893).
56. The Judiciary Act of 1911, ch. 231, 36 Stat. 1087, 1131. Federal appellate courts still have
original jurisdiction for some kinds of actions. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (1982) (any judge or
justice may issue writ of habeas corpus).
57. See, e.g., W. VA. CONST. art. 8, § 3 (Supreme Court of Appeals; Jurisdiction and Powers)
("The court shall have appellate jurisdiction in civil cases at law where the matter in controversy
... is of greater value or amount than three hundred dollars .. "). See also ASS'N OF MtN.
COURT CLERKS OF CAL., SMALL CLAIMS MANUAL COMMITTEE, MANUAL OF PROCEDURES IN
SMALL CLAIMS CASES 12-13 (1978) (judgment in small claims court is conclusive upon the
plaintiff).
58. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19-20 (1956) (holding that once states make appeals avail-
able, states must provide poor litigants with access to appeals).
59. See infra notes 719-67 and accompanying text. Appellate courts generally draw a dis-
tinction between "fact" and "law" and trial courts' factual findings are given greater deference.
See FED. R. Ciw. P. 52(a), construed in Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287 (1982) (find-
ings of fact cannot be set aside unless clearly erroneous). Further, some decisions are within trial
judges' discretion and can be overturned only if an abuse of discretion is shown. See, e.g., Na-
tional Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976) (per curiam) (hold-
ing no abuse of discretion by a trial judge who dismissed an action, because he found bad faith on
plaintiffs' part for failure to comply with discovery requests). See generall, Rosenberg, Judicial
Discretion of the Trial Court, ViewedFrom Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. Rnv. 635, 636 (1971) (discuss-
ing numerous aspects of judicial discretion).
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hundred years60 and was written into some state constitutions drafted
in the mid-nineteenth century. 6t The fear of "judicial despotism"' 62 has
resulted in the provision of review.
One variant of the Single Judge/Finality Model is the Several
Judge/Finality Model, in which a group of judges, rather than a single
individual, renders a final decision. This group model diffuses and lim-
its the power of a single individual. Individual biases may also be miti-
gated, and a greater degree of impartiality thus ensured.6 3 Although
this model is more expensive than the Single Judge/Finality Model, the
Several Judge/Finality Model is sometimes used to underscore the im-
portance of state intervention in individuals' lives. Further, if the sev-
eral judges are lay, rather than professional, their employment may
also represent a democratization of the judgment process. The obvious
example of the Several Judge/Finality Model is the jury trial.' While
not every jury decision is final, some, such as acquittals in criminal
cases, are.
60. See The Judiciary Act of 1891 (Evarts Act), ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826. For explanations of the
need for an appellate court, see 13 CONG. REc. 3463, 3464-3466 (1882) (statement of Sen. Davis).
61. See, eg., ARK. CONST. art. 7, § 4 (1874); CAL. CONsT. art. 6, § 4 (1849).
62. Mr. Culberson, of Texas, 21 CONG. Rac. 3404 (1890). Although a burdensome Supreme
Court caseload was a major impetus to reform, the desire to diffuse power was also a factor. See
Hill & Dent, Report of Committee on Judicial.4dministration and Remedial Procedure, 17 REP.
A.B.A. 336, 339 (1894) ("Under the [pre-1891] system, the District Judge or Circuit Judge ... was
the anachronism of the century.... He was the depository of more arbitrary one-man power
than any other official known to American public life."). See also REORGANIZATION OF THE JUDI-
CIARY OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. REP. No. 45, 44th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1876) (describing "a
policy concerning the right of appeal which has been long established, and which is justly re-
garded by the people as securing to them an important and valuable right").
63. The rationale for having a number of jurors and requiring them to be drawn from a
"cross section" of the community is to mitigate against individual biases. See Ballew v. Georgia,
435 U.S. 223 (1978) (five-person jury unconstitutional); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975)
(fair cross section of community required and systematic exclusion of women unconstitutional).
Seegenerally H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 38 (study on decisionmaking practices ofjudges
and juries); Lempert, Jury Size and the Preemptory Challenge, 22 LAW QUADRANGLE NOTES (U.
Mich.) 8 (1978), reprinted in R. COVER & 0. Fiss, supra note 1, at 351 (group decisionmaking
ameliorates bias "as individuals with conflicting points of view call each other to account").
64. The three judge court system, created in the early part of this century and largely aban-
doned in 1976, is another example of the Several Judge/Finality Model, albeit with the possibility
of appellate review by the United States Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2282, repealed by
Act of Aug. 12, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-381, §§ 1, 2, 90 Stat. 1119; 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1982) (three
judge court). The deployment of several judges was used to underscore the import of the deci-
sions. Three judge federal courts were mandatory when litigants claimed state statutes were un-
constitutional. See generally Currie, The Three-Judge District Court in ConstitutionalLitigation, 32
U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 2 (1964) (discussing when three judge courts had to be convened).
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2. The Single Judge Plus Same Judge Model
Before turning to consideration of two-tier models of procedure, it
is worth exploring a simple variant of the Single Judge/Finality Model.
This variant gives the single judge one or several opportunities to re-
vise, alter, or abide by the first decision issued. Examples occur in the
Federal Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure. 65 Both sets of rules
authorize litigants to ask the judge who first issued the decision for
reconsideration. In my lexicon, this model is the Single Judge plus
Same Judge Model, which exists mostly in the context of other, more
elaborate models, but may occur as a self-contained system.
In the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, for example, the sin-
gle judge's authority to reduce or modify a sentence generally extin-
guishes after 120 days.6 At that point, the sentencing decision is
"final."' 67 Since appellate review of sentencing is very limited;68 for all
practical purposes, within a short time a single judge has made a con-
clusive decision. In contrast, federal habeas corpus statutes currently
permit federal prisoners to return to the same judge, on select grounds,
without regard to any time limit.69 In those cases, reconsideration and
modification of the underlying judgment are always available, at least
in theory.
The Single Judge plus Same Judge Model raises the question of
when finality attaches.7" Given the availability of this reconsideration,
we could describe the first decisions as nonfinal and view the litigation
as ongoing. Sometimes we expressly characterize decisions as nonfinal;
65. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 59, 60 (new trials may be granted); FED. R. CRAM. P. 35 (courts
may correct illegal or illegally imposed sentences). See generall, Moore & Rogers, Federal Relief
from Civil Judgments, 55 YALE L.J. 623, 627-53 (1946) (discussing application of FED. R. Civ. P.
60).
66. Rule 35 does, however, permit a court to modify an illegal sentence "at any time." FED.
R. CRIM. P. 35(a).
67. The decision is final insofar as the judge is concerned. Members of the executive branch
do, however, have opportunities to alter the decision. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 4206 (1982) (Parole
Commission may release prisoners before sentences expire); id § 3570 (presidential remission of
sentences).
68. See Solem v. Helm, 103 S. CL 3001, 3009-10 (1983) (appellate review of sentencing for
proportionality may occur, but as a narrow exception to the general nonreviewability of sentenc-
ing decisions).
69. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1982), discussed infra notes 296-324 and accompanying text.
70. In other eras, finality was tied to the conclusion of a court's term. R. MILLAR, CIVIL
PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HIsTORIcAL PERSPECTIVE 385 (1952). For recent Supreme
Court discussion of the question of when finality attaches, see Justices of Boston Mun. Court v.
Lydon, 104 S. Ct. 1805 (1984) (to decide whether a defendant was twice in jeopardy, the Court
had to determine when, in a de novo trial system, finality attached).
1984]
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for example, in so-called "public law" cases,"' involving school deseg-
regation or prison reform, entry of final judgment may be called "con-
ditional" or the court's jurisdiction described as "retained." The
terminology takes account of the possibility of change, in either the
factual circumstances or the law, and of the desirability of revision by
the same judge who issued the initial ruling.
In contrast, our terminology describes the criminal process as for-
mally concluding with the conviction and sentence (and appeal, if any).
Prisoners who seek to renew litigation are "collaterally" attacking their
convictions rather than "resuming" litigation. Use of the word "collat-
eral" arises in part from the fact that some attacks on conviction occur
in a different court than that which issued the first decree.72 In this
respect, "collateral" indicates that the second proceeding may be in-
dependent of the first. But the term is also applied when federal pris-
oners return to the same court, indeed to the very same judge, who
presided at the trial or guilty plea, to request either reconsideration of
earlier decisions or to raise new claims based on changing facts or
law.
73
The choice of terms is not value free. "Retention of jurisdiction"
has a less disruptive connotation than does the phrase "collateral at-
tack." Correspondingly, the barriers to renewed litigation are lower
when courts have continuing jurisdiction and higher when courts' prior
decisions are described as final. On the other hand, "collateral" may
also indicate that the second proceeding is less constrained by pre-
sumptions of the first proceeding's correctness. In that sense, "collat-
eral attacks" could provide a second judge with greater latitude to
rethink earlier rulings.
The Single Judge plus Same Judge Model expresses some in-
creased concern for litigants' autonomy and persuasion opportunities.
We provide litigants with control over repetition, and we permit deci-
sionmakers to entertain repeated cries for help. This model does bur-
den one side of the lawsuit, the victor in the first round, and also
burdens the system to some extent. In this model, the values that ani-
71. See Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1284
(1976) (describing multiparty lawsuits in which judges attempt to fashion ongoing relief). In many
such cases, despite the issuance of a decree, courts maintain jurisdiction so as to supervise imple-
mentation efforts and to modify the decree when appropriate. Resnik, supra note 26, at 386-413.
72. For example, state prisoners may request relief from the federal courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254
(1982).
73. Id § 2255; RULES GOVERNING SECTION 2255 PROCEEDINGS IN THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURTS, Rule 4 [hereinafter cited as Section 2255 Rules].
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mate revisionism have some sway in that finality is postponed and
economy compromised to permit renewed exercises of decisionmakers'
power. But the possibilities of reconsideration are still limited in the
Single Judge plus Same Judge Model. Unless it exists within a more
complex procedural model, the model continues to centralize the state's
authority in a single person. This model also provides limited mecha-
nisms by which to ensure that person's impartiality, consistency, or ra-
tionality. The only constraints are ritual, formality, and visibility of the
proceedings. In addition, the passage of time may provide new, and
wiser, insight.
3. The Single Judge Plus Limited Review Model
Other models illustrate vertical rather than horizontal replication.
These models are all more complex because they rely upon the addi-
tion of other decisionmakers atop the Single Judge. Additional person-
nel result in greater expense and in a longer duration from lawsuits'
commencement to termination.
A common example of such complexity is an appellate court, in
which a different judge or group of judges reviews the decisions of the
first tier. Today, in federal and in most state courts, aggrieved parties
have a right to appellate review of many decisions of the first tier. A
series of doctrines, however, limit second tier judges from making deci-
sions afresh; rather, appellate judges and parties are obliged to narrow
their concerns to issues raised below on the record. Some first tier deci-
sions are entitled to presumptions of correctness, while others receive
more searching review.74 I refer to this model as the Single Judge plus
Limited Review Model and note that it has become the prevailing
norm.
The Single Judge plus Limited Review Model increases litigants'
persuasion opportunities by offering them a new audience. This model
also values litigants' autonomy by allowing the parties to decide
whether to appeal. The model is revisionist; it provides the possibility
of redecision by individuals other than the author of the first decision.
In addition, the Single Judge plus Limited Review Model diffuses the
power of the first tier. The hierarchy informs us that the decisions of
the second or third tier are determinative and that members of the su-
74. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a) (the "clearly erroneous" rule, creating a presumption in
favor of trial courts' factual findings). See also Davies, Aflnned.- A Study of Criminal Appeals and
Decision-Making Norms in a Caifornia Court ofAppeal, 1982 A.B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 543, 583-
619 (discussing low reversal rates in criminal cases).
1984]
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perior tiers are deemed better able to pronounce, interpret, or under-
stand. The second tier provides a possibility for more ritual and for
increased formality. Furthermore, differentiating the import of cases is
possible because the second tier need not be empowered to review all
first tier decisions. The Single Judge plus Limited Review Model may
also ensure consistency; if the second tier itself works consistently, it
can rectify disparities and inequities produced by the first. The second
tier may supervise first tier decisionmakers and screen for impartiality
and for rational norm enforcement. Justice may be enhanced. Alter-
natively, the problems of inconsistency, irrationality, and bias may only
be moved from the first to the second tier, and possibly from individu-
als of lower social classes to those of higher status.
The Single Judge plus Limited Review Model compromises other
concerns. Finality is delayed, although not ignored; once the appeal is
concluded, res judicata precludes additional litigation. Economy is
also affected under this model. Time and money are spent in deference
to the perceived desirability of responding repeatedly to individuals'
complaints. The first tier's power is diminished, but the degree of con-
straint varies with the kind and number of presumptions in favor of
first tier decisions.
4. The Single Judge Plus Unlimited Review Model
An obvious alternative is the Single Judge plus Unlimited Review
Model, in which the second tier is authorized to hear cases afresh.
Such de novo decisionmaking may still be constrained in various ways
by decisions rendered below. For example, when law and equity were
distinct, appellate review in equity was described as being a de novo
review. The appellate court, however, did not generally consider infor-
mation beyond that adduced below and deferred, upon occasion, to the
decisions of the first tier.75
A contemporary example of the Single Judge plus Unlimited Re-
view Model is the relationship between federal judges and magistrates.
Congress has authorized magistrates to make dispositive decisions, but
if the parties object, Congress has instructed trial judges to make deter-
minations de novo.76 Unlike equity appeals, trial judges may receive
75. R. POUND, supra note 53, at 226-27; Orfield, Appellate Procedure in Equity Cases: A
Guide for Appeals at Law, 90 U. PA. L. REv. 563, 593-96 (1942).
76. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) (1982). Since the 1979 amendments, magistrates may, with the
parties' consent, conduct trials. Id. § 636(c)(1). See Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am., Inc. v.
Instromedix, Inc., 712 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 725 F.2d 537, 544 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc);
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information beyond that obtained by magistrates. Like the old equity
appeals, some deference is accorded magistrates' decisions."7
An alternative form of de novo decisionmaking occurs when a sec-
ond decisionmaker is completely unconstrained by the first tier's deci-
sions. Rather than obtaining a record from the first tier, the second
decisionmaker is kept uninformed and instead repeats the first's process
or follows its own. Some state court de novo trial systems operate in
this fashion.78
All variants of this model give litigants substantial persuasion op-
portunities. When the government dispatches multiple sets of deci-
sionmakers, it indicates an increased willingness to entertain
individuals' complaints and to permit individual participation. Fur-
ther, where the second decision occurs only at the request of litigants,
the Single Judge plus Unlimited Review Model respects the com-
plaining litigants' autonomy; those litigants choose which tier will issue
the final decision.7 9 Of course, the litigants who emerge victorious in
the first tier may experience the renewed state intervention as an incur-
sion into their autonomy.
A de novo model can be consumptive of resources when the sec-
ond tier replicates the first's work. But many de novo models are cre-
ated to economize. The model is often put into place with the
assumption, sometimes accurate, that with the employment of fewer
and, therefore, less expensive decisionmakers, litigants will be satisfied
with the first ruling and will never request a second decision.80
5. The Single Judge Plus Limited Review Plus Limited Review Model
To elaborate the other alternatives, we can expand our models,
Wharton-Thomas v. United States, 721 F.2d 922, 924-30 (3d Cir. 1983) (both upholding the
§ 636(c)(1) grant of authority to magistrates).
77. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) (1982). See also Shapiro, Federal Habeas Corpus: A Study in
Massachusetts, 87 HARV. L. REv. 321, 337-42 (1973) (some judges in one federal district court
adopted magistrates' recommendations in all cases).
78. See, e.g., the discussion of Massachusetts' two tier system in Justices of the Boston Mun.
Court v. Lydon, 104 S. Ct. 1805, 1808 (1984). See also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1282 (West 1982)
(decision in nonbinding arbitration not admissible at de novo trial), discussed in D. HENSTLER, A.
LiPsON & E. ROLPH, JUDICIAL ARBITRATION IN CALIFORNIA: THE FIRsT YEAR (1981).
79. The majority opinion in Lydon relied in part upon this aspect of the Massachusetts two-
tier system to determine that the defendant's double jeopardy protection did not attach until after
the second tier had issued its decision. 104 S. Ct. at 1814 (1984).
80. See id. at 1815 n.8 ("[Tihousands of cases were disposed of by convictions at bench trials
because many convicted defendants do not exercise their right to appeal to the jury trial session.")
(citation omitted).
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like tinkertoys, in a variety of directions. By adding a series of limited
review possibilities after the first decision is rendered, we create a
model that I label the Single Judge plus Limited Review plus Limited
Review Model. Contemporary analogues are the three tiers of courts
found in the federal system and in many states. The trial court has the
greatest freedom in decisionmaking; the next two tiers are both limited
review tiers, and the third tier typically has discretion to review or to let
the second tier's result stand.8' Members of the second and third tiers
often have distinct tasks.82 For example, the Supreme Court is gener-
ally thought to be in the business of law announcement rather than
error correction. The intermediate appellate courts, in contrast, have
both the "institutional" function of rule development and the obliga-
tion to review for correctness and appropriateness.8 3
Like the Single Judge plus Limited Review Model, this model
postpones finality and consumes more resources than do simpler mod-
els. This model offers litigants more occasions to persuade state offi-
cials and increases opportunities for revisionism. The existence of the
multiple tiers permits greater differentiation among decisions and pro-
vides occasions for more ritual and formality to surround some cases.
When the structure is the typical pyramid, the subset of decisions that
reaches the highest tier becomes imbued with great importance-either
because the litigants have raised critical issues or because, by being de-
cided by the most prestigious decisionmakers, the cases become critical
to other litigants.
This model both diffuses and concentrates power. The judges at
the top have enormous authority and, like in all other models, there are
few mechanisms by which to ensure that the highest tier does its work
impartially, rationally, and consistently. On the other hand, the exist-
ence of a third tier, if small, may increase public scrutiny of that court,
and the visibility of its proceedings may provide some constraints.
The power of the highest tier may also be limited by its size. If the
number of judges is proportionately small as compared to the number
81. Although the Supreme Court has mandatory jurisdiction in some areas, proposals have
been made to end such obligations and to have all of the Supreme Court's docket become discre-
tionary. See, e.g., S. 450, 96th Cong., Ist Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 7648 (1979); H.R. 2700, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); S. REP. No. 142, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
82. There is some overlap. Both the Supreme Court and the federal appellate courts retain
some grants of original jurisdiction. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 839f(e)(5) (1982) (suits challenging
constitutionality of Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act to be filed in
court of appeals); 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (1982) (Supreme Court original jurisdiction).
83. JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note I, at 2-4.
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of cases, only a fraction of the disputes will reach the highest tier; other
decisionmakers in the lower echelons will also wield substantial power.
Moreover, while the highest court announces the law, the lower tiers
must usually implement and enforce decisions. Finally, all the high
court benches in the United States are multimembered; no single indi-
vidual is all-powerful. Indeed, the highest tier is usually the court with
the largest number of judges sitting together to decide outcomes, and
this factor further diffuses individuals' power by obliging compromise,
negotiation, and bargaining.
This model has costs. First, it is expensive to maintain three tiers.
Second, one set of litigants, victors at the tier below, must participate in
another round of the dispute. Third, the losers at the lower tiers may
not have the money or experience to proceed onto the next rung.
Fourth, the society may be impatient with the delay from initiation to
disposition of a dispute.
6. The Single Judge/Different Forum Plus Unlimited Review Model
A sixth model depends upon redundant but independent decision
centers, each authorized to look afresh at a dispute, to define its own
scope of inquiry, and to render a decision. This model is parallel to the
Single Judge/Unlimited Review Model but is distinct because this
model occurs only when the second decision is made by individuals in
a separate political structure. The Single Judge/Different Forum plus
Unlimited Review Model is found either when interrelated sovereigns
coexist or when two entities (agencies and courts, for example) share
jurisdiction. Some kinds of family disputes were processed under this
model; where jurisdiction was concurrent in several states, each court
acted independently. 4 Two other examples include Title VII and the
habeas corpus statutes, both of which give federal courts authority to
consider issues already decided by either state agencies or courts. My
shorthand for this arrangement is the Different Forum Model.
Variants of this model include those in which the single judge in
the first forum is subject to limited review or repeated reviews, and the
84. The full faith and credit doctrine was of limited application in this area. See generally
Ratner, Procedural Due Process, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: Effective-Litigation Values vs. the Terri-
torial Imperative, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, 75 Nw. U. L. REv. 363, 383-85 (1980)
(in any forum where an abducting parent and child reside, the issue can be relitigated and, after
giving the prior decree respectful consideration, the forum may make a de novo determination).
Of late, there has been increased cooperation among states under interstate child custody acts. Id.
at 388-90. In 1980, modifications were made to the federal full faith and credit statute to require
greater uniformity. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982).
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second decision center also provides for review of its first tier. That
model gives my nomenclature its ultimate extension-the Single Judge
(plus Limited Review plus Limited Review)/Different Forum plus Un-
limited Review (plus Limited Review plus Limited Review) Model.
This model permits duplication of efforts at three levels-at entry and
at two appellate stages. Each forum is a self-contained tiered system
with differentiation of functions at each level. Yet another form of this
model requires that the new forum give deference to some of the deci-
sions of the first forum.
8 5
The Different Forum Model limits the power of the first forum,
increases litigants' persuasion opportunities, and enhances the possibil-
ity of revisionism. By allowing the different forum to undo the first
forum's decisions, the model creates occasions for the second forum to
supervise indirectly the first. If the second forum works consistently,
rationally, and impartially, norm enforcement may be enhanced. But
the model, like all the prior ones, has to rely upon training, visibility,
and ritual to obtain consistency, rationality, and impartiality from deci-
sionmakers at the highest tier. The Different Forum Model's very
existence enhances differentiation because only select kinds of cases
may be eligible to receive the elaborated procedures. At the same time,
the Different Forum Model relies upon the expenditure of substantial
resources and delays finality.
The Different Forum Model both diffuses and reallocates power.
When some deference is accorded first forum decisionmakers, the first
forum's judges retain substantial authority despite the second forum's
power of revision. If litigants can choose whether to go to the second
forum, litigants' autonomy is underscored by the choices offered. Be-
cause this model is one of the most expansive decisionmaking appara-
tuses currently available, its use indicates that the category of disputes
worthy of it are very special and are deserving of or needing the re-
sources committed.
C. THE RATIONALES FOR COMPLEX MODELS
Given contemporary sensibilities about limited resources, Con-
gress' or the Supreme Court's decisions to create elaborate procedural
models, involving the employment of several tiers (either vertically or
horizontally), appear odd. The Single Judge/Finality Model and its
85. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)-(c) (1982) (the EEOC must accord state agency findings
"substantial weight").
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simplest variants (the Single Judge plus Same Judge Model or the Sin-
gle Judge plus Limited Review Model) seem adequate to realize most
of the goals of our procedural system. Why not have just a single op-
portunity to litigate? Does not one round, with or without reconsidera-
tion or appeal, provide litigants with sufficient opportunity to make and
defend cases? Why go beyond this straightforward scheme to consider
models that are costly and that postpone finality by enabling repetitive
litigation?
These are the questions I explore in later sections, but some pre-
liminary comments need to be made. First, different models come into
being because no single model adequately expresses all concerns about
how government dispute resolution systems should function. At vari-
ous points in our history, some valued features have been perceived as
having greater import than others. Finality and economy weigh heav-
ily today, but they are only two of the several basic features of proce-
dure, and the other features also reflect social concerns to which
attention must be paid. For example, the constitutional requirement
that the "writ of habeas corpus" not be "suspended"86 is generally in-
terpreted to mean that government must provide a procedure by which
to reconsider some decisions to incarcerate 87 -that something more
than the Single Judge/Finality Model must be available for some dep-
rivations of individual liberty.
A second reason for procedural complexity is that procedural de-
signs express views about the appropriate allocation of power between
the states and the federal government and between agencies and the
courts. Redundancy exists in part because Congress or the Supreme
Court is unwilling to divest states or agencies of adjudicatory power
but is also uneasy about how states and agencies may perform their
functions as derivative adjudicators of federal rights. Avenues to fed-
eral courts are open, but state court or agency adjudication remains
either a prerequisite or an alternative. One example of such procedural
duplication is contained in Title VII, which requires litigants first to
seek assistance from state administrative agencies but thereafter per-
mits a federal forum to make new findings.8" A second example is fed-
eral jurisdiction to entertain state prisoners' claims that their state court
86. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
87. Even narrow readings of the history of the writ indicate that some deprivations of liberty
should be reviewable. See Bator, supra note 13, at 451. The possibility of reconsideration does
not, of course, mandate federal reconsideration. See Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 385 (1977)
(Burger, C.J., concurring) (the suspension clause does not require access to federal courts).
88. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1982).
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convictions were unconstitutional. Prisoners are first required to "ex-
haust" state judicial remedies.89 A third illustration is the Civil Rights
Act of 1871, which has been interpreted as providing a "supplemen-
tary" remedy; litigants may go to either state or federal court to seek
redress for violations of federal rights by state actors.90
All of the state/federal and agency/court schemes sacrifice the ap-
parent economies of a single decisionmaker or single set of deci-
sionmakers to other interests, such as diffusion of power, differentiation
of labor to reflect the expertise of the respective bodies, and federal
rights' enforcement by federal entities. Complex procedural schemes
may also evidence beliefs about the importance or difficulty of a cate-
gory of cases to be decided. In addition, elaborate procedures may
help socialize us about "new" rights. By cloaking such rights in a good
deal of process, those hostile to their implementation may be mollified
by the many opportunities to contest. Ventilation of displeasure may
dissipate the dislike, and the procedures may channel the aggression.
Alternatively, those hostile to the rights may create so cumbersome a
procedure as to make rights enforcement extraordinarily difficult.
A third reason for complex procedural models is a perceived need
to empower more than one decisionmaker to issue dispositive rulings.
Many observers of the dispute resolution process believe that members
of the first tier, in state and federal courts and agencies, should be su-
pervised. Some commentators report that first tier decisionmakers fre-
quently fail in the task of norm application,9' and others express
concern about individual decisionmakers' abuse of power.92 While we
are cognizant of human fallibility at all tiers and aware that repeated
adjudications do not necessarily produce correct results, we neverthe-
less have created opportunities to review, if not to rectify, some of those
mistakes. We draw some measure of comfort from having many ac-
tors, and sometimes specific kinds of decisionmakers (perhaps better
paid or more carefully selected), participate in the decisionmaking pro-
cess. The decisions thus gain legitimacy.
A fourth rationale for procedural complexity is, somewhat ironi-
89. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1982).
90. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
91. See J. MAsHAw, C. GOETZ, F. GOODMAN, W. SCHWARTZ, P. VERKUIL & M. CARROW,
SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS: A STUDY IN THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRA-
TION HEARING SYSTEM 126-30 (1978) (description of Social Security Administration's case
processing difficulties); Davies, supra note 74, at 586-87 (state trial judges' errors); Peller, supra
note 13, at 643-61 (state trial and appellate court errors).
92. JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 1, at 2-4; Resnik, supra note 26, at 424-31.
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cally, economy itself. Throughout most of our history, judges have
complained about being unable to accomplish all of their work.93
Rather than always adding judges to the existing tiers, we have at-
tempted a variety of diversionary tactics that take sets of cases away
from juries, from article III and from state court judges, and from the
Supreme Court. Courts and legislatures have crafted or condoned a
wide variety of so-called "alternative" procedures, such as agency adju-
dication, mandatory arbitration, "mini" or summary trials, medical
malpractice panels, and magistrate adjudication.94 These approaches
are all designed to be nonbinding and nonfinal, so as not to supplant
the consitutionally required or politically valued jury or judge trial. In
my lexicon, these procedures can be understood as tiers of decision-
making, sometimes with unlimited review (the Single Judge plus Un-
limited Review Model) and at other times with limited review (the
Single Judge plus Limited Review Model).
Procedural modeling is, of course, animated by more than solici-
tude to theoretical views of what psychic or social benefits procedure
may confer. Political power struggles are also at the heart of proce-
dural choices. For example, Congress has expanded and contracted the
Supreme Court's jurisdiction over habeas corpus-at times in hostile
reaction to the Court's decisions. In the politically charged atmosphere
shortly after the Civil War, the Court's ruling in a habeas case met with
congressional displeasure. 95 In retaliation, Congress withdrew some of
the Court's jurisdiction over habeas petitions,96 and that withdrawal
was sanctioned by the Supreme Court.97 Years later, after passions
cooled, Congress restored the Supreme Court's appellate habeas
jurisdiction.98
93. See, e.g., F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 39, at 80-93 (the Supreme Court's
caseload too large).
94. See Silberman, Masters and Magistrates Part II" The American Analogue, 50 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1297 passim (1975) (history of use of magistrates in the United States). For early so-called
"dispute resolution alternatives," see R. POUND, ORGANIZATION OF COURTS 36-38 (1941) (use of
arbitrators) id. at 202 (use of commissioners).
95. ExparteMcCardle, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318 (1867).
96. See Act of March 27, 1868, ch. 34, § 2, 15 Stat. 44 (repeal of a prior act that had author-
ized some appeals from judgments of the circuit courts to the Supreme Court). However, by virtue
of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the Supreme Court continued to have original jurisdiction over
habeas petitions. The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81. See also Exparte Yerger,
75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 96 (1868) (Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over habeas petitions).
97. Exparte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868). See generally Van Astyne, .4
Critical Guide to Ex parte McCardle, 15 ARIZ. L. Rav. 229, 236-44 (1973) (discussing that case's
history and congressional power to remove appellate jurisdiction from the Supreme Court).
98. In 1885, Congress authorized Supreme Court review of trial judges' decisions on habeas
petitions "as of right" by a "writ of error." Act of March 3, 1885, ch. 353, 23 Stat. 437. In 1897,
19841
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To summarize, there are no procedural designs in which all the
features of procedure are maximized, because several are in tension
and some are in direct conflict with each other. Further, the political
structure of the United States, with its dual sovereignties, its insistence
on lay participation, and its federal supremacy, makes procedural sim-
plicity difficult to achieve. Our responses to these problems vary. At
times, we appear to tolerate or to ignore the tensions; we seem uninter-
ested in procedure. At other moments, the tensions among the features
make procedural reform appear imperative, and many voices join in
complaining about the inadequacies of current schemes and in advo-
cating revision. One such moment was the 1960's, during which the
Warren Court reevaluated procedural models in an effort to further the
Court's values. I believe a majority of today's Supreme Court is en-
gaged in a parallel effort. The Court is articulating its preferences
among the features and the values that underlie them. Across all the
procedural models I examine, one theme emerges: This Supreme
Court, in the name of economy, seeks to resolve the tensions among the
features by giving great weight to finality and deferring to the authority
of first tier decisionmakers.
II. THE VALUE CHOICES: HABEAS CORPUS
A first example of the current Supreme Court's drive to enshrine
finality, the authority of the first tier, and economy, is the new law of
habeas corpus. It is ironic that habeas corpus is a prime illustration of
the increased concern for the preservation of first tier decisions. A
premise of the "Great Writ" is a willingness to look anew. Habeas
corpus incorporates a possibility of revision long after such hope has
been extinguished in many other kinds of cases.9 9
But contemporary federal habeas corpus has become a law of clo-
sure, of complex procedural obstacles that preclude adjudication on the
merits. Current case law is dominated by announcements of new pro-
cedural requirements or refinements of those already in place. Other
Congress altered the scheme by making Supreme Court review of habeas petitions discretionary.
In addition, Congress limited state petitioners' appellate opportunities by requiring them to ob-
tain, either from the judge who had denied the petition or from an appellate court, certification of
"probable cause" to appeal. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 517, § 5, 26 Stat. 827; Act of Jan. 20, 1897,
ch. 68, 29 Stat. 492; 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (1976).
99. For discussions of the history of habeas corpus, see Duker, The English Origins of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus. .4 Peculiar Path to Fame, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 983 (1978); Oakes, Legal
History in the High Court-Habeas Corpus, 64 MICH. L. REv. 451 (1966). Most commentators
agree that the original purpose of the writ was to remedy executive detention, but in the United
States that the writ's purpose evolved to embrace claims of allegedly wrongful judicial detention.
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commentators have chronicled the arguments about the validity of
habeas corpus review. 00 My task here is to review its evolution to de-
termine what animated both the Warren Court's expansionist construc-
tion and the current Court's narrow reading of the habeas statutes. I
will examine the two genres of habeas cases that federal judges de-
cide-lawsuits filed by state prisoners seeking to invalidate their con-
victions, and lawsuits filed by federal prisoners also claiming invalid
convictions or sentences. Statutes govern both types of habeas claims,
and the reach of both statutes has been sharply limited.
A. STATE PRISONERS' EFFORTS TO OBTAIN HABEAS REVIEW IN
FEDERAL COURT
1. The Statutory Framework
In 1867, Congress authorized federal judges to review the deten-
tion of state prisoners.' 0 ' That statute's modern day counterpart is 28
U.S.C. § 2254, which gives federal judges jurisdiction to entertain state
prisoners' claims that their custody is "in violation of the Constitution
or laws or treaties of the United States." 10 2 In terms of the models with
which I began, the statute creates an opportunity for repeated reviews
of a first tier decision and, in some circumstances, for unlimited review
by a second, autonomous decision center. The congressional grant of
jurisdiction to federal courts for state habeas claims realocates and dif-
fuses power. Further, it provides additional opportunities for revision-
ism, for rational and impartial implementation of constitutional norms,
and for consistent federal law enforcement. By authorizing unusual
procedures and by giving them uncommon ritual, Congress differenti-
ated claims of unconstitutional confinement from other kinds of cases.
The original decisions, a judgment of guilt and imposition of sen-
tence, are made by a jury or judge in a state court. Thereafter, if the
state system provides review mechanisms, state prisoners must chal-
lenge their convictions in state courts and exhaust the remedies avail-
able. 103 If, however, a state provides no opportunity for
reconsideration when the prisoner seeks habeas relief, then the prisoner
100. E.g., Bator, supra note 13, at 499-519; Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 13, at 1037-54;
Friendly, supra note 13, at 151-57.
101. One reason for the statute was to enable federal courts to free ex-slaves illegally impris-
oned by states trying to avoid emancipation decrees. Oakes, supra note 99, at 452.
102. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1982).
103. Id § 2254(c); see Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 515-18 (1982) (discussing the history of
the exhaustion doctrine). The exhaustion requirement is not, however, jurisdictional. Strickland
v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2063 (1984).
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may proceed to federal court.' °4
The habeas statute is a complex procedural model. In the state
forum, a judge or jury's decision may be subjected to limited review by
one or two tiers and then again, under state collateral remedies, by the
same courts. Thereafter, federal trial judges may undertake unlimited
review of some claims of illegality, and their work may also be sub-
jected to one or two tiers of limited review.
But my description needs some immediate modification. Federal
judges' review of state prisoners' claims is in one sense "unlimited,"
and in another, very limited. The statutory habeas model is one of "un-
limited" review in the sense that, when federal constitutional questions
are raised, federal courts have the authority to go beyond state court
records, to hold evidentiary hearings, to consider new information, and
to make their own decisions, unconstrained by the state courts'
rulings. 10
5
Federal courts' habeas jurisdiction, however, is in another sense
limited. First, federal courts may entertain only complaints of "consti-
tutional" or "fundamental" error; other kinds of claimed illegalities,
such as breaches of state law, are insufficient to invoke federal jurisdic-
tion. 10 6 Second, as previously noted, state prisoners must initially raise
their claims of federal constitutional error in state courts, to "exhaust"
this first decision center before the second, federal decision center will
consider the claim."0 7 Third, since 1908, the congressional scheme has
permitted federal appellate review of state prisoners' cases only after
either the federal district court that denied the habeas petition or an
appellate court grants a certificate of "probable cause." This document
certifies that the appeal raises "substantial" or at least "debatable" is-
sues. 08 The many other limitations on federal review will be chroni-
cled shortly.
With the enactment of a habeas statute, Congress gave lower fed-
eral courts substantial opportunities to review state court processes. In
the 1960's, the Warren Court exploited those opportunities and author-
ized federal trial courts to use the habeas statute as a vehicle for super-
104. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 398-99 (1963).
105. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1982). See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312-18 (1963) (new
evidentiary hearing permissible in federal court).
106. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1982).
107. Id. § 2254(b).
108. Id § 2253; FED. 1L ApP. P. 22. Discussion of the standard for such certification is pro-
vided in Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct. 3383, 3394 n.4 (1983).
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vising state criminal procedures. The Court relied upon the habeas
statute's rich procedural possibilities to articulate and enforce federal
norms for the criminal convictions process. In the 1980's, however, the
Burger Court has employed the same statute to very different ends: the
Burger Court uses habeas cases as occasions to announce the impor-
tance of simple process and of limiting review of the first tier's work.
2. The Warren Court's Approach: The Single Judge/Dffierent Forum
Plus Unlimited Review Model of Fay v. Noia
An expansionist interpretation of the habeas corpus statute was
suggested in Brown v. Allen'0 9 and arrived in full force with the Warren
Court's 1963 decisions of Townsend v. Saint" and Fay v. Nola.I1I Fay
v. Noia illustrates the value preferences underlying the Warren Court's
procedural choices.
In 1942, Charles Noia and two codefendants, Santo Caminito and
Frank Bonino, were convicted of felony murder and sentenced to life in
prison." 2 The trio's confessions provided the only evidence of their
guilt."t3 The police obtained those confessions after holding the three
incommunicado and interrogating them continuously for more than 24
hours. 1 4 All three sought unsuccessfully to have their confessions sup-
pressed at trial. Upon conviction, however, only Caminito and Bonino
appealed, and both lost."' Years later, Caminito was granted habeas
corpus relief by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on the
grounds that the admission of a coerced confession violated the four-
teenth amendment." 6 Thereafter, Bonino submitted a motion for rear-
gument to the New York Court of Appeals. Because that court had no
time limit for filing motions to reargue, it granted Bonino's motion-
despite the fact that the motion was filed some thirteen years after the
109. 344 U.S. 443 (1953). For discussion of that case, see Peller, supra note 13, at 583-92.
110. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
111. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
112. United States ex rel Noia v. Fay, 300 F.2d 345, 347 (2d Cir. 1962), a ', 372 U.S. 391
(1963).
113. United States ex rel Noia v. Fay, 300 F.2d at 347; People v. Caminito, 3 N.Y.2d 596,
598, 170 N.Y.S.2d 799, 802 (1958). But see People v. Noia, 4 A.D.2d 698, 698, 163 N.Y.S.2d 796,
797 (1957) (Noia's case may not have been identical to that of Caminito and Bonino).
114. Judge Frank, writing for the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, described how one
of Noia's codefendants had been treated: "The police interrogated him almost continuously for 27
hours.... During this long period, the police, in effect, kidnapped him: They kept him incommu-
nicado, refusing to allow his lawyer, his family, and his friends to consult with him." United
States ex rel. Caminito v. Murphy, 222 F.2d 698, 701 (2d Cir. 1955).
115. 372 U.S. at 394-95 n.l.
116. United States ex rel. Caminito v. Murphy, 222 F.2d at 700.
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original appeal had been denied."17
Noia then returned to New York state courts, and like his code-
fendants, asked that his conviction be overturned. Although the trial
court granted his motion to vacate,' 18 the appellate court reversed, con-
cluding that New York courts lacked jurisdiction to hear Noia's claim
because neither had he appealed nor was he advancing claims based
upon previously unavailable information. 19 Noia eventually suc-
ceeded in the federal courts; both the Second Circuit and the United
States Supreme Court held that his confinement was
unconstitutional.1
2 0
The Supreme Court couched its decision in classic habeas terms;
the Court granted the writ and mandated that the prisoner be retried or
freed. The Court's unspoken conclusion, however, was that New
York's procedures, in which finality and economy concerns reigned
supreme, were unconstitutional. Tradition, comity, and the fear of
opening the floodgates to prisoner litigation constrained the Court; it
did not directly invalidate or enjoin New York procedures.' 2 1 Instead,
the Court declined to be bound by New York's preclusion rules and
interpreted the federal habeas statute to offer what New York courts
would not-an opportunity to revise earlier rulings.
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, rejected New York's
contention that its refusal to entertain Noia's claims should preclude
federal court review-in the jargon, that New York's decision was an
"independent and adequate" state ground.12 2  Justice Brennan ex-
117. 372 U.S. at 395 n.l.
118. People v. Noia, 3 Misc. 2d 447, 450, 158 N.Y.S.2d 683, 687 (Kings County Ct. 1956).
119. People v. Noia, 4 A.D.2d 698, 698, 163 N.Y.S.2d 796, 797 (1957), aj'd, 3 N.Y.2d 596,
601, 148 N.E.2d 139, 142-43, 170 N.Y.S.2d 799, 804 (1958).
120. United States ex rel. Noia v. Fay, 300 F.2d 345, 365 (2d Cir. 1962), aj'a 372 U.S. 391,
441 (1963).
121. The remedy when a petition for habeas corpus is granted is to release a prisoner but not
to enjoin the unconstitutional acts that formed the basis for the illegal conduct. The release, how-
ever, is conditional. The state has the choice of freeing a petitioner or retrying that person in a
constitutional manner. As discussed by Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 13, at 1035-45, federal
habeas is thus less intrusive than a civil injunction. In their view, habeas has served as an impor-
tant mechanism by which federal courts affect state criminal procedures. In a sense, habeas relief
can be understood as the functional analogue of a declaratory judgment.
122. When a state court decides a case on federal and nonfederal grounds, and the reversal of
the federal ground will not invalidate the judgment, the United States Supreme Court generally
declines to decide whether the state court's ruling on the federal issue was correct. Murdock v.
City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 634-36 (1875). By distinguishing state "procedural"
grounds from other state grounds, Fay v. Nola established a distinct "independent and adequate"
rule for habeas corpus proceedings. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. at 431. Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S.
443, 446-47 (1965), applied the Fay test on direct appeal. The Fay v. Nola approach has been
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plained that the "breadth" of federal court jurisdiction to entertain
state prisoners' habeas petitions was essential to maintenance of "due
process."' 123 In response to the contention that, by procedural default,
Noia had forfeited his opportunity to claim constitutional error in the
federal courts, Justice Brennan stated: "a forfeiture of remedies does
not legitimize the unconstitutional conduct by which. . .[a] conviction
was procured."' 124 In other words, Justice Brennan believed that the
state procedural system had failed to implement important values and
that, given the congressional mandate, federal courts could appropri-
ately supersede state decisions.
In reaching his conclusion, Justice Brennan relied repeatedly upon
the notion that federal habeas review was "independent'1 25 of state
court proceedings-that a second decision center had authority to un-
dertake unlimited review of federal constitutional issues. The majority
did not, however, ignore the state's express concern that the availability
of a second, independent federal procedure would undermine states'
abilities to conclude their criminal process. The Court ruled that in the
event a prisoner "deliberately by-passed the orderly procedure of the
state courts," 126 federal judges had discretion to deny habeas relief. A
deliberate bypass or waiver was to be tested under the standard set
forth in Johnson v. Zerbst,27 "whether there was an intentional relin-
quishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege."' 128 In the
majority's view, Noia's case was not an example of a deliberate
bypass.
129
Given the record in Noia's case, that conclusion is not obvious.
Noia, represented by counsel, had known of and made the claim of an
unconstitutionally coerced confession at trial. Further, he had known
of the possibility of appeal but declined to seek review. In his postcon-
viction proceedings, Noia offered two explanations for his failure, al-
most twenty years earlier, to appeal. He stated that he had lacked
funds to pay an attorney for the appeal and that he had feared a suc-
cessful appeal could have resulted in retrial, conviction, and the impo-
greatly eroded by Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), discussed infra notes 206-19 and ac-
companying text.
123. 372 U.S. at 427.
124. Id. at 428.
125. Id at 422, 424.
126. Id at 438.
127. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
128. Id at 464.
129. 372 U.S. at 440.
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sition of the death sentence.1 30 Without much explanation, the Court
decided that Noia's "grisly choice" did not constitute a knowing relin-
quishment.1 3 However, the Court also described itself as ruling that
some defendants who had refused to utilize state procedures due to fear
of heavier penalties, "even the death penalty," could be found to have
deliberately bypassed state procedures and thus to have lost their op-
portunity for federal court review.
132
Noia's "grisly choice" did not abate with the passage of the time in
which to appeal. State prisoners who succeed on federal habeas
corpus, like those prisoners who succeed in state appellate or coram
nobis proceedings, face the possibility of retrial. Noia's "choice" on
appeal was identical to that in his later postconviction attempts: at all
times, he faced the threat of retrial and resentencing. But, there were
critical differences between Noia's 1942 choice and his 1962 choice.
First, time had passed, and the likelihood of retrial diminishes in pro-
portion to the length of time between an initial conviction and its later
invalidation. Second, the possibility of retrial was almost nil because
both codefendants' convictions had been invalidated and their indict-
ments dismissed.1 33 As a result, one could argue that Noia had made'a
"strategic or tactical" decision. Having "deliberately by-passed" ap-
peal when vulnerable, the prisoner then moved for relief when the risks
130. 372 U.S. at 397 n.3, 439-40. These facts were developed in a federal court hearing on
Noia's habeas petition. United States ex rel. Noia v. Fay, 183 F. Supp. 222, 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1960),
rev'd, 300 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1962), a'a 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
A few years after it decided Fay v. Nola, the Supreme Court decided that courts could not
burden the right to appeal with such a "grisly choice." In North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711,
724 (1969), the Court concluded that "the imposition of a penalty upon the defendant for having
successfully pursued a statutory right of appeal or collateral remedy would be. . . a violation of
due process of law." Trial judges could impose greater sentences only if they could provide rea-
sons, based upon new information developed after the first sentencing. Id. at 726.
Pearce has not made appeals totally risk-free. See Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 22-
35 (1973) (no Pearce problem if new jury, uninformed of earlier sentence, imposes more severe
penalty); Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 114-20 (1972) (greater sentence after de novo trial
permissible). Nor has the Court held all defendants' choices unconstitutional. See North Caro-
lina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 39 (1970) (to avoid risk of death penalty, criminal defendant may
enter guilty plea while affirming innocence).
The other factor that Noia claimed had influenced his choice, the difficulty of paying for
counsel on appeal, has also been eliminated. In the same term as Fay v. Nola, the Court held that
indigent criminal defendants had to be provided counsel on appeal. Douglas v. California, 372
U.S. 353, 357-58 (1963).
131. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. at 440. Daniels v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953), provides a better
example of an unintentional bypass. In Daniels, the attorney of one of the petitioners had filed
appeal papers one day after the deadline. The state court denied leave for late filing, and federal
review was refused.
132. 372 U.S. at 440.
133. Id at 441.
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of retrial were almost negligible. 134
But Noia's case also presented unusually compelling facts. In the
majority's view:
[S]urely no just and humane legal system can tolerate a result
whereby a Caminito and a Bonino are at liberty because their confes-
sions were found to have been coerced yet a Noia, whose confession
was also coerced, remains in jail for life. . . . [Therefore] [i]f the
States withhold effective remedy, the federal courts have the power
and the duty to provide it. 35
The Court's procedural model enabled it to respond to the "duty" it
perceived in light of the poignant facts presented. However, if the
Court was correct that "no just and humane system" could condone
such an outcome, it is difficult to understand the relevance of the delib-
erate bypass test. If the system's integrity, its basic values, are at stake,
why should it matter that this litigant did not perform adequately, that
he made autonomous choices that might have been misguided at the
time and in hindsight prove ill-advised? In retrospect, because the de-
liberate bypass standard of Fay v. Noia calls into question a litigant's
moral worthiness to request revision of earlier decisions, Fay v. Noia
provided an avenue for the demise of the habeas model that the opin-
ion crafted.
Fay v. Noia exemplifies the operation of the two independent deci-
sion centers model, the Single Judge plus Limited Review/Different
Forum plus Unlimited Review Model. New York courts justified dif-
ferential treatment of three codefendants on the grounds of litigant au-
tonomy, finality, and economy. The state courts decided that Noia did
not qualify for release because he had not pursued his claims in the
state appellate courts. To respect Noia's decisionmaking power, to con-
serve resources, and to enforce closure, the state courts determined that
Noia should be bound by his choices-regardless of how his codefend-
ants had been treated. The federal appellate courts chose differently.
134. Justice Harlan made this argument in his dissent. Id. at 475-76 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Justice Harlan also argued that New York had a "vital interest in requiring that appeals be taken
on the basis of facts known at the time, since the first assertion of a claim many years later might
otherwise require release long after it was feasible to hold a new trial." Id at 473 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
while other states might lay claim to such an interest, New York's posture was less clear.
New York, as noted, had no time limit on motions to reconsider appeals; under New York proce-
dure, Bonino had succeeded in invalidating his conviction thirteen years after he had appealed.
Given the availability in New York of such late "reopenings," it is difficult to find compelling that
state's interest in quick retrials.
135. Id. at 441.
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Concerned about equal treatment, those courts opted for revisionism,
consistency, and federal substantive norm enforcement, and they re-
fused to legitimate Noia's continued incarceration. Fay v. Noia illus-
trates that, by differently valuing procedural features, two independent
systems can provide diverse outcomes on the same facts.
136
What if the values of the second procedural system had been du-
plicative of the first, or were different from those embraced by the Noia
Court? What if, for example, the federal courts had affirmed New
York State's rulings or, on the merits, had ruled the confession un-
coerced? Is there still a justification for a procedural model that incor-
porates independent, redundant decision centers?
At the theoretical level, the attraction of the duplicative model per-
sists. The two decision centers each have the opportunity to assess the
case and to determine whether to adjudicate the merits. Given that the
Different Forum Model presupposes politically distinct decision cen-
ters, consistent replication would be improbable. At a structural level,
the two fora may engage in a dialogue, of sorts, about their valuation
process. 37 If the only advantage is the possibility of difference, such an
advantage remains regardless of which decision center's rulings are
supreme or whether the decision centers in fact reach different results.
Further, in ritualistic and symbolic terms, the more individuals of
respected status who "sign off" on a decision, the greater the legitimacy
of that decision. Finally, individuals subject to the decision are, by vir-
tue of a duplicative model, given more opportunities to persuade and
thereby to express their personal dignitary interests. Thus, even where
revisionism results only in replication, it may still serve symbolic legiti-
mating functions.
On a functional level, by permitting the duplication, Congress pre-
sumably believed that the two decision centers were not fungible, that
the states would not value federal rights as the federal courts would,
and that federal decisions about facts and law were likely to be "better"
insofar as both related to federal constitutional norms.1 38 Hence, Con-
136. The Fay v. Noia opinion expressly linked procedure to substantive outcomes. "Although
in form the Great Writ is simply a mode of procedure, its history is inextricably intertwined with
the growth of fundamental rights of personal liberty." Id. at 401.
137. See Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 13, at 1046-64 (procedural redundancy results in
"dialectical federalism"). But see Meador, The Impact of Federal Habeas Corpus on State Trial
Frocedures, 52 VA. L. REV. 286, 291-93 (1966) (state court judges feel only indirectly affected by
Supreme Court decisions about federal questions).
138. It is difficult to ascertain the 1867's Congress' views on this issue. The legislative history
of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 is sparse. It is summarized in Mayers, Thethabeas CorpusAct
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gress gave federal courts the last word on federal constitutional claims.
The lowest level federal judge has, in a sense, appellate jurisdiction
over the decisions of the highest state court, while state courts are for-
bidden to order release of federal prisoners. 13 9
Modem critics of federal habeas jurisdiction, and especially of Fay
v. Noia, denounce habeas corpus procedures and their underlying as-
sumptions. 40 Pay v. No/a defenders believe in the continued utility of
federal courts' oversight.' 4' The views of more recent Congresses are
difficult to divine. The fact that Congress has failed to revise the
habeas statute in ways relevant here142 is arguably evidence of the leg-
islators' continued belief that states cannot be totally entrusted with all
federal rights enforcement. 43 The language of the statute makes fed-
eral courts available as second, independent decision centers for all
claims of constitutional error in state criminal proceedings. That same
statute, however, has been reinterpreted substantially by the Court
of 1867 The Supreme Court as Legal Historian, 33 U. CHI. L. REv. 31 (1965) (arguing that
Supreme Court's claim in Fay v. Noia and other cases that the Act of 1867 was intended to provide
broad remedies for state prisoners is not supported by congressional records; Mayers suggested
that Congress wanted, primarily, to provide a federal forum for ex-slaves detained by states after
the Civil War). Id at 33-48. Cf. W. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS
192-93 (1980) (purpose of 1867 Act was to protect "all those imprisoned," and specifically, state
prisoners).
See also Hass, The "New Federalism" andPrisoners'Rights: State Supreme Courts in Compar-
ative Perspective, 34 W. POL. Q. 552, 569 (1981) (state supreme courts generally hostile to imple-
mentation of prisoners' right of access to courts); Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV.
1105 (1977) (institutional disparities between federal and state courts make the two decision cen-
ters different in fact).
139. Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397, 409 (1872). But seeM. REDISH, FEDERAL JURIS-
DICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 116-24 (1980) (Tarble wrongly de-
cided and not constitutionally compelled); Arnold, The Power of State Courts to Enjoin Federal
Officers, 73 YALE L.J. 1385, 1386-93, 1401-02 (1964) (historical precedents for permitting state
court jurisdiction over persons in federal custody).
140. E.g., Bator, supra note 13, passim, Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional
Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REv. 605, 612-16 (1981).
141. Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 13, at 1067-68; Peller, supra note 13, at 666-69; Yackle,
The Reagan .4dministration's Habeas Corpus Proposals, 68 IOWA L. REV. 606, 616-17 (1983). See
also Lay, Problems of Federal Habeas Corpus Involving State Prisoners, 45 F.R.D. 45, 67 (1969);
McMillian, Habeas Corpus and the Burger Court, 28 ST. Louis U. L.J. 11 (1984) (both federal
judges endorsing federal review in habeas cases).
142. Congress did alter section 2254 in response to one of Fay v. Noids companion cases,
Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963). Townsend authorized federal court de novo factfinding.
Id at 312-18. In 1966, Congress ordered federal courts to accord a "presumption of correctness"
to state court findings; federal factfinding is permissible only if the statutory conditions are met.
Act of Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-711, § 2(d), 80 Stat. 1104, 1105-06 (1966) (codified as amended
,at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1982)).
143. But, of course, the language of the statute is "open textured," and Congress has not
overturned recent Supreme Court decisions that have substantially abrogated the Fay v. Noia
interpretation.
HeinOnline -- 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. 883 1983-1984
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:837
since Fay v. Noia, and Congress has, thus far, also resisted efforts either
to reaffirm Fay v. Nola or to adopt the subsequent reinterpretation. 44
3. The Burger Court's Alternative: The Single Judge/Different Forum
Plus Limited Review Model of Stone v. Powell and
Wainwright v. Sykes
Fay v. Nola had a relatively short life. Efforts to revise substan-
tially Noids doctrine showed strength first in Stone v. Powell 45 and
emerged, in full force, with the Burger Court's ruling in Wainwright v.
Sykes.'46 In my lexicon, the Court opted in both cases for a Single
Judge plus Limited Review plus Limited Review/Different Forum plus
Very Limited Review Model, with only a minimal chance of unlimited
review in the background. Stone v. Powell and Wainwright v. Sykes
took analytically distinct routes to limit the second forum's reach. The
Court in Stone v. Powell relied upon the fact that the state courts had
already decided an issue once; the Sykes Court rested its decision upon
a litigant's failure to raise an issue earlier in state courts.
Stone v. Powell established the principle that state prisoners who
have received an "opportunity for full and fair litigation" of fourth
amendment claims in state courts may not obtain federal habeas corpus
review of those claims. 147 Despite opinions by the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit that the arrest of Lloyd Powell for vagrancy and the
subsequent search had been unconstitutional,'48 and by the Eighth Cir-
cuit that the warrantless police search of David Rice's home was ille-
gal, 149 the Supreme Court decided to uphold the decisions of the state
trial judges, who had first heard the arguments of unconstitutionality
and had ruled against them. The Supreme Court did not affirm the
144. Two bills are pending before Congress. Both would impose, inter ala, a one-year statute
of limitations on habeas corpus, and a "cause and prejudice" rule. S. 1763, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 2 (1983); H.R. 2238, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Habeas Corpus Legisla-
tion of 1983]. See also S. REP. No. 226, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 110-11 (1983) (explaining intent of
Senate bill 1763). S. 1763 was passed by the Senate on February 2, 1984 and is before the House
Judiciary Committee, as is H.R. 2238. For a discussion of proposed amendments to section 2254
and of proposals rejected in the past, see Yackle, supranote 141, at 610-11 n.12. For discussions of
earlier legislative proposals to amend section 2254, see Note, Proposed Mod/icatdon of Federal
Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners-Reform or RevocatlionZ 61 GEo. L.J. 1221 (1973).
145. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
146. 433 U.S. 72 (1977). For a view that in narrow circumstances, Fay . Nola survived Wain.
wright v. Sykes, see Holcomb v. Murphy, 701 F.2d 1307 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3546
(1983).
147. 428 U.S. at 494.
148. Powell v. Stone, 507 F.2d 93, 96 (9th Cir. 1974), rev', 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
149. Rice v. Wolff, 513 F.2d 1280, 1289 (8th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
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trial judges on the merits. Rather, the Court held that, because the
prisoners had had opportunities to litigate "fully and fairly" the fourth
amendment claims in state courts, no federal review was available.'5 °
In light of Fay v. Noids express concern that habeas petitioners not
deliberately bypass state courts, the ruling in Stone v. Powell seems
ironic. In the later case, the habeas applicants had made the correct
procedural moves, both under Fay v. Noia and under the habeas corpus
statute. The prisoners had not bypassed the state systems; rather, they
had raised the fourth amendment violations first in the state courts. In
Stone v. Powell, however, the very procedural posture lauded in Fay v.
Nola was used to preclude habeas corpus petitioners from obtaining
federal decisions on the merits. Moreover, the Court refused federal
review even though, in the two companion cases, the opinions of six
judges of United States appellate courts had disagreed with the state
courts' judgments and had found constitutional error.' 51 The Court
disregarded the discrepancies between the first and second decision
centers' outcomes and stated its preference for more limited procedural
opportunities: once a state judge has given a defendant an opportunity
for "full and fair litigation' 52 of a fourth amendment claim, and ap-
peal of that decision has been afforded, no federal review is
permitted.
53
Stone v. Powell evinces the current Supreme Court's preference for
a very different procedural model from that adopted in Fay v. Noa.
The Stone v. PowellCourt chose a single decision center (and perhaps a
single judge 54) model-although without complete abandonment of a
role for the second decision center. Under Stone, the federal courts
150. 428 U.S. at 494.
151. Rice v. Wolff, 513 F.2d 1280 (8th Cir. 1975), rev'a 428 U.S. 465 (1976), and Powell v.
Stone, 507 F.2d 93 (9th Cir. 1974), re'd, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), were both unanimous.
152. Under case law development after Stone v. Powell, "opportunities for full and fair litiga-
tion" have been interpreted to include instances in which state courts have "employed an incorrect
legal standard, misapplied the correct standard, or erred in finding the underlying facts." Halpern,
Federal Habeas Corpus and the Mapp Exclusionary Rule After Stone v. Powell, 82 COLuM. L. Rnv.
1, 17-18 (1982) (footnotes omitted). Further, all that states need provide are "opportunities"; ac-
tual litigation on the merits is not generally held to be a prerequisite to the imposition of a Stone v.
Powell bar. Id at 21.
153. Fay v. Noia and Stone v. Powell might be rationalized as meaning that every habeas
claimant gets only one decision on the merits, and that the Supreme Court is indifferent to
whether the merits decision is made in state or federal court. However, Wainwright v. Sykes,
under which federal habeas corpus review could be precluded without the state court ever issuing
a decision on the merits, belies this reading. See infra notes 161-91 and accompanying text.
154. Where fourth amendment claims are made and lost on motions or at trial and no appeal
is taken, a single trial judge makes the final ruling.
1984]
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have an independent decision to make. Did the petitioner have an op-
portunity to litigate fully and fairly in the first forum? This decision
occasionally yields the answer "no"'55 and permits the federal courts to
make other independent decisions.1 56 However, if a petitioner has a
full and fair first round, no second opportunity is available.15 7 Presum-
ably, the Supreme Court weighed the costs of repetition against the
benefits of occasional federal court revision of state court judgments.
The Stone v. Powell Court either found the costs too onerous or
counted the benefits as insignificant. 
1 5
The question after Stone v. Powellwas whether that decision hear-
kened a new habeas model for all cases or only for those involving the
fourth amendment. Stone v. Powell might have been pigeon-holed as
an aberration in habeas corpus law reflective of the Court's growing
ambivalence towards the exclusionary rule.159 Indeed, the Court later
rejected an attempt to extend Stone v. Powell's "opportunity for full
and fair litigation" standard to claims of discrimination in grand jury
selection.' 60
The greater import of Stone, however, became clear with the
155. See, e.g., Gamble v. Oklahoma, 583 F.2d 1161, 1165 (10th Cir. 1978) (state court will-
fully refused to apply correct and controlling constitutional standards; fourth amendment issue
may therefore be reviewed in federal habeas proceeding).
156. Surmounting the Stone v. Powell bar does not necessarily result in a merits review. See,
e.g., Gates v. Henderson, 568 F.2d 830, 842-44 (2d Cir. 1977) (en banc) (Oakes, J., concurring)
("cause and prejudice" bar of Wainwright v. Sykesalso applies to fourth amendment claims), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1038 (1978).
157. Stone v. Powell is frequently assumed to be a citadel of comity and of respect for state
interests. Yet, in some sense, the state courts are at greater risk under Stone v. Powell because it
authorizes a broad inquiry into the soundness of their procedures. The alternative question, of
whether a case was correctly decided, seems less intrusive. However, because few inmates have the
resources necessary to mount a comprehensive challenge to state procedures, in practice Stone has
limited federal review of state convictions. Halpern, supra note 152, at 1.
158. The Court expressly relied upon a utilitarian approach, but described itself as weighing
the costs and benefits not of federal norm enforcement, but of the exclusionary rule, whose deter-
rent force the Court believed diminished as the interval between conviction and review grew. 428
U.S. at 489-94. For the argument that some federal habeas fourth amendment review is worth the
cost, see Halpern, supra note 152, at 31-34.
159. See Nix v. Williams, 104 S. Ct. 2501 (1984) (authoring an exception to the application of
the exclusionary rule); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974) (allowing grand jury
questioning based upon illegally obtained evidence).
160. Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 560-61 (1979); Peller, supra note 13, at 596-602. See
Cardwell v. Taylor, 103 S. Ct. 2015, 2016 (1983) (holding that Stone does not apply to involuntary
confession claims based on the fifth amendment); White v. Finkbeiner, 687 F.2d 885, 888-91 (7th
Cir. 1982) (interpreting Stone as inapplicable to Miranda claims). The Court has, however, lim-
ited the applicability of the exclusionary rule in fifth amendment cases. New York v. Quarles, 104
S. Ct. 2626 (1984).
HeinOnline -- 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. 886 1983-1984
19841 TIERS
Court's 1977 decision in Wainwright v. Sykes.' There, the Court
chose a somewhat different procedural mechanism and adopted a test
that it had flirted with in prior years.' 62 Consistent with its decision in
Stone v. Powell, the Court set up another roadblock to federal review of
habeas claims by reiterating its preference for simpler adjudication
models and for the primacy of first tier decisions.
John Sykes argued that the admission at his trial of statements
made to the police violated his fifth amendment rights because the state
court had failed to hold a preadmission hearing on voluntariness, as
required by Jackson v. Denno.16s Neither Sykes nor his attorney had
raised that claim at Sykes's 1972 trial. Rather, Sykes made the argu-
ment for the first time in a motion filed in the Florida courts to vacate
his conviction. 64 Because the Florida system declined to consider his
claim, 65 Sykes sought federal habeas review. A federal district judge
agreed that the state court should have held a Jackson v. Denno hearing
161. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
162. Eg., Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976);
Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333 (1974) (all employing "cause and prejudice" test in more
limited contexts).
163. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
164. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 75 (1977). This statement needs some qualification.
Justice Rehnquist stated that although Sykes had appealed his conviction, he "apparently did not
challenge the admissibility of the inculpatory statements." Id. (emphasis added). Justice Rehn-
quist noted, however, that the Florida District Court of Appeals, Second District (ruling against
Sykes'spro se application for habeas relief in the state courts) did conclude that "the admissibility
of the post-arrest statements had been raised and decided on direct appeal." 433 U.S. at 75 n.3
(citing Sykes v. State, 275 So. 2d 24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973)). Justice Rehnquist construed the
statement in the Florida case that "[oin direct appeal this court affirmed because the record amply
supported the findings," 275 So. 2d at 24, to indicate that Florida had been presented with a
challenge on admissibility. However, to substantiate his conclusion that no challenge had been
made, Justice Rehnquist relied instead upon the undisputed "findings" of the United States dis-
trict court, which "explicitly found to the contrary"; that is, that Sykes had not raised an objection
to admissibility earlier. 433 U.S. at 75 n.3.
165. Once again, there is some ambiguity. Justice Rehnquist stated that the Florida courts
did not rule on the merits because Sykes's attorney had failed to comply with the contemporane-
ous objection rule. 433 U.S. at 85-86. Justice Rehnquist then found that such a failure to obey a
state rule, absent "cause and prejudice," would serve as an "independent and adequate state
ground" to support the denial of federal review. Id. at 86-87.
The Florida courts, however, said little when denying Sykes's habeas application. The opin-
ion of the Florida District Court of Appeal stated only: "This petition for writ of habeas corpus
raises questions as to admissibility of a confession which was allowed in the trial court against
Sykes. On direct appeal this court affirmed because the record amply supported the findings.
Petition denied." 275 So. 2d at 24. It is unclear whether the "findings" to which the Florida court
referred were based on the appellate court's consideration of the claimed errors, deemed "harm-
less," as Justice White concluded, 433 U.S. at 97-98 (White, J., concurring), or whether, as Justice
Rehnquist assumed, Florida declined to review the claim of error because it had not been raised
earlier.
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on whether Sykes's statements to the police were voluntary, and the
Fifth Circuit affirmed. 166
The Supreme Court reversed, but not because it disagreed with the
merits of the holdings of the federal judges below. The Court did not
decide the merits. Instead, a majority of the Court announced that the
"simple legal question' 67 before it was to interpret the habeas corpus
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), to determine whether the statute's lan-
guage precluded federal courts from reaching the merits of Mr. Sykes's
application. The Court held that Mr. Sykes's claim was not within the
congressional grant to federal courts to entertain applications from
state prisoners "on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 168 Federal habeas
review of the merits was unavailable because Sykes's attorney had
failed to object contemporaneously as required by Florida law,169 be-
cause, in his postconviction attack, Sykes had failed to demonstrate
"cause" for his attorney's failure to object at trial to the admissibility of
the statements,170 and because Sykes had not shown how the admission
of the statements had "prejudiced" his trial.
1 7 1
That "cause" could not be established in Mr. Sykes's case is debat-
able. Little conceivable strategic advantage could be gained by a deci-
sion not to object to the admissibility of two prior inculpatory
statements.' 72 The most likely "cause" for the absence of a contempo-
raneous objection was that Mr. Sykes's attorney did not recognize, and
therefore did not raise, the available evidentiary objection based on
Miranda v. Arizona 73 and Jackson v. Denno.174 The Chief Justice im-
plicitly suggested this explanation in his concurrence, 175 Justices Bren-
166. Wainwright v. Sykes, 528 F.2d 522 (5th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
167. 433 U.S. at 77.
168. Id (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1982)).
169. Id at 86-87.
170. Id at 91.
171. Id This decision about prejudice is a threshold assessment. A court could determine
that "cause and prejudice" has been shown and then turn to the merits and decide that a convic-
tion was constitutional. Moreover, to adjudicate the merits of some constitutional claims, judges
must make a second inquiry about prejudice. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052,
2067 (1984) (to establish a sixth amendment violation, a petitioner must show counsel's serious
errors and that the "deficient performance prejudiced the defense").
172. Wainwright v. Sykes, 528 F.2d at 527. Bul see433 U.S. at 94-97 (Stevens, J., concurring)
(there may have been a tactical reason for not objecting to admissibility).
173. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
174. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
175. 433 U.S. at 93 (Burger, CJ., concurring).
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nan and Marshall assert such "cause" in dissent, 7 6 and the Fifth
Circuit found that there had been no deliberate bypass relating to trial
tactics. 77 In the Supreme Court majority's view, however, the prior
failure to raise the claim was dispositive, whatever the explanation.'78
The Supreme Court's test of "prejudice" derives from its view of
the petitioner's guilt. The majority found the trial record sufficiently
persuasive to render its own culpability judgment. In the Court's view,
given the "other evidence of guilt," the admission of Mr. Sykes's state-
ments did not result in any "actual prejudice."' 179 The Court's conclu-
sion excluded the possibility that Sykes's statements themselves were so
damning that the Court's view of guilt might have been unduly influ-
enced by its knowledge of Sykes's admissions. The Jackson v. Denno
rule, which mandates that the admissibility decision be made outside
the jury's presence, is premised upon a belief that after listening to de-
fendants' questionable admissions, factfinders cannot easily disregard
them.
180
To complain about the majority's assessment of whether Mr.
Sykes met the threshold "cause and prejudice" standard and was there-
fore eligible for a review of the merits of his claim is to play in the
Court's ballpark. My principal concern is not whether the facts of
Sykes fit the law the Court created. Rather, I am concerned with what
animates the model of habeas corpus that Sykes created.
In support of his opinion for the Court, Justice Rehnquist ex-
plained his views of procedure, his concerns about economy, finality,
ritual, norm enforcement, first tier authority, and litigant autonomy.
First, the Justice explained the obvious economy and finality rationales
of the contemporaneous objection rule. Bringing claims of error to the
attention of a trial judge may, if the trial judge rules correctly, avoid
the possible necessity of retrial.' 81 Further, Justice Rehnquist referred
to the importance of preserving the "perception of the trial of a crimi-
nal case in state court as a decisive and portentous event."' 82 The
176. 433 U.S. at 104-05 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
177. Wainwright v. Sykes, 528 F.2d at 527.
178. 433 U.S. at 91.
179. Id
180. The intuition behind the Jackson v. Denno rule is that the "vividness" of a defendant's
inculpatory statements cannot easily be ignored, even if factlinders are instructed to disregard the
statements. See generally R. NIsBErT & L. Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORT-
COMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 43-62 (1980) (review of relationship between kinds of informa-
tion and cognitive inferences and errors).
181. 433 U.S. at 88.
182. Id. at 90.
19841
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state's opportunity to enforce its norms and to exercise its authority
should, the Justice claimed, be as unfettered as possible.
Underlying the Justice's economy/finality concerns was a fear that
litigants would exploit their autonomy and engage in "sandbagging,"
as Justice Rehnquist labeled it.' 83 The majority saw the contemporane-
ous objection rule as a deterrent to litigants who might prefer to permit
errors at trial to go unchallenged in order to learn whether the trial
outcomes are favorable and, if subsequently dissatisfied, to protest.'84
Justice Rehnquist did not discuss any need to diffuse the first tier's
power, nor did he express concern about revisionism. Labeling the
criminal trial as the "main event,"' 5 he claimed that the contempora-
neous objection rule worked "within the limits of human fallibility"'' 6
to resolve correctly the question of a defendant's guilt or innocence.
The procedural world envisioned by the opinion is one in which trial
judges are unambivalent about enforcing federal norms and are rarely
inept. Implicitly, Justice Rehnquist assumed that any needed supervi-
sion would come from state courts and that, in cases like Sykes, a state
appellate court's refusal to review the first tier should suffice for all
time.187
The Court's opinion is almost silent about the legal import of
Sykes's attorney's failure to object. Justice Rehnquist did not directly
answer the question of whether Sykes would have had a sixth amend-
ment claim for ineffective assistance of counsel if his attorney had not
been aware of the Jackson v. Denno claim. Justice Rehnquist ignored
the problem by stating that Sykes "expressly waived 'any contention or
allegation as regards ineffective assistance of counsel' at his trial."'
' 88
183. Id at 89.
184. Id
185. Id at 90.
186. Id
187. There may remain a slim possibility for federal review. Brilmayer, supra note 27, at 758.
But even if state courts review the merits of cases, "norms of affirmance" substantially protects
first tier decisions. Davies, supra note 74, at 612.
188. 433 U.S. at 75 n.4. The docket entry that Justice Rehnquist cited was signed November
20, 1973, some six months after Sykes filed hispro sehabeas petition in federal court. According
to Justice Brennan's dissent, counsel at oral argument explained that Sykes had waived an ineffec-
tive assistance claim "solely" because the federal habeas court had informed him that a sixth
amendment challenge would have necessitated a return to state court to exhaust state judicial
remedies. Id at 105 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The Court did not discuss whether such a waiver could be viewed as "knowing and volun-
tary" under the Johnston v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), standard. Sykes evidently had not known
of the impact of counsel's failures at the time of the waiver. Cf. White, Federal Habeas Corpus."
The Impact of the Failure to Assert a Constitutional Claim at Trial, 58 VA. L. REv. 67, 68 (1972) (to
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Justice White, in his concurrence, did face the issue of ineffective
assistance. He viewed the failure to object as "harmless error" and thus
concluded that an ineffective assistance claim could not succeed. 8 9
Justice White went further and stated that attorneys' mistakes would
not sustain federal habeas claims of sixth amendment violations absent
record errors qualifying for the appellation of "egregious" error or de-
monstrable incompetence. 190
Wainwright v. Sykes stands for the proposition that failures by
criminal defense attorneys to follow state court contemporaneous ob-
jection rules may, absent something deliberately not fully defined by
the opinion but labeled "cause and prejudice,"' 91 make state first tier
rulings unassailable in federal court. Wainwright v. Sykes signals a ren-
aissance of the Single Judge/Finality Model for criminal convictions, a
category of cases that, just fifteen years earlier, had been deemed to
require an elaborate, layered procedural model permitting federal
courts to reach the merits of constitutional claims. Be the judgments of
defense attorneys, judges, prosecutors, or police good or bad; be the
processes by which state courts and their police, judges, prosecutors,
and defense attorneys arrive at decisions constitutional or unconstitu-
tional; federal courts today are generally not permitted to consider a
state prisoner's claim of constitutional error unless the prisoner had the
foresight or luck to be represented by an informed attorney who raised
a claim of illegality at trial. For those prisoners whose claims arise
under the fourth amendment, even prompt objections do not help be-
cause once a state court has provided adequate opportunities for fourth
amendment litigation, a federal court must stay its hand. In sum, the
Burger Court has almost eliminated the second decision center's re-
view. Unlimited review is available only if a litigant passes the very
substantial tests of "full and fair litigation" (for fourth amendment
claims) and of "cause and prejudice" (for constitutional claims not
raised contemporaneously).
assess validity of waiver, consider social value of vindicating particular claim, the likelihood that
the claim is frivolous, and the benefit received by defendant in exchange for the waiver).
189. 433 U.S. at 98 (White, J., concurring).
190. Id. at 99 (White, J., concurring). Justice Stevens, also concurring, eliminated any possi-
ble ineffective assistance of counsel claim by explaining how Sykes' counsel's "strategy" might
have been aided by not challenging the admission of the alleged inculpatory statements. Id. at 96
(Stevens, J., concurring).
191. Id. at 87. Justice Rehnquist stated, "[w]hatever precise content may be given those terms
by later cases, we feel confident in holding without further elaboration that they do not exist
here." Id at 91. For subsequent explanations of the doctrine, see United States v. Frady, 456 U.S.
152 (1982), discussed infra notes 326-58 and accompanying text, and Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107
(1982), discussed infra notes 222-79 and accompanying text.
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4. Some Explanations of the Contemporary Preferences
In Stone v. Powell and Wainwright v. Sykes, the Supreme Court
provided independent rationales to explain its contraction of the
layered Fay v. Noia model and its reliance, with only narrow excep-
tions, on a single decision center model. Stone v. Powell is premised
upon great deference to the first decision center. Unless the state courts
have failed to function as courts, their decisions on fourth amendment
issues stand. Sykes rests on a limited view of litigant autonomy. Un-
less defendants' attorneys comply with many (if not all) state proce-
dural rules, defendants' convictions stand. Subsequent Supreme Court
decisions on habeas claims articulate other justifications for preferring
a single decision center, but all the decisions support the underlying
theses: this Court's dominant procedural concerns are finality and
economy; this Court is sanguine about granting authority to state
courts in general and to the first tier in particular, and this Court has
largely rejected the procedural models approved by its predecessor.
a. The power of the first tier: Stone v. Powell sounds like a re-
statement of the law of res judicata and collateral estoppel.19 2 In Stone
v. Powell, the Court announced that, for fourth amendment claims at
least, one bite at the apple is enough. If the second decisionmaker (the
federal court) concludes that the first decisionmaker (the state court)
provided a facially respectable procedure for making decisions, the sec-
ond decisionmaker must bow out as superfluous.
Stone v. Powell is confusing, however, because it evokes the doc-
trine of res judicata in an arena previously thought immune from such
a defense. The oft-stated "rule" is that habeas corpus is the remarkable
exception to res judicata.193 Why did Stone v. Powell import res judi-
cata finality concerns into a field relatively free from such constraints-
especially on a record where the lower federal courts had found state
courts insensitive to federal constitutional norms?
Several explanations provide partial answers. First, the Burger
Court has displayed a lack of interest in enforcing the exclusionary
192. It is unclear which doctrine the Court is invoking. The opinion does not directly answer
the following question: Must the fourth amendment claim have been actually litigated and de-
cided, as in Stone v. Powell and as collateral estoppel law requires, or is only an opportunity for full
and fair litigation required, as resjudicata would demand? See generally Halpern, supra note 152,
at 17-24 (examining federal courts' interpretation of the "opportunity for full and fair litigation"
standard).
193. See, e.g., Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 8 (1963) (inapplicability ofresjudicata to
habeas corpus is inherent in the purpose of the writ).
HeinOnline -- 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. 892 1983-1984
TIERS
rule;' 94 jettisoning fourth amendment claims from those cognizable on
habeas corpus fits within a pattern of decisions diluting the rule. Fur-
ther, in Stone v. Powell the Court was explicit about its view of the
exclusionary rule's limited utility in postconviction proceedings. 95
This exclusionary rule interpretation of Stone v. Powell, however,
glosses over the basis of the Court's opinion. The Court founded pre-
clusion upon a prior opportunity for full and fair litigation and not
upon the raising of a fourth amendment claim per se. Moreover, by
virtue of Wainwright v. Sykes, we know that fourth amendment claims
are not the only category, precluded from receiving a merits review on
habeas corpus. Decreased interest in the exclusionary rule, while un-
doubtedly important to the Stone v. Powell Court, fails to explain the
Court's consistent pattern in fashioning preclusion rules that go far be-
yond the fourth amendment.
Second, it could be claimed that Stone v. Powell only reformulates
fourth amendment rights. The right to have evidence excluded on the
basis of the fourth amendment could be understood to extinguish after
one court system has found no constitutional deficiencies-in part be-
cause of an assumption that the deterrence value of the exclusionary
rule diminishes over time. The Supreme Court's holding in Stone v.
Powell, however, does not permit this interpretation, because proce-
dural failures (other than those of defendants or their attorneys) in
state courts "revive" the federal right to have the fourth amendment
enforced. That is, if a trial judge does not provide a "full and fair"
opportunity to litigate the fourth amendment claim, the federal court
can hear the merits.
A third explanation of Stone v. Powell, also insufficient, is that the
case is indicative of the Court's desire to provide habeas review only to
the "colorably innocent" and not to the guilty. Since claims of illegal
search and seizure are unrelated to the guilt of defendants, Stone v.
Powell might have meant that the Court would require, as a precondi-
tion for federal habeas corpus review, that petitioners make colorable
claims of innocence. 196 Indeed, the Court stated that the issue in the
194. See supra note 159.
195. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482-89 (1976).
196. See, e.g., Friendly, supra note 13, at 142 (collateral attack should be available only when
prisoner establishes colorable claim of innocence). The perception that the claims advanced in
many habeas petitions do not implicate guilt is undermined by Professor Shapiro's study of 257
petitions filed in federal district court in Massachusetts during the years between 1970 and 1972.
Only 24 involved fourth amendment claims, and "a maximum of 42 others might conceivably
have involved claims which were not guilt related." Shapiro, supra note 77, at 372.
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typical fourth amendment case "has no bearing on the basic justice of
[the defendant's] incarceration,"' 97-presumably because the peti-
tioner's guilt is unquestioned.
The Court in Stone v. Powell, however, did not adopt "colorable
innocence" as its test. Instead it authorized lower federal courts to con-
sider the litigation opportunities in state courts, an inquiry not coexten-
sive with the question of colorable innocence. Further, when later
asked to demand colorable innocence as a precondition to habeas re-
lief, a majority of the Court expressly declined to do so. In Rose v.
Mitchell,9 8 for example, two black defendants sought to have their
convictions overturned because of allegations that the indicting grand
jury had been selected in an unconstitutionally discriminatory manner.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit agreed.' 99
Despite the attenuated relationship between the composition of a grand
jury and the guilt of individuals convicted by an untainted petit jury,
the Supreme Court concluded that "[flederal habeas review is neces-
sary to ensure that constitutional defects in the state judiciary's grand
jury selection procedure are not overlooked," 2" and decided the case
on its merits.20 Thus, federal habeas corpus remains viable, at least in
theory, for challenges to some as of yet unspecified subset of alleged
constitutional violations in state courts--even when such violations do
not undermine conclusions about defendants' factual guilt.20 2 Stone v.
Powell must therefore mean something other than that only the argua-
bly innocent deserve a Single Judge plus Limited Review/Different Fo-
rum plus Unlimited Review Model of decisionmaking.
A fourth possible explanation is that Stone v. Powell assumes that
no principled reason exists to prefer a federal court decision to that of a
state court.203 Stone v. Powell, however, is not a good example of the
difficulty of ascertaining which courts provide more "correct" deci-
sions, because the issues in Stone v. Powellwere questions of the mean-
197. 428 U.S. at 491-92 n.31.
198. 443 U.S. 545 (1979).
199. 570 F.2d 129, 136 (6th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 443 U.S. 545 (1979).
200. 443 U.S. at 563.
201. The Court held that the grand jury foreman had not been selected unconstitutionally.
Id. at 574.
202. See also Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An Examination of Continuity and
Change in Criminal Procedure, 80 COLUM. L. Rav. 436, 483-501 (1980) (arguing that concern
about crime control, and not about innocence, animates the Burger Court's decisions on criminal
procedure).
203. See Bator, supra note 13, at 526-27 (assuming state gave full corrective process, habeas as
"mere repetition" is institutionally unjustified); Bator, supra note 140, at 615 (claims of preference
for federal forum outweighed by disadvantage of redundancy).
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ing of federal law. We do have a principled basis upon which to prefer
federal decisionmaking-a raison d'etre of the federal courts is exper-
tise in federal law.204 Federal courts specialize in announcing and im-
plementing federal norms. Yet, when presented with the "right"
answer on the merits of the fourth amendment violation question, the
Supreme Court mandated a retreat to the "wrong" answer because it
believed the "costs" of rightness-the dual litigation system, the post-
poning of the finality of convictions, and the application of the exclu-
sionary rule-outweighed the "benefits." In its calculus, the Court did
not appear to count as a cost Stone v. Powell's likely byproduct-state
courts' diverse interpretations of what the fourth amendment
205requires.
In my opinion, one explanation that reconciles the Court's choices
in Stone v. Powell and its pronouncements in subsequent cases is that
Stone v. Powell is about procedural modeling. The Court held that
when a decision is rendered in a state court via a process that is famil-
iar, federal courts may not probe that decision for its congruence with
federal law, even when those who challenge the decision are incarcer-
ated. To prefer state adjudication despite federal decisions that state
courts have erred, yet not to overturn those federal rulings on the mer-
its, is to give scant weight to consistent enforcement of federal rights.
b. Litigants'autonomy: In Wainwright v. Sykes, there was no un-
ambiguous state court decision on the merits of Mr. Sykes's claim that
statements had been admitted at trial in violation of the fifth amend-
ment. Nevertheless, the Court declined to inquire into the constitution-
ality of Mr. Sykes's incarceration because Mr. Sykes had delayed
raising the constitutional claim and had shown neither "cause" to ex-
cuse the failure nor "prejudice" resulting from the statements'
admission.
The Sykes Court created more preclusion opportunities than had
existed under Fay v. Nolo. Under Noia, a court was permitted to find
"deliberate by-pass" only when the defendant personally had decided
to withhold a claim;2°6 in Wainwright v. Sykes, defense attorneys' deci-
204. See Eisenberg, supra note 49, at 511 (lower federal courts are "primary vindicators" of
federal rights); Sager, Foreward" Congressional Limitations on Congress'Authority to Regulate the
Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REv. 17, 42-60 (1981) (lower federal courts have
important role in federal rights enforcement).
205. The Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction is inadequate to impose consistency. Sager,
supra note 204, at 28-29.
206. 372 U.S. at 439.
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sions also "counted" as bases for preclusion.20 7 The concurring opin-
ions of both Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stevens assumed that
Sykes played no role in the decision not to object contemporaneously.
In the Chief Justice's words, such "trial decisions are of necessity en-
trusted to the accused's attorney." 08 Thus, when a litigant's autonomy
is transferred to an attorney, the attorney is free to make binding deci-
sions for the client although the client may never be consulted and
might not have concurred in the choices made. 0 9 Given that the Court
took at face value Sykes's so-called "express waiver" of any ineffective
assistance of counsel claim he might have had, attorneys' mistakes can
be completely insulated from challenges or review.210
Why should attorneys' choices, inadvertence, or errors bar federal
review of the constitutionality of convictions? While acknowledging
the role played by Sykes's attorney, part of the Court's answer envi-
sioned defendants, as well as their attorneys, as the critical actors. The
Court argued that a rule that permits litigants two avenues of redress
encourages them to misuse the first by "sandbagging,"' 21' deliberately
withholding claims of error in hopes of acquittals, and if the "initial
gamble does not pay off,"212 playing a second card.
The sandbag argument, not unique to Sykes,2 1 3 is unpersuasive for
207. 433 U.S. at 89. The concurring opinions make this assumption explicit. Id. at 93, 96, 98-
99 (Burger, Stevens & White, JJ., each concurring separately). For discussion of the constraints,
both in time and information, on defense counsel, see Note, Federal Habeas Corpus Review of
Unintentionally Defaulted Constitutional Claims, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 981, 996-98 (1982).
208. 433 U.S. at 94 (Burger, CJ., concurring).
209. Further, as we learned some six years later, even when criminal clients explicitly object
to attorneys' decisions, defendants may nevertheless be bound. See Jones v. Barnes, 103 S. Ct.
3308, 3312 (1983) (refusal by state-appointed lawyer to press nonfrivolous claims on appeal of
indigent criminal defendant's case did not violate the defendant's sixth amendment rights). See
also Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976) (criminal defense attorney's refusal to object to trial
while defendant was dressed in prison garb constituted waiver of that due process claim, even
though record indicated that defendant had complained to attorney about going to trial in prison
clothes).
210. Justice Brennan, dissenting in Sykes, complained that "in light of the prevailing stan-
dards, or lack of standards, for judging the competency of trial counsel, it is perfectly consistent
for even a lawyer who commits a grievous error-whether due to negligence or ignorance-to be
deemed to have provided competent representation." 433 U.S. at 105 n.6 (citation omitted). In
1984, the Supreme Court set forth the test for sixth amendment challenges. See Strickland v.
Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984), discussed infra text accompanying notes 274-75.
211. 433 U.S. at 89.
212. Id
213. E.g., Spalding v. Aiken, 103 S. Ct. 1795, 1797 (1983) (Burger, C.J., statement concerning
denial of certiorari), denying cert. to 684 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Frady, 456 U.S.
152, 154 (1982); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 109 (1982), discussed infra notes 221-79, 326-57 and
accompanying text.
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several reasons. First, it assumes a fantastically risk-prone pool of de-
fendants and attorneys.214 Given that the success rate at trial and on
appeal,2 t5 while low, is greater than the success rate on habeas
corpus,216 the odds are against being able to "sandbag" in a first proce-
dure and emerge victorious in a second. Moreover, because appeals
and habeas decisions occur many months and often years after convic-
tion, defendants must discount the odds of victory by the years of in-
carceration pending adjudication.217 Further, the sandbagging
argument is based upon the unrealistic premises that criminal defend-
ants or their attorneys know of all the possible legal claims and that
criminal defendants have control over their attorneys.218
Second, the sandbagging argument assumes that attorneys some-
times take such gambles without conferring with their clients-an as-
sumption of lawyers free from ethical constraints. If the majority of
criminal defense attorneys are in fact so liberated, it would be odd for
the Court to endorse and, by refusing sixth amendment claims, to insu-
late that behavior. Finally, even if the Court believed "sandbagging" to
be a frequent phenomenon, the Court did not explain why Fay v.
Noia's "deliberate by-pass" standard, or a deliberate bypass standard
encompassing attorneys' decisions, was not sufficient deterrence for
such a practice. The Court never articulated why the test it crafted,
214. See generally Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial- 4 TheoreticalAnalysis Under Alterna-
tive Methods/or the 411ocation ofLegal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55 passim (1982) (modeling the
risk factors and the circumstances under which litigants will go to trial rather than settle).
215. Data on the federal system suggest that criminal defendants succeeded in obtaining ac-
quittals or dismissals in 18% of all federal criminal cases disposed of in 1982-83. See ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, in
REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 340 table
D-4 (1983) [hereinafter cited as 1983 ANNUAL REPORT] [hereinafter all Annual Reports of the
Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts will be cited by their year as
19xx ANNUAL REPORT].
Appellate reversal rates vary. While Davies (describing the California Court of Appeals for
the First Appellate District) indicates that more than 95% of all criminal cases are affirmed, and
the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts (describing federal appellate
rates) indicates that approximately 87% of all criminal cases are affirmed, Judge Wald reports only
an 82% affirmation rate in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Com-
pare Davies, supra note 74, at 577 and 1983 ANNUAL REPORT, supra at 243 table B-IA with Wald,
supra note 23, at 767.
216. See P. ROBINSON, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW OF
STATE COURT JUDGMENTS 4(a) (1979) (only 3.2% of petitions studied resulted in any relief).
217. Release on bail pending decision is unusual. See, e.g., CaUey v. Callaway, 496 F.2d 701
(5th Cir.) (bail while habeas petition pending only in exceptional circumstances), applicaion/or
stay ofmandate denied, 418 U.S. 906 (1974).
218. See, e.g., Morris v. Slappy, 103 S. Ct. 1610 (1983) (public defender's decision to go to
trial over client's objections-because prior public defender had become ill-not grounds for va-
cature of conviction).
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which snared inadvertence and error as well as deliberate choice, was
the necessary prophylactic.
But the Court uses its odd version of litigant autonomy to justify
the Court's endorsement of finality. First, the Court assumes either
that litigants make knowledgeable choices and exercise control over
their attorneys, or that litigants cede all control to attorneys and are
appropriately bound by lawyers' decisions or actions. Then, by imply-
ing that litigants or their lawyers have chosen to sandbag, the Court
concludes that litigants "deserve" the outcomes of their first, and only,
shot.
c. Revisionism and the relevance of guilt: At first blush, Wain-
wnht v. Sykes, like Stone v. Powell, might appear to be a case in which
the Court's procedural rule of "cause and prejudice" is a surrogate for
a deeper concern, the guilt or innocence of the petitioner. Inquiries
about "prejudice" seem very close to questions about guilt; reviewing
courts are invited to make independent determinations of petitioners'
moral worthiness for habeas relief. While the Court declined to adopt
a straightforward "colorably innocent" test in Sykes and Stone v. Pow-
ell, the two cases could be seen as transitional, paving the way for a
case in which the Court will announce that "custody in violation of the
Constitution" means "custody of colorably innocent individuals."219
The difficulty with the thesis that guilt was the Sykes Court's un-
derlying concern is that the "cause and prejudice" test applies to the
possibly innocent as well as the guilty.22° Many criminal defendants
may be represented by misguided or unsophisticated counsel who fail
to make timely claims of unconstitutional error. The Supreme Court's
choice to require both "cause and prejudice" presumably precludes
those who can show prejudice but have no excuse for a failure to raise a
claim earlier. Colorable innocence might be necessary, but it is not
sufficient.
A reading of Sykes's cause and prejudice test to catch the possibly
219. The Court has come close to this formulation in some cases. See, e.g., United States v.
Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 171 (1982) (the majority stated that Frady had "malice aplenty" and denied
his habeas petition). Guilt is not, of course, irrelevant. See generally Ponsoldt, When Guilt Should
Be Irrelevant: Government Overreaching as a Bar to Reprosecution Under the Double Jeopardy
ClauseAfter Oregon v. Kennedy, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 76 pasim (1983) (prosecutorial misconduct
should bar reprosecution after a mistrial, regardless of defendant's possible guilt).
220. Whether Sykes's claim was one of innocence is unclear. Although he predicated his
claim for exclusion of his admission on grounds of intoxication, the opinion does not indicate
whether Sykes claimed his intoxicated state caused him to admit to a crime he did not commit, or
to speak with the police about a crime he did commit.
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innocent as well as the likely guilty is substantiated by more recent
cases. In Engle v. Isaac,221 for example, the Court expressly concluded
that arguably innocent petitioners may be precluded under the Sykes
test. Isaac also gave new definition to the meaning of "cause."
In 1975, a jury in Ohio convicted Lincoln Isaac of aggravated as-
sault. Isaac had defended by claiming that he had beaten his former
wife's boyfriend in self-defense. 22 2 In accordance with the then com-
mon interpretation of an Ohio statute that the "burden of going for-
ward with the evidence of an affirmative defense is upon the
accused," 223 the trial judge had instructed the jury that Isaac had the
burden of proving self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence,
and Isaac's attorney made no objection to the instruction.
After Isaac's conviction, but prior to his appeal, the Ohio Supreme
Court interpreted the statute to require that defendants provide suffi-
cient evidence to raise an affirmative defense, but not to place the bur-
den of proving such defenses on defendants. 224  Relying on that
interpretation, Isaac argued in his appeal that the trial court's jury in-
structions had been erroneous. Although the Ohio Supreme Court had
previously held that its new interpretation of Ohio's self-defense statute
was to be applied retroactively, 2 5 the Ohio court dismissed Isaac's ap-
peal because Isaac's attorney had failed to object contemporaneously to
the instruction.226 Yet, on the very day the Ohio court denied Isaac's
appeal, the court concluded that another appellant, Barbara Meyer,
who had also had the burden of proving self-defense, had not lost her
claim because of the contemporaneous objection rule. Unlike Isaac,
Meyer had been tried by a judge. Because Ohio's contemporaneous
objection rule was phrased to require objections "before the jury re-
tires,"227 the Ohio Supreme Court concluded that the contemporaneous
objection rule had no application to bench trials like Meyer's and up-
221. 456 U.S. 107 (1982).
222. Id. at 114-15.
223. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.05(A) (Page 1975). In 1978, the Ohio legislature amended
section 2901.05(A) to read: "The burden of going forward with the evidence of an affirmative
defense and the burden ofproof, by a preponderance of the evidence, for an affhnative defense, is
upon the accused." Id. § 2901.05(A) (Page Supp. 1980) (emphasis added).
224. State v. Robinson, 47 Ohio St. 2d 103, 110, 351 N.E.2d 88, 93 (1976).
225. State v. Humphries, 51 Ohio St. 2d 95, 103, 364 N.E.2d 1354, 1359 (1977).
226. Isaac v. Engle, 646 F.2d 1129, 1132 (6th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 456 U.S. 107 (1982).
227. At the time, OHIo R. CraM. P. 30 stated:
No party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omission therefrom unless he
objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating specifically the matter
to which he objects and the grounds of his objection. Opportunity shall be given to make
the objection out of the hearing of the jury.
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held the intermediate court's reversal of her conviction.22 8
Isaac succeeded on federal habeas review in the Sixth Circuit,
which first issued a panel decision and then heard his case en banc.
229
Reviewing Ohio law, both the panel and en banc opinions concluded
that, prior to the new case interpretation, defendants' burden of proof
of affirmative defenses had been so well settled that defense attorneys
could not reasonably have been expected to challenge instructions in
accordance with that rule.23° Thus, Isaac had "cause" for his failure to
object to the jury instructions.23' Moreover, the "resulting prejudice"
was "clear" because the misallocation of the burden of proof "pro-
foundly" affected the "basic fairness of the trial" and called the defend-
ant's legal guilt into question.1
2
After determining that Isaac met the threshold "cause and
prejudice" test of Wainwright v. Sykes, the Sixth Circuit granted his
petition. In that court's view, the state had a due process obligation to
prove all elements of crimes and could not constitutionally shift any of
its burden to a defendant. Once Ohio had accused Isaac of aggravated
assault, and defined the absence of self-defense as an element of the
crime, Ohio could not require him to prove self-defense. 33
In the panel and en banc decisions, nine judges issued five opin-
ions, each with different theories of how Ohio courts had violated the
Constitution.2 34  The multiplicity of opinions demonstrates the diffli-
228. State v. Meyer, 51 Ohio St. 95, 364 N.E.2d 1354 (1977). See also State v. Humphries, 51
Ohio St. 2d 95, 1359, 364 N.E.2d 1354, 1354 (1977) (ruling that Humphries, who had been tried by
a jury and had failed to object contemporaneously, was barred from appeal).
229. Isaac v. Engle, 646 F.2d 1122 (6th Cir.) (panel), aj'a 646 F.2d 1129 (6th Cir. 1980) (en
banc), rev'd, 456 U.S. 107 (1982).
230. 646 F.2d at 1126 (panel); 646 F.2d at 1133 (en banc).
231. 646 F.2d at 1133-34 (en banc plurality).
232. Id at 1134.
233. Id at 1135-36. See also Koeher v. Engle, 707 F.2d 241 (6th Cir. 1983), a f'd by an
equally divided Court, 104 S. Ct. 1673 (1984) (impermissible shift of burdens of proof).
234. The majority in the panel's opinion held that Ohio could not, consistent with due pro-
cess, apply its contemporaneous objection rule in a manner that precluded Isaac from obtaining
the benefits of the Robinson ruling. In the majority's view, there was no rational relationship
between the contemporaneous objection rule and Isaac's counsel's failure to object to a well-set-
tled practice. Thus Ohio's "selective retroactivity claim" was a violation of due process. 646 F.2d
at 1126-27 (panel). The concurrence concluded that retroactive application of Robinson was con-
stitutionally required. 646 F.2d at 1129 (en banc).
The plurality opinion for the en banc court held that the cause and prejudice test of Wain-
wright v. Sykes was met. Thereafter, relying on Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), the en
banc court decided that Ohio's burden of proof rule, as applied to Isaac, was unconstitutional. 646
F.2d at 1135-36 (en banc). The two concurring opinions, however, offered different rationales. Id.
at 1136 (Edwards, C.J., concurring); Id at 1137 (Jones, J., concurring). As one concurring judge
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culty of the case for the court.2 35 Although disagreeing about the pre-
cise nature of Isaac's right, most of the judges agreed that Ohio courts
had used procedural rules in an offensive manner. These judges be-
lieved that the contemporaneous objection rule had been misapplied to
Isaac's case, since any objection that might have been made would
have been "futile" 236 or "vain. 2 37 The federal judges were also trou-
bled by the Ohio court's decision to make its new understanding of the
burden of proof retroactive, but to give the benefits of its ruling only to
those defendants tried by judges or to those represented by attorneys
who had raised "futile" objections at trial.238
Isaac's case is reminiscent of Fay v. Noia. In both cases, federal
judges' disapproval of state courts criminal process flowed from con-
cern about uneven application of legal rules resulting in disparate treat-
ment of criminal defendants. In both cases, the procedurally
disadvantaged had claims of legal innocence that state courts refused to
hear. Unlike Fay v. Noia, however, the Supreme Court in Engle v.
Isaac did not share the federal appellate court's criticism of a state
court's uneven use of preclusion rules. Rather, the Court ordered fed-
eral courts not to intervene.2 39
The Supreme Court agreed with the Sixth Circuit that Ohio's bur-
den of proof rules had been well established. "For over a century,"
defendants had borne the burden of proving self-defense, and most
courts in Ohio had agreed that the 1974 legislative codification of bur-
dens "worked no change in Ohio's traditional burden-of-proof
rules." 240 Further, the Supreme Court agreed with the Sixth Circuit
that Isaac had raised a "colorable constitutional claim" in arguing that
Ohio's burden of proof rule violated due process.241 The Supreme
explained, "A majority of the en banc Court agrees on only one point: that Isaac's imprisonment
is in violation of due process of law." Id. at 1136 (Jones, J., concurring).
235. Chief Judge Edwards stated that "few cases in the history of this court have resulted in
as much soul-searching thought and debate as has this case." 646 F.2d at 1136.
236. 646 F.2d at 1133 (en banc).
237. 646 F.2d at 1126 (panel).
238. Id at 1127.
239. The Supreme Court ruling applied to Isaac's case and to two other Sixth Circuit opinions
that had been consolidated with Isaac and that were also reversed. 451 U.S. 906 (1981). Hughes v.
Engle, 642 F.2d 451 (6th Cir. 1980); Bell v. Perini, 635 F.2d 575 (6th Cir. 1980).
240. 456 U.S. at 110-11 (footnote omitted).
241. Id at 122. For other Supreme Court discussions about the import of errors flowing from
jury instructions, and specifically of an erroneous instruction in a criminal trial that "the law
presumes a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts," see Connecticut v.
Johnson, 103 S. Ct. 969 (1983). In Johnson, a direct appeal, a plurality opinion upheld the reversal
of a conviction based upon such an instruction.
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Court disagreed, however, about whether Isaac had overcome the pre-
clusion rule of Wainwright v. Sykes. Holding that Isaac had not shown
"cause" for his failure to comply with the state's contemporaneous ob-
jection rule, the Court reversed.242
Most of the rationales provided in Justice O'Connor's majority
opinion were familiar. "The Great Writ entails significant costs";
243
the "writ undermines the usual principles of finality of litigation";
244
the writ "degrades" the trial;," the "writs. . . cost society the right to
punish admitted offenders";, 6 federal intrusion frustrates "[s]tates' ex-
ercise of their sovereign powers to punish offenders. 247 Some of the
arguments, however, had novel twists. The majority claimed that the
existence of habeas corpus relief was bad for defendants. Implicitly
rejecting the commonplace assumption that the threat of review in-
spires care, Justice O'Connor stated that "participants" (presumably
state prosecutors, judges, and defense counsel), safe in the knowledge
of federal habeas review, would be more casual in their adherence to
constitutional rules.248
Issac resolved two questions that had been debated after Wain-
wright v. Sykes. First, the Court confronted the question of whether the
Sykes's preclusion rule should apply only to claims unrelated to inno-
cence.24 9 The Court concluded that "the principles of Sykes" did not
"lend" themselves to "this limitation. 250 Whether or not habeas peti-
tioners claim unconstitutional distortions of truthfinding, all petitioners
whose attorneys fail to comply with state contemporaneous objection
rules must show "cause and actual prejudice." 251 Second, Isaac defined
"cause" as a requirement of monumental proportions. "[T]he futility
of presenting an objection to the state courts cannot alone constitute
242. 456 U.S. at 129.
243. Id at 126 (footnote omitted).
244. Id at 127 (footnote omitted).
245. Id
246. Id Justice O'Connor did not explain what relevance this concern had to Isaac's case, as
he was not an "admitted offender."
247. Id at 128.
248. Id at 127.
249. Id at 129. Sykes had argued that his confession had been improperly admitted at trial.
433 U.S. at 74. While that claim could have been understood as related to innocence, Isaac sought
to distinguish his claim from that of Sykes by arguing that innocence was directly implicated. The
Isaac Court agreed with Isaac that Sykes's claim "did not affect the determination of guilt at
trial." 456 U.S. at 129.
250. 456 U.S. at 129.
251. Id
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cause for a failure to object at trial. ' 25 2 Nor can counsel's malfeasance,
whether due to "simple ignorance or the pressure of trial, '253 constitute
cause. "The defendant's counsel, for whatever reasons, has detracted
from the trial's significance by neglecting to raise a claim in that
forum.
2 5 4
Under Isaac, criminal defense lawyers are well advised to raise all
and any claims, whatever the state of the law on any given issue.
Given Ohio case law and the fact that part of Isaac's claim did not arise
until ten months after trial, his lawyer could hardly have been expected
to have raised the argument at trial.255 Justice O'Connor conceded that
many "astute" lawyers would not have done so. 2 5 6 Nevertheless, she
blocked Isaac's access to federal court. Given the absence of "cause,"
the Court declined to address Isaac's argument about "prejudice."
257
The "cause" requirement can thus function to preclude habeas re-
view based upon changes in constitutional law. The desire of some
members of the Court to use "cause" to achieve this goal became clear
when, two years after Isaac, a four-person plurality placed one narrow
limitation on Isaads broad definition of "cause." In Reed v. Ross,
258
Justice Brennan, writing for the plurality, held that "where a constitu-
tional claim is so novel that its legal basis is not reasonably available to
counsel, ' 259 a defendant has established "cause" for a prior failure to
claim the error.
Reed v. Ross is very similar to Engle v. Isaac. Defendant Ross was
convicted in 1969 of first degree murder. The trial judge had instructed
the jury that the defendant bore the burden of proving several affirma-
252. Id at 130.
253. Id at 129 n.34. See Long v. McKeen, 722 F.2d 286, 289 (6th Cir. 1983) (defense attor-
ney's alleged incompetence in failing to raise timely objection to erroneous jury instructions insuf-
ficient to establish "cause"), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1608 (1984); Marks v. Estelle, 691 F.2d 730,
735 (5th Cir. 1982) ("cause" could not be ineffective assistance of counsel, because then allegations
of ineffectiveness would render "that prong of Sykes meaningless"). Cf. Alston v. Garrison, 720
F.2d 812, 816 (4th Cir. 1983) (ineffective assistance of counsel satisfies "cause" since allegedly
ineffective counsel could not "have been expected to assert his own incompetence"); Tague, Fed-
eral Habeas Corpus and Ineffective Representation of Counsel The Supreme Court Has Work to
Do, 31 STAN. L. REv. 1, 25 n.123 (1978) (relationship between ineffective assistance and "cause"
not settled).
254. 456 U.S. at 128-29 (emphasis added).
255. Justice Brennan, joined in dissent by Justice Marshall, argued that the "claim did not
even exist until after Isaac was denied relief on his last direct appeal." Id at 137-38 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis in original).
256. Id. at 133.
257. Id at 134 n.43.
258. 104 S. Ct. 2901 (1984).
259. Id at 2910.
1984]
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tive defenses, including the absence of malice and self-defense.260 Un-
like Isaac, the state in Ross "conceded" that Ross had suffered "actual
prejudice" 26 because of the trial judge's instructions. One year after
Ross's trial, the Court decided In re Winsh p,2 61 which began a line of
cases culminating several years later with Mullaney v. Wilbu 2 63 and
Hankerson v. North Carolina .2 4 These cases held that "due process
requires the prosecution to bear the burden of persuasion with respect
to each element of a crime" 265 and that such principles were to be ap-
plied retroactively.
Thus, the dissenters (Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Black-
mun and Chief Justice Burger) in Ross accurately described that case as
one "tried properly by then-prevailing constitutional standards and be-
ing set aside because of legal developments that occurred long after."
266
For these Justices, who formed part of the majority in Isaac, Reed v.
Ross is but another example of an unreasonable waste of "[t]ime and
energy spent relitigating trials long final and completely fair. ' 267 The
dissenters would handle cases like Ross with a blanket rule: new con-
stitutional principles should, "with rare exception, not be given retroac-
tive application on habeas review." 268 Moreover, the dissenters had
thought that with the stringent definition of "cause" in Isaac, such a
rule had been put into place. They protested that Ross was simply an-
other in the Isaac line.269
Although the Ross plurality found a crevice in the seemingly im-
pregnable "cause" requirement of Isaac, the aperture is narrow. The
assumption, even of the Ross plurality, is the same, ever-haunting spec-
tre of litigant autonomy, played out as "sandbagging." When criminal
defendants are represented by counsel who do not present constitu-
tional claims at trial, the plurality was prepared to assume that counsel
had knowledge of the claims and made deliberate tactical decisions to
260. Id at 2905.
261. Id at 2908.
262. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
263. 421 U.S. at 684 (1975).
264. 432 U.S. 233 (1977).
265. According to Justice Brennan, summarizing the cases in Reed v. Ross, 104 S. Ct. at 2904,
266. Id at 2913.
267. Id at 2915-16 n.3.
268. Id Justice Powell concurred in Reedbecause the state had not challenged the retroactive
application ofMullaney v. Wilbur. However, Justice Powell reiterated his view that "new constitu-
tional rules [should be applied] retroactively on collateral review only in exceptional cases." Id at
2912. See also Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233, 246-48 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring
to make the same argument).
269. 104 S. Ct. at 2915.
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withhold claims. Therefore, habeas review would be barred. Under
Ross, the hurdle of "cause" can only be surmounted in rare instances-
when a claim is "truly novel" 271 so that a court can be sure that a "pro-
cedural failure is not attributable to an intentional decision by coun-
sel."272  Further, the plurality instructed lower courts to impute
deliberate withholding of claims without taking the obvious step of
conducting factfinding hearings to determine what defendants' attor-
neys knew. Presumably the plurality assumed that defense attorneys
would be unavailable, would not be able to remember, would not accu-
rately report their memories, or that the expenses of asking were too
great.
After Isaac and Ross, whether colorable innocence is a condition
of the "cause and prejudice" test remains unclear. The Supreme Court
has had other opportunities to discuss "prejudice, 17 3 but has declined
to equate it with innocence. For example, in Strickland v. Washing-
ton,2 74 which set forth the standard for sixth amendment ineffective
assistance of counsel claims, the Court held that "prejudice," in that
context, was whether a defendant could show "a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceed-
ing would have been different."275 A quick translation of that rule is
that convicted defendants must establish that they could have been ac-
quitted. But as the Court has reminded us in other cases,276 defendants
could be acquitted but not necessarily be able to establish innocence.
Thus, although evidently flirting with the idea of linking prejudice to
innocence, the Court still shies away from explicitly equating the two.
Engle v. Isaac is consistent with the vision of Stone v. Powell and
Wainwright v. Sykes: one decision is enough. In all three cases, lower
federal judges were willing to engage in revisionism, to implement fed-
eral constitutional protections at the expense of the finality of state con-
270. Id. at 2909-10.
271. Id at 2910.
272. Id at 2909. The plurality elaborated that such claims would not be "reasonably avail-
able" to attorneys when the claims were based upon Supreme Court cases overruling prior prece-
dents or widespread practices of lower courts or upon Supreme Court disapproval of a practice
arguably sanctioned by prior cases. Id. at 2911. The third category will involve the most difficult
determinations.
273. Eg. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982); United States v. Morrison, 449
U.S. 361 (1981).
274. 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).
275. Id at 2068.
276. See, e.g., United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 104 S. Ct. 1099, 1104 (1984)
("[Aln acquittal on criminal charges does not prove that the defendant is innocent; it merely
proves the existence of a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.").
1984]
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victions. The Supreme Court, however, chose deference to state judges,
and the Court seemed unperturbed about states' erratic enforcement of
federal rights.2 77 The Court's valuations of finality, economy, and the
first tier's decisionmaking powers are determinate in its modeling of
habeas corpus;278 innocence is insufficient.27 9
d. The role offederalism: Perhaps recent habeas corpus case law
can be explained as responsive to federalism concerns. Stone v. Powell,
Wainwright v. Sykes, and Engle v. Isaac are all cases in which state
prisoners sought relief from the federal courts. Perhaps these cases,
and the model of habeas corpus they created, indicate that the Court
believes state adjudication rarely should be disturbed by federal judges.
Principles of comity, invoked in many other areas,280 may explain the
results. As the Court remarked in Isaac: "[f]ederal intrusions into state
criminal trials frustrate both the States' sovereign power to punish of-
fenders and their good-faith attempts to honor constitutional rights. ' 281
277. Professor Brilmayer, in an article that predated Engle v. Isaac, argued that commentators
were too quick to criticize the "cause and prejudice" standard for giving too much weight to state
courts' preclusion rules. She claimed that, since cause and prejudice is a federally formulated
preclusion rule, no undue deference had been given to the states. Brilmayer, supra note 27, at 754-
55.
A footnote in Engle v. Isaac undercuts her argument. Justice O'Connor stated that had Ohio
"exercised its discretion to consider respondents' claims, then [respondents'] initial default would
no longer block federal review." 456 U.S. at 135 n.44. Thus, federal preclusion rules depend
directly upon state rules. See also Smith v. Kemp, 715 F.2d 1459, 1470-71 (5th Cir.) (one code-
fendant who had failed to object contemporaneously not barred from federal habeas corpus be-
cause state had declined to enforce its procedural rule, while other codefendant barred because
state had enforced its rule in his case), cert. deniea 104 S. Ct. 510 (1983).
278. The Court might have been concerned that a favorable decision in Isaac would have
mandated the retrial of hundreds of defendants. Justice White expressed such a fear in Hanker-
son v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233, 239 (1977), which had given retroactive effect to the ruling on
burden of proof in Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975). Justice White suggested that states
"may be able to insulate past convictions by enforcing the normal and valid rule that failure to
object to a jury instruction is a waiver of any claim of error." 432 U.S. at 244 n.8. Justice
O'Connor quoted this comment in her opinion in Isaac. 456 U.S. at 134 n.43.
279. The Supreme Court has declined to hear other habeas cases in which the petitioners have
claimed innocence. See, e.g., Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982), discussed infranotes 576-78 and
accompanying text, and Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591 (1982); Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539
(1981) (deference to state court findings required remanding claim of allegedly impermissibly sug-
gestive identification of the defendant).
280. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 103 S. Ct. 1660, 1670 (1983) (principles of equity,
comity, and federalism limit federal courts when reviewing the actions of state law enforcement
agencies); Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 110-13 (1981) (as a
matter of comity, federal courts should not adjudicate claims, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, that state tax systems violate individuals' civil rights).
281. 456 U.S. at 128 (citation omitted). The majority opinion also expressed concern that
federal courts' habeas corpus decisions undermined the "morale" of state court judges. Id at 128
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The difficulty with a federalism explanation, however, is that the
principles and the procedural preferences announced extend beyond
cases filed by state prisoners. Not only have the new rules been applied
to federal habeas petitioners,282 but concerns for finality, economy, and
first tier decisionmakers' authority have also influenced results in law-
suits unrelated to criminal law.283 My point is not that federalism is
irrelevant, but rather that federalism is used only as a justification for
decisions made for other reasons.
On the same day that the Court announced its decision in Engle v.
Isaac, the Court held in United States v. Frady28 4 that the "cause and
prejudice" test applied with full force to federal prisoners' habeas ap-
plications filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.285 Further, in Frady the
Supreme Court erected barriers to habeas for federal prisoners that are
greater than those state prisoners face. Frady provides additional in-
sight into the meaning of "prejudice" and demonstrates that the Single
Judge plus Limited Review Model now has preclusive force in habeas
claims filed within a single decision center, the federal system.
B. FEDERAL PRISONERS' EFFORTS TO OBTAIN HABEAS REVIEW
1. The Statutory Framework
Prior to 1948, federal prisoners, like state prisoners, requested
n.33. Federalism, as a theme, has a long history in habeas corpus. See Exparte Royall, 117 U.S.
241, 251-53 (1886) (judicial creation of exhaustion of state remedies doctrine).
282. See, e.g., United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 (1982) (applying the Sykes rule to federal
prisoners' claims). The Supreme Court has not decided a federal prisoner's fourth amendment
claim since its decision on state prisoners' claims in Stone v. Powell. In Kaufman v. United States,
394 U.S. 217 (1969), however, the Court mandated that federal prisoners' fourth amendment
claims receive treatment similar to that of state prisoners. Id. at 228. Since Stone v. Powell, lower
federal courts have barred federal prisoners' fourth amendment habeas petitions if the prisoner
had had a prior "opportunity for full and fair litigation." E.g., Tisnado v. United States, 547 F.2d
452, 457 (9th Cir. 1976).
283. See, e.g., Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461,478 (1982) (employment dis-
crimination claim), discussed infra notes 644-77 and accompanying text.
284. 456 U.S. 152 (1982).
285. Id at 167. Although Frady was a District of Columbia offender, the Court's interpreta-
tion of section 2255, the habeas statute for federal prisoners, embraces all federal prisoners' com-
plaints. 456 U.S. at 162.
The "cause and prejudice" standard had been applied previously in habeas petitions fied by
federal prisoners. For example, in Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973), the defendant
failed to object at trial to the composition ofthejury. The Supreme Court held that Davis had not
established "cause" for his failure to comply with FED. R. CiuM. P. 12(b)(2), which requires such
objections to be made contemporaneously. Because Davis involved a statutory issue, it was un-
clear until United States v. Frady whether the "cause and prejudice" test extended to all federal
prisoners' habeas claims.
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habeas relief from the federal court in the jurisdiction in which they
were confined.286 When that habeas procedure was formulated, no fed-
eral prisons existed. Rather, the federal government paid the states, on
a per diem basis, to house federal inmates in prisons across the
country.
287
Federal reliance upon state prisons began to decline in the early
1900's with the opening of the federal penitentiaries at Leavenworth
and Atlanta.218  By 1930, when Congress created the United States Bu-
reau of Prisons, seven federal prisons were in existence, and by 1943,
most federal prisoners were housed in those penitentiaries.2 89 This
concentration of prisoners in specific jurisdictions became a major fac-
tor in what the judiciary began to recognize as the habeas corpus
"problem."
Federal district courts in which federal penitentiaries were lo-
cated-such as the Northern District of Georgia, the Northern District
of California, the Western District of Washington, the Western District
of Missouri, and the District of Kansas-received most federal prison-
ers' habeas petitions. The number of those petitions grew, as did the
ranks of federal prisoners, and the numbers of Supreme Court deci-
sions redefining the scope of habeas review.2 90 According to a federal
judges' committee report, the average number of federal petitions filed
in 1936 and 1937 was 310. Seven years later, the number had grown to
845.291
In 1943, a committee of judges headed by Judge John Parker con-
cluded that the workload imposed by federal prisoners' petitions was
286. SeeAct of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385 (expanding power to all cases where any
person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the Constitution); The Judiciary Act
of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 82 (granting the judiciary the power to issue writs of habeas corpus
for those in custody of the United States); Federal prisoners may still bring some claims of illegal
confinement in the jurisdiction where confined. See Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 122 (2d Cir.
1978) (federal pretrial detainees, confined in New York City, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241
(1982) a habeas petition in the Southern District of New York), rev'd on other grounds sub nor.
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
287. There had been some federal prisons in the territories. During the 1880's, Congress was
repeatedly requested to authorize the construction of a federal penitentiary. E.g., 1889 Arr'y
GEN. ANN. REP. XI.
288. U.S. DEP'T OF JusTIcE, FEDERAL PRISON SYSTEM-FACILITIES '82, at 19, 45 (1983).
289. Id. at 3.
290. See, e.g., Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104-05 (1942) (federal habeas corpus review
not restricted to cases in which judgments are void for lack of jurisdiction); Frank v. Mangum, 237
U.S. 309,331-38 (1915) (allegations of mob violence during the course of a trial may be considered
on federal habeas corpus). See generally Peller, supra note 13, at 608-10 (discussing why the
Supreme Court expanded habeas jurisdiction in Frank v. Mangum).
291. United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 212 n.13 (1952).
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sufficiently great to justify jurisdictional changes. Judge Parker's com-
mittee drafted a proposed statute requiring federal prisoners to file
complaints about conviction in the courts that had convicted them. 292
The judges on the committee were not unanimous in their views,2 93 but
some proposed that such a shift in locus from the district of confine-
ment to the district of conviction would be desirable for two reasons.
First, these judges believed that obtaining information from the judges
who had presided at trial or guilty plea was essential to promote accu-
racy.294 Second, committee members also sought to conserve resources.
A judge already familiar with a case would presumably spend less time
deciding its merits than would a judge fresh to the problem. Further,
some committee members believed a relocation of habeas proceedings
to the sentencing court would avoid the necessity of having a trial judge
testify "as an ordinary witness" before another judge at a habeas
corpus hearing.295
In 1948, Congress passed legislation that embodied some of the
Parker Committee's proposals and that is now codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255.296 Section 2255 sets out the procedure by which federal prison-
ers today seek habeas corpus redress.297 Section 2255, a variant of the
292. Report of the Committee on Habeas Corpus Procedure Submitted to the Judicial Con-
ference of the United States (June 7, 1943) (available from the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts, habeas corpus microfiche subject file, fiche I) [hereinafter cited as Parker Commit-
tee Report]. See also Parker, Limiting the Abuse of Habeas Corpus, 8 F.R.D. 171, 173 (1949) (dis-
cussing state prisoners' habeas litigation).
293. Two alternative statutes were drafted. The commentary to the proposals specify which
of the six judges declined to endorse a given recommendation. Parker Committee Report, supra
note 292, at 6-10. Judges Stephens, Underwood, and Wyzanski objected to the proposed restric-
tions on habeas corpus; they argued in a separate letter to the Chief Justice: "No trouble or
inconvenience to officials of our government, or cost to it, can justify the withdrawal of the right to
a free, open and adequate official investigation into an imprisonment where the prisoner...
asserts, as facts, statements which, if true, would establish its illegality." Letter from Judges Ste-
phens, Underwood, and Wyzanski to the Chief Justice and the Senior Circuit Judges in Confer-
ence (Feb. 20, 1947).
294. Parker Committee Report, supra note 292, at 4-5, 8-10.
295. Id. at 4. The Committee was also concerned about the problems of state court judges,
faced with having to testify in federal court proceedings. Id See also Parker, supra note 292, at
172-73 (the "unseemly spectacle. . . of state trial judges appearing as witnesses in defense of the
proceedings" in their courts). In the meantime, the Parker Committee urged all judges to make
complete contemporaneous records so as to provide more information to reviewing courts. Parker
Committee Report, supra note 292, at 9-10. See also Letter from Circuit Judge Stone, on behalf of
the Judicial Conference, to Congress (March 2, 1944) (discussing potential inconvenience to sen-
tencing judges who had to travel to site of habeas hearings), quoted in part in United States v.
Hayman, 342 U.S. at 217-18 n.25 [hereinafter cited as Circuit Judge Stone's Letter].
296. Judicial Code and Judiciary Act, ch. 646, § 1, 62 Stat. 869, 967 (1948).
297. Section 2255 is not a verbatim replica of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1982), the state prisoners'
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Single Judge plus Same Judge Model,2 98 permits litigants to receive a
second review from the judge who made the initial decision and there-
after to receive limited review from a second tier.299 In a sense, section
2255 reinstitutes a procedural model disavowed for the federal courts
by the Evarts Act of 1891-the prohibition against any judge sitting
"on appeal from his own court.' ' 3 °
2. Interpreting the Meaning of Section 2255
Section 2255 is an offshoot of other habeas corpus enactments and
contains the concept common to all-prisoners can attack custody
claimed to be "in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United
States."'301 However, section 2255 contains language not found in the
earlier habeas corpus statutes nor in the contemporaneously reenacted
habeas legislation. The statute authorizes litigation against unconstitu-
tional or illegal sentences as well as those "otherwise subject to collat-
eral attack." Moreover, section 2255 contains language permitting
challenges to illegal sentences, as distinct from unlawful custody. Fi-
nally, although describing itself as authorizing "collateral" attack, sec-
tion 2255 returns prisoners not to new or independent courts but to the
courts where they were convicted and sentenced.
The repetitive, dense language of the statute caused substantial ju-
dicial confusion during the first decade of section 2255's existence. Onemight have been tempted to describe the section simply as federal pris-
oners' "habeas corpus." Such an approach was discouraged, however,
by a phrase of the statute that a court is not to entertain an "application
habeas corpus statute. The confusion generated by section 2255's language was quieted by
Supreme Court interpretations of section 2255. See infra notes 304-24 and accompanying text.
298. Section 2255 sometimes mixes models. For example, when a defendant is tried, appeals,
and then files for habeas relief, the procedure followed is the Single Judge plus Limited Review
plus Same Judge Model. If no appeal is taken and a challenge is subsequently filed, however,
secion 2255 proceeds under the Single Judge plus Same Judge Model. In both cases, appellate
review of the second decision is available.
299. In 1976 the Supreme Court promulgated special rules to govern section 2255 proceed-
ings. Those rules mandate that all section 2255 motions be sent to the judge who imposed sen-
tence. Section 2255 Rules, supra note 73, at Rule 4. The statute itself states only that a petitioner
must return to the same "court." Prior to the promulgation of the Section 2255 Rules, and due to
concern about possible bias, the First Circuit interpreted section 2255 as requiring return to the
same court but not to the same judge. Halliday v. United States, 380 F.2d 270, 273 (1st Cir. 1967).
Under Rule 4, a judge who presided at trial or guilty plea can be disqualified only upon a showing
of bias, claimed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 144 or 28 U.S.C. § 455.
300. Although the rhetoric is that "habeas corpus will not be allowed to do service for an
appeal," Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 178 (1974) (emphasis in original), habeas corpus is often
functionally equivalent to a belated appeal, albeit one limited to a narrow set of grounds.
301. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2254-2255 (1982).
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for a writ of habeas corpus" unless a prisoner first files a section 2255
motion. Judges consequently assumed that section 2255 was something
other than habeas corpus. Legislative acts of the 1948 Congress bol-
stered that notion; in addition to creating section 2255, Congress en-
acted a habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, called "Power to grant writ."
Section 2241 provides that "[w]rits of habeas corpus may be granted by
the . . . district courts . . . within their respective jurisdictions," if a
prisoner is in federal custody "in violation of the Constitution or laws
or treaties of the United States. 30 2 Section 2241's applicability to fed-
eral prisoners, coupled with principles of parsimony, suggested that
section 2255 was not a habeas statute, but only a step along the way.
Perhaps section 2255 was a predicate to habeas corpus, an exhaustion
of judicial remedies requirement paralleling that imposed upon state
prisoners. °3
Under this reading of section 2255, after trial and appeal (the Sin-
gle Judge plus Limited Review Model), a prisoner would have to return
to the sentencing judge but thereafter would be entitled to a different
forum (e.g., another federal judge) who could undertake unlimited re-
view of certain claims. Although layered, such a model would have
both concentrated and diffused power. The first judge would have had
two opportunities to exercise power but a different judge would have
had a right of review-thereby providing a check on that power, pro-
tecting against partiality, and giving the litigant a new audience to per-
suade. This model would have also built in some economies; if the first
judge satisfied the litigant, no other judge would have to become famil-
iar with the case. In short, such an interpretation would have resulted
in a complex balancing of values.
However, when first interpreting section 2255 in 1952,304 the
Supreme Court announced a rule that incorporated a simpler proce-
dural model-the Single Judge plus Same Judge plus Limited Review
Model. A federal prisoner, Herman Hayman, incarcerated at McNeil
Island Penitentiary in Washington, filed under section 2255 in the
Southern District of California, where he had been convicted. Mr.
Hayman sought to vacate his 1947 conviction and twenty-year sentence
on the ground that his sixth amendment right to counsel had been de-
nied. Specifically, Hayman claimed that the principal witness who had
testified against him was also a client of Hayman's defense attorney
302. Id § 2241(a), (c)(1).
303. Id § 2254(b).
304. United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952).
1984]
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and that such conflict of interest had corrupted the attorney's loyalty
and prejudiced the defense.30 5
The district judge in California held a three-day hearing to resolve
the factual questions raised by the motion. Hayman, incarcerated at
McNeil Island, did not attend. Despite Hayman's absence, the judge
concluded that Hayman had known of the joint representation and
consented to it. The motion to vacate was denied.30 6
The Ninth Circuit, sua sponte, raised the issue of the constitution-
ality of section 2255 .30 A few years earlier, the Supreme Court had
held that district courts had "habeas corpus jurisdiction" only within
"their respective jurisdictions"; 30 8 thus, only inmates within the territo-
rial boundaries of a federal court could petition that court for habeas
relief. As a consequence, the Ninth Circuit believed that, even if the
trial judge had wanted Hayman to testify, the judge had lacked author-
ity by which to order Hayman's appearance. The court reasoned that,
since section 2255 appeared to sanction exparle proceedings, it had, in
Hayman's case, worked an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus. 3 0 9 The appellate court therefore vacated the section
2255 ruling, remanded Hayman to file a "regular" habeas under section
2241 in the district of confinement, and ruled that section 2255 could
only be used when "the court of the prisoner's conviction is of the dis-
trict where he is confined."
310
Chief Justice Vinson, writing for the Supreme Court, reversed.
The Court held that section 2255 did not authorize exparle hearings,
and thus was not unconstitutional.3 1' To interpret section 2255, the
Court relied heavily upon the Judicial Conference Statement which ar-
gued the utility of section 2255. As a consequence, the Chief Justice
read section 2255 as intending a remedy "as broad as habeas
corpus."312 Section 2255 could not, however, be habeas corpus because
the Court was unprepared to discard its prior ruling that federal judges'
habeas jurisdiction reached only as far as the boundaries of their dis-
305. Id. at 208.
306. Id. at 208-09.
307. United States v. Hayman, 187 F.2d 456, 457-58 (9th Cir. 1951), vacated 342 U.S. 205
(1952).
308. Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188, 189-90 (1948), overruled in part, Braden v. 30th Judicial
Court. 410 U.S. 484, 497-500 (1973).
309. United States v. Hayman, 187 F.2d at 462-64.
310. Id. at 464.
311. United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. at 219-20.
312. Id at 217 (quoting Circuit Judge Stone's Letter, supra note 295).
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tricts 31' But the Court found authority in another statute3 14 for federal
judges to order prisoners outside a district to appear, and the Court
thereby sanctioned the use of section 2255 for all federal prisoners.31 5
Between Congress and Chief Justice Vinson, section 2255 became
a unique and odd entity. It was not habeas corpus because at that time
habeas corpus was territorially bounded and section 2255 was not. Sec-
tion 2255 was not less than habeas corpus, since the statute had been
created as an economical counterpart to habeas corpus for federal pris-
oners. Section 2255 did not totally displace habeas corpus because, by
its own terms, the statute permitted habeas corpus as an alternative
when a section 2255 motion was "inadequate." Finally, section 2255
contained language not found in the habeas corpus statutes. It sug-
gested two new grounds for attacking a conviction-a sentence in vio-
lation of the Constitution or laws of the United States and convictions
or sentences that might be "otherwise subject to collateral attack." The
extra verbiage and Chief Justice Vinson's description of section 2255 as
an "independent and collateral inquiry into the validity of the convic-
tion" lent support to the hypothesis that section 2255 might be more
than habeas corpus.
Had that possibility been borne out, federalism might have more
explanatory power for our understanding of the limits that the
Supreme Court has placed on habeas corpus for state prisoners. In the
years of litigation since Hayman, however, the Supreme Court has re-
treated from an expansive interpretation of section 2255, and has, by
denying the ordinary sense of some of section 2255's phrases, read the
language of the statute narrowly. For example, in Hill v. United
States,3" 6 a federal prisoner had established that he had been sentenced
in violation of Rule 32(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which requires a sentencing judge to afford a defendant a personal op-
portunity to speak prior to the imposition of sentence. 7 The issue
presented in Hill was whether, if claimed under section 2255, a judge's
failure to provide a defendant with an oppportunity to speak required
that the sentence be vacated and the prisoner resentenced.
At one level, the answer appeared obvious. The Court did not
313. See supra note 308 and accompanying text.
314. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1982) (All Writs Act, permitting courts to issue all writs necessary in
"aid of their respective jurisdictions").
315. 342 U.S. at 220-23.
316. 368 U.S. 424 (1962).
317. Id. at 425; Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 304-05 (1961).
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state that Rule 32(a) was not a "law" of the United States.3 1 Nor did
the Court suggest that section 2255 referred only to the laws in exist-
ence when it was enacted. Further, the facts were undisputed: the
judge who had sentenced Hill had not followed the dictates of the rule;
he had not asked Hill to speak before imposing sentence. Hill's convic-
tion and sentencing had occurred in 1954, before the 1961 ruling that a
Rule 32(a) error required vacature of the sentence. Hill had not ap-
pealed, and the Court did not raise a deliberate bypass problem.
Nevertheless, the five-person majority concluded that collateral re-
lief was not available for Mr. Hill. The trial judge's failure to request a
personal statement from Hill prior, to imposition of sentence was
deemed an error of neither "jurisdictional nor constitutional" dimen-
sions. "It is not a fundamental defect which inherently results in a
complete miscarriage of justice," nor an exceptional "circumstance
where the need for the remedy afforded by the writ of habeas corpus is
apparent. '319 The Hill Court did not preclude all Rule 32 claims.
Since Hill had not explained how personal allocution would have al-
tered the outcome, the Court deferred the question of "[w]hether sec-
tion 2255 relief would be available if a violation of Rule 32(a)"
occurred with "aggravating circumstances."320 Ignoring the language
in Hayman differentiating section 2255 from habeas corpus and imply-
ing that section 2255 could be broader, Hillheld that section 2255 was a
remedy "exactly commensurate with . . . habeas corpus."
321
Subsequent Supreme Court pronouncements have reiterated that
to the extent possible,322 federal prisoners' section 2255 claims are to be
subject to the same requirements as state prisoners' claims. 23 With
that approach, the Court has applied its "cause and prejudice" stan-
dard to cases brought by both federal and state prisoners. 24
318. Some form of that argument was available. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
unlike statutes, are not "laws" enacted by Congress; rather, the Rules are promulgated by the
Supreme Court and, if Congress does not act within 90 days of the Rules' promulgation, they
become effective. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3771, 3772 (1982); 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1982).
319. 368 U.S. at 428.
320. Id at 429.
321. Id at 427.
322. There are statutorily created distinctions between the remedies for state and federal pris-
oners. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)-(c) (1982) (exhaustion requirement), construed in Rose v.
Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1982) (state factfinding presumptively correct),
construedin Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591 (1982); Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1981).
323. See, e.g., Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 228 (1969) (fourth amendment claims
to be treated the same for federal prisoners as for state prisoners).
324. The "cause and prejudice" test was first articulated in a federal prisoner's belated claim
of an unconstitutional grand jury selection. Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233, 238 (1973). The
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3. Narrowing the Meaning of Section 2255
The Supreme Court's decision to conform its interpretation of sec-
tion 2255 to its rules for habeas corpus petitions filed by state prisoners
might be understood as embracing federalism. Federalism may simply
oblige federal courts to accord equal deference to federal and state
court judgments. 25
The Supreme Court, however, has not mandated equal deference
to federal and state court judgments. Rather, in United States v.
Frady,326 the Court imposed even greater strictures on federal prisoners
who claim constitutional error but who have failed to object contempo-
raneously than the Court has placed on state prisoners. In addition,
Frady both clarified the stringency of the "prejudice" prong of the
"cause and prejudice" test and illustrated the central role of finality in
the Court's work.
In 1963, Joseph Frady was convicted of first degree murder in the
Federal District Court for the District of Columbia. Frady appealed
the conviction on various grounds and succeeded in overturning the
death sentence imposed but not the conviction itself.32 7 In 1979, Frady
filed a section 2255 motion. He claimed for the first time that the trial
test resurfaced in a state prisoner's case, Frances v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 539 (1976), and
gained universal application to all kinds of claims made in violation of contemporaneous objec-
tion rules, United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 (1982); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982); Wain-
wright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). For Judge Posner's suggestion that the "cause and prejudice"
test should apply in the absence of a contemporaneous objection rule, see Norris v. United States,
687 F.2d 899, 901 (7th Cir. 1982).
325. Federalism principles could also support making access to collateral review either
broader or narrower for federal prisoners than for state prisoners. Access to postconviction review
could be easier because no state court "morale" problem exists; federal postconviction review
revises federal judgments. The expansive language of section 2255 supports this thesis.
Access to collateral review for federal prisoners could also be narrower, at least for claims
raised at trial or on appeal, because those claims have, by definition, received one federal airing.
To the extent that habeas corpus is supposed to provide criminal defendants with the federal
bench's expertise on points of federal law, federal defendants have already had the benefit of such
expertise. Echoes of this thesis can be heard in Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in Frady. She
stated that Frady "already has had a fair opportunity to present his federal claims to a federal
forum." 456 U.S. at 164. The challenge made in the 1982 case, however, had not been
presented-indeed had not existed-at the time of trial.
Taken to its logical extreme, a single federal hearing rule would preclude all federal prisoners
from habeas review, and perhaps even from appeal. Equality problems between state and federal
prisoners might then arise because state prisoners would, presumably, still have access to a second,
federal review.
326. 456 U.S. 152 (1982).
327. 348 F.2d 84 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. deniea 382 U.S. 909 (1965). Justice O'Connor,
writing for the Court in Frady's 1982 case, noted that, in 1965, "Frady escaped electrocution" by a
5-4 vote. 456 U.S. at 156-57.
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judge had given a defective jury instruction3 28-the trial judge had
equated specific intent with malice.329 The judge had instructed the
jury that "the law infers or presumes from the use of such weapon [part
of a table top and Frady's boots] in the absence of explanatory or miti-
gating circumstances the existence of malice essential to culpable
homicide."
331
Frady is a variant of the Engle v. Isaac problem. In 1963, when
Frady was convicted, the instructions given were "standard. ' 331 A few
years later, however, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
invalidated such instructions. 332 Therefore, when reviewing Frady's
section 2255 petition in 1980, the court of appeals concluded that, at the
time of Frady's trial and appeal, objections to such instructions would
have been "futile."' 33 Thus, Frady had shown sufficient "cause" for his
failure to complain contemporaneously. The court of appeals also held
that Frady had been "prejudiced" in that he "may, in fact, have been
convicted of the wrong crime. '334  The appellate court further con-
cluded that Frady's claim should be tested under the "plain error" stan-
dard of Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.33
Deciding that the error undermined the "integrity of the judicial pro-
cess," 336 the court proceeded to decide the merits. The court held that
Supreme Court decisions mandated retroactive application of new con-
stitutional doctrine addressing issues which impair the "truth-finding
328. Frady claimed that his trial judge, the Honorable George Hart, Jr., had erred in. the 1965
jury instructions. As Rule 4 of the Section 2255 Rules, supra note 73, requires, Judge Hart also
decided the merits of Frady's 1979 section 2255 motion. Judge Hart denied relief on the grounds
that Frady did or should have raised his claim earlier. Petition for Certiorari at 29a app. D,
United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 (1982). The Court of Appeals, however, found "no evidence
in the record to support the finding of the trial judge that Frady raised the issue of erroneous jury
instructions in any motions or appeals." United States v. Frady, 636 F.2d 506, 508 n.3 (D.C. Cir.
1980), rev'd, 456 U.S. 152 (1982).
329. 636 F.2d at 508.
330. Id.
331. Id at 512.
332. See, e.g., United States v. Wharton, 433 F.2d 451,455-56 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (malice cannot
be inferred from use of a deadly weapon).
333. 636 F.2d at 512. "To rule otherwise would be to suggest that trial counsel should object
to al/jury instructions in anticipation of changes in the constitutionality ofjury instructions. Such
a suggestion borders on the absurd." Id (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
334. I1d at 513.
335. The court believed that, because "comity and federalism" were not at issue, Id at 509,
the standard of review should be that of FED. R. CRiM. P. 52(b): "[p]lain errors or defects affect-
ing substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the
court." 636 F.2d at 510-12. The court made clear, however, that under the "cause and prejudice"
test of Sykes, Frady's claim was also cognizable. Id at 513 n.17.
336. 636 F.2d at 513.
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function" of criminal trials337 and granted Frady's motion. Given the
lengthy interval between the trial and the collateral proceeding, the ap-
pellate court suggested that, with the government's consent, the district
court enter a verdict of manslaughter.
338
The Supreme Court rejected the appellate court's view that, since
no "problems of comity and federalism ' 339 were present, Frady's fail-
ure to object contemporaneously should be tested under the plain error
standard.340 Once again writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor
concluded that the test chosen in Engle v. Isaac, "cause and actual
prejudice," should be applied to Frady's claim 341 and ruled that he had
not established "actual prejudice."
Despite the invocation of the identical "cause and actual
prejudice" test in both federal and state habeas cases, federal prisoners
have less access to collateral review than do state prisoners. As Justices
Blackmun and Brennan noted in separate opinions, 342 state courts have
discretion to ignore prisoners' failures to follow contemporaneous ob-
jection rules. When state courts do not enforce those rules but hear the
merits of petitions, federal courts are also permitted to decide the mer-
its of state prisoners' claims.343 But, under Frady, federal judges have
no similar discretion to disregard failures by federal prisoners to object
contemporaneously. Frady prohibits federal judges, when they are de-
ciding section 2255 motions, from exercising discretion to ignore proce-
dural errors and consider the merits. Rather, federal prisoners must
either object contemporaneously or meet the stringent cause and
prejudice test of Sykes, Isaac, and Frady.34
337. Id. (quoting Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233, 241 (1977), which in turn
quotes Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 653 (1971) ("Neither good-faith reliance by state
or federal authorities on prior constitutional law or accepted practice, nor severe impact on the
administration of justice has sufficed to require [only] prospective application in these
circumstances.")).
338. Id. at 514.
339. Id at 509.
340. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. at 164-66.
341. Id at 167.
342. Justice Blackmun concurred in the judgment because he believed Frady could not estab-
lish "plain error." Id at 178 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Brennan dissented but also indi-
cated he might have joined the Court's opinion, had it not rejected the plain error test. Id at 187
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
343. If state courts decide the merits of federal constitutional challenges, then no "independ-
ent and adequate" state ground supports the judgment and no procedural bar to federal review
exists. See, e.g., Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 147-49 (1979) (when state decision is
based on federal law, federal court may also decide the merits).
344. 456 U.S. at 167-68.
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Moreover, "cause and prejudice" is more exacting than "plain er-
ror." The plain error doctrine assumes that an objection was not raised
below, makes no inquiry into the "cause" for the failure to object, and
instead focuses only upon the harm resulting from the "plain error."345
A more difficult question is whether, "cause" aside, there is any sub-
stantive difference between the "actual prejudice" test of Sykes-Isaac
and the plain error rule. Under the plain error rule, courts are only
allowed to correct errors "both obvious and substantial" in "excep-
tional circumstances . . . to avoid a miscarriage of justice. ' 346 Can
there be no "actual prejudice" where there has been no plain error?
Probably not, and one would have been tempted to equate the two con-
cepts. But the Supreme Court appeared in Frady to assume that there
can be plain error and yet no "actual prejudice."
Under Frady, "actual prejudice" requires that a habeas corpus pe-
titioner show "actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire
trial with error of constitutional dimensions. ' 317 According to the
Supreme Court, Frady could not meet such a test because he had, in
fact, acted with "malice aplenty."348 That finding is somewhat curious
in light of the circuit court opinion that Frady might have acted with-
out malice.349 The disagreement between the courts raises questions
about how to decide whether prejudice exists. Can a court rely upon a
wrongly instructed jury's verdict? Should a court review the evidence
itself and decide? The Supreme Court implicitly made its own finding
of guilt to conclude that no actual prejudice had occurred, and .there-
fore that it need not decide whether the jury instruction was constitu-
tionally defective.35
0
A second distinction the Court made between plain error and "ac-
tual prejudice" relates to time. In the majority's view, plain error is
reserved exclusively for direct appeals because retrial is relatively easy.
In contrast, "actual prejudice" is required when the interval between
trial and reconsideration is long. The Frady Court referred repeatedly
345. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b) Advisory Committee Note.
346. 456 U.S. at 163 n.14 (quoting United States v. Gerald, 624 F.2d 1291, 1299 (5th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 920 (1981)).
347. Id at 170 (emphasis in original).
348. Id at 171.
349. 636 F.2d at 511.
350. Cf. Connecticut v. Johnson, 103 S. Ct. 969, 977 (1983) (plurality opinion):
To allow a reviewing court to perform the jury's function of evaluating the evidence of
intent, when the jury never may have performed that function, would give too much
weight to society's interest in punishing the guilty and too little weight to the method by
which decisions of guilt are to be made.
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to the years between Frady's original 1963 trial and his 1979 claim of
error.351 Given the improbability of retrial, the Court imposed a higher
burden.
Frady reflects the centrality of finality in the Court's consideration
of criminal prosecutions and postconviction proceedings. "Once the
defendant's chance to appeal has been waived or exhausted. . . we are
entitled to presume he stands fairly and finally convicted, especially
when, as here, he already has had a fair opportunity to present his fed-
eral claims to a federal forum. . . .[A] final judgment commands re-
spect. 35 2 In an unexplained reference, Justice O'Connor hinted that
her finality concerns have a constitutional basis: "[T]he federal interest
in finality is as great as the States', and the relevant federal constitu-
tional strictures apply with equal force to both jurisdictions.
353
Of course, finality has always been important in criminal cases.
Defendants' finality interests are explicitly recognized in the constitu-
tional protection against double jeopardy.354 The Constitution's one-
sided protection of defendants has been explained, primarily, by the
inequalities in resources and power between the parties in criminal
cases.355 Defendants' revisionism interests are also constitutionally rec-
ognized in the habeas corpus clause.356 The case law debate has been
about what expectations of revisionism are to be legitimated.
The Frady majority shifted the focus from defendants to the pub-
lic. Justice O'Connor's reference to a "federal interest in finality"
357
suggests some concept of a right to finality. It is unclear, however to
whom such a "right" belongs. Perhaps the theory is that once the gov-
ernment undertakes a prosecution and prevails, it is entitled to rest
upon its laurels and not be questioned about the techniques employed
to obtain the conviction.358 Perhaps, as suggested in another recent
351. 456 U.S. at 159-63.
352. Id. at 164-65.
353. Id. at 169 n.17 (emphasis added).
354. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
355. See Westin & Drubel, Towarda General Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1978 Sup. CT. REv.
81 (double jeopardy serves three interests: systemic finality, defendants' rights to avoid double
punishment, and the right of juries to nullify the power of the prosecution).
356. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9.
357. 456 U.S. at 169 n.17.
358. Cf. Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 225 (1969) (fourth amendment error can be
grounds for section 2255 motion because of concern about systemic integrity); People v. Germany,
674 P.2d 345 (Colo. 1983) (holding state statute of limitations in habeas cases unconstitutional
because state has no legitimate interest in finality of unconstitutional convictions).
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opinion, 359 "finality interests" belong to victims, "entitled" not to par-
ticipate in a second trial. Perhaps finality is only a surrogate for econ-
omy-a systemic need to conserve resources.
Whatever its sources, the Court's emphasis on finality calls into
question the very existence of collateral proceedings and, perhaps, of
direct appeals. If all convictions were presumed fair once a period of
time had elapsed, postconviction review would become an empty exer-
cise. Frady may foreshadow the elimination of collateral review of fed-
eral convictions and the reliance instead upon either the Single Judge
plus Limited Review or the Single Judge/Finality Models.
C. RULEMAKING AS A DEVICE TO ENSHRINE FINALITY
Thus far, I have examined Supreme Court case law on the availa-
bility of postconviction relief in federal court. I have mapped the ex-
pansive role the federal courts played in the 1960's and the contraction
of that role in the 1970's and 1980's. In addition to writing opinions,
the Court has another technique by which it can express its value
choices. The Court has the power to make rules governing the conduct
of habeas and other litigation. The rules by which habeas cases are
litigated, like the cases interpreting the habeas statutes, illustrate how
value choices have changed.
1. The Practice
Prior to 1977, federal habeas petitions, whether filed by state or
federal prisoners, were treated as new civil actions and were literally
collateral to the first conviction proceeding.3 60 Although habeas corpus
has its roots in the criminal law, habeas actions were denominated
"civil in nature."3 61 However, while the Supreme Court had promul-
gated rules governing the practice for the rest of the civil docket, Con-
gress wrote the habeas practice rules into the habeas statutes
themselves. 62
First drafting habeas rules in 1867, Congress ordered that habeas
359. See Morris v. Slappy, 103 S. Ct. 1610, 1617 (1983) (victims' interests relevant to denial of
habeas).
360. A petitioner commenced a new lawsuit, complete with its own docket number and filing
fee or, more often, waiver of the filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915, 2254, 2255 (1982). Despite section
2255's reference to a "motion," most litigants filed "petitions for habeas corpus." Interview with
Prof. Dennis Curtis, University of Southern California Law Center (April 1983).
361. Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 293 (1969).
362. Claimants had to submit a written petition verified by affidavit. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch,
28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385, 385 [hereinafter cited as 1867 Act]. If the facts set forth a prima facie case of
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petitions be decided with rapidity; within three days of the order to
show cause from the court, the custodian was to file a "return," unless
"good cause [was] shown" for more time to be allowed.363 The pris-
oner could add information via a "traverse" and, within five days, the
court was to "proceed in a summary way to determine the facts of the
case."
364
The recodification of the habeas statutes in 1948 confused the
practice somewhat. As noted, three habeas statutes were delineated:
28 U.S.C. § 2254 for state prisoners, 28 U.S.C. § 2255 for those con-
victed in federal courts, and 28 U.S.C. § 2241 as a general habeas pro-
vision. Congress set specific procedures for habeas corpus
"petitions, ' 365 and distinct procedures for section 2255 "motions. ' 366
Over time, section 2255 "motions" came to be understood as federal
prisoners' "habeas corpus." The practice developed to ignore the statu-
tory appellation "motion 367 and to commence civil actions (akin to
section 2254 petitions) invoking section 2255 as the jurisdictional base.
Questions about how to practice under the federal habeas statutes
reached the Supreme Court in 1969. In Harris v. Nelson,368 the Court
unlawful detention, a judge issued a habeas writ "forthwith." The writ ordered the petitioner's
custodian to file a "return," justifying continued custody. Id
Within five days of the "return," a hearing was to be held, at which a judge took testimony,
heard oral argument, and made a prompt decision. The remedy, for the victorious prisoner, was
supposed to be speedy--"forthwith be discharged and set at liberty." Id at 386.
Compliance with writs of habeas corpus was insured by the potential for criminal sanctions.
Id. If the custodian failed to make the "return" promptly, lied in the return, or refused to set the
prisoner free, criminal charges could be lodged. If prosecuted successfully, a misdemeanor con-
viction could result, and a fine of up to $1000 and/or one year of imprisonment could be imposed.
Id.
The legacy of the 1867 congressional procedures remains: the format-filing with the court,
court review prior to custodial response, and prompt judicial consideration-has been included in
the habeas statutes since 1867, including those in effect today. The words of the 1867 Act, "re-
strained of his or her liberty in violation of the Contitution, laws and treaty of the United States,"
have survived, with slight modification, as the centerpiece of habeas legislation.
363. Under the 1867 Act, the exact time limits depended upon the distance from courthouse
to prison. If a prison were 20 miles from the courthouse, the custodian had three days in which to
respond. A distance of 100 miles permitted the jailor 20 days to respond. Id The 1948 recodifica-
tion deleted the details about distance. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2249 (1982).
364. 1867 Act, § 1, 14 Stat. at 386. Similar language appears today in 28 U.S.C. § 2243
(1982).
365. See 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1982) ("Issuance of the writ" procedures applicable to sections
2241 and 2254).
366. Id § 2255. Those procedures are similar but not identical to those proscribed for peti-
tions under sections 2241 and 2254.
367. See Section 2255 Rules, supra note 73, at Rule I Advisory Committee Note (discussing
the desirability of the then new requirement of motions, rather than separate court actions).
368. 394 U.S. 286 (1969).
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announced that, although habeas actions were "civil in nature," the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure did not apply with full force: habeas
petitioners had no automatic right to undertake discovery.369 Rather,
federal judges were to make case-by-case decisions about the need for
discovery.370 The source of authority for habeas discovery orders was
not the federal rules but the "All Writs Act," authorizing courts to act
"in aid of their respective jurisdictions. 371
The Harris v. Nelson approach to habeas actions, like that of Fay v.
Noia, gave federal judges substantial authority over habeas adjudica-
tion. Harris reflected a preference for case-by-case sculpting of proce-
dures to fit the needs of lawsuits and an assumption that such an effort
would not place undue demands on federal judges.37 2 But the forces
that brought section 2255 into being, concerns about the increase in
habeas applications and economical solutions to their claims,373
quickly made the Harris v. Nelson approach obsolete. Within a few
years after Harris, the Advisory Committee on the Rules of Practice
and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States Courts
drafted special rules to regulate habeas corpus practice.374 In 1976, the
Supreme Court promulgated the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases
and the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings in the United
States District Courts.3 7 - These Rules, effective in 1977, sought to im-
pose uniformity in habeas corpus practice and created new substantive
limits on the availability of habeas review.
369. Id at 293.
370. Id at 298-300.
371. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1982). For the pre-Harris v. Nelson practice, see Note, Civil Discovery
in Habeas Corpus, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1296 (1967).
372. Cf 394 U.S. at 305-07 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (proposing the adoption of rules for habeas
corpus). For discussion of Harris v. Nelson, see Cover, For James Win. Moore: Some Reflections
on a Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718, 736-40 (1975).
373. See Parker Committee Report, supra note 292, at 3-5. For the history of habeas practice
from 1953-1963, see Habeas Corpus and Post-Conviction Reviews, 33 F.R.D. 363, 367-86 (1963);
Carter, Pre-Trial Suggestionsfor Section 2255 Cases, 32 F.R.D. 391, 393-97 (1963). Cf. FEDEAL
JUDICIARY CENTER, RECOMMENDED PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING PRISONER CIVIL RIGHTS
CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 7-28 (1980) (discussion of need for special rules for prisoners'
lawsuits filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
374. Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United
States, Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Proposed Rules Gov-
erning Habeas Corpus Proceedings, Proposed Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings for the United
States District Courts, and Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 3-
124 (1973) (preliminary draft). See also H.R. REP. No. 1471, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in
1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2478, 2478 (legislative history of the Rules).
375. RULES GOVERNING SECTION 2254 CASES IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS
[hereinafter cited as Section 2254 Rules]; Section 2255 Rules, supra note 73.
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2. The 1977 Rules
In some respects, the 1977 Rules continue the procedures fash-
ioned by the 1867 Congress. Prisoners must first apply to the courts for
screening of their applications. Unless "plainly" apparent from the
prisoners' papers that applicants are not entitled to relief, courts must
ask the prisoners' custodians for answers documenting the validity of
continued incarceration.3 76 The Rules provide for hearings when evi-
dence needs to be taken.377 The Harris v. Nelson approach to discovery
is incorporated,378 and courts are mandated to appoint counsel "[i]f
necessary for [the] effective utilization of discovery procedures" 37 9 or if
an "evidentiary hearing is required."38
The Rules are also innovative. First, despite the Supreme Court's
case law efforts to equate section 2255 proceedings with those brought
by state prisoners under section 2254, the Rules differentiate between
the two proceedings. No longer a "civil action," a section 2255 motion
is now "a further step in the movant's criminal case."38' Describing an
action as civil or criminal has significant consequences. For example,
the Advisory Committee Notes indicate that the rules of criminal dis-
covery, which are more limited than the rules of civil discovery, may be
applied to section 2255.382 The Rules do not, however, lay to rest the
ambiguities surrounding the "nature" of section 2255 proceedings. The
Rules still expressly authorize judges to apply either civil or criminal
rules, where appropriate,383 and the time to file an appeal is that al-
lowed in civil cases.384
376. Section 2254 Rules, supra note 375, at Rule 4; Section 2255 Rules, supra note 73, at Rule
4(b).
377. Section 2254 Rules, supra note 375, at Rule 8(a); Section 2255 Rules, supra note 73, at
Rule 8(a).
378. Section 2254 Rules, supra note 375, at Rule 6 Advisory Committee Note.
379. Id.; Section 2255 Rules, supra note 73, at Rule 6(a).
380. Section 2254 Rules, supra note 375, at Rule 8(c); Section 2255 Rules, supra note 73, at
Rule 8(c).
381. Section 2255 Rules, supra note 73, at Rule 1 Advisory Committee Note.
382. Id. The Advisory Committee added that, simply because a section 2255 proceeding is a
postconviction motion, "does not mean" that a movant has the same rights as a defendant--such
as "counsel, presence, confrontation, self-incrimination, and burden of proof." Id (emphasis in
original).
383. Section 2255 Rules, supra note 73, at Rule 12. See, e.g., Browder v. Director, Dep't of
Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, 270 (Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rules 59 and 60 may apply to
habeas actions), reh'g denied, 434 U.S. 1089 (1978). Cf. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 166
(1982) (Federal Rules Criminal Procedure Rule 52(b) (plain error rule) inapplicable to section
2255 proceedings, discussed supra notes 335-53 and accompanying text).
384. Section 2255 Rules, supra note 73, at Rule 11.
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Second, the Rules require that prisoners use either the model
forms appended or forms drafted by local district courts. 38 - While such
a requirement appears trivial, it has functioned to delay, if not to pre-
clude, the filing of some applications. The Rules permit judges to re-
fuse to file prisoners' forms that do not "substantially comply" with the
authorized format.386 While the Rules specifically permit refusals only
"if ajudge of the court so directs,"3 87 habeas corpus practitioners report
that, in some districts, clerks enforce these provisions.3 8 One habeas
claimant, alleging that prison officials had seized all pens and paper so
as to impede his access to the courts, filed an application he carved onto
styrofoam cups. After file-stamping the paper bag in which the cups
were sent, the district court clerks returned the cups as not conforming
to the required format.389
The forms also impose substantive limits on the structure and sub-
stance of habeas cases. For example, some federal prisoners' habeas
applications may be characterized as federal question lawsuits, filed
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.390 Some cases may also properly invoke fed-
eral courts' mandamus jurisdiction.391 Most federal courts' habeas
forms, however, do not provide for allegations of alternative jurisdic-
385. Section 2254 Rules, supra note 375, at Rule 2(c); Section 2255 Rules, stpra note 73, at
Rule 2(b). For examples of forms that had been used prior to the rules in some local district
courts, see Applicationsfor Writs of Habeas Corpus and Post-Conviction Review of Sentences in the
United States Courts, 33 F.R.D. 363, 399-408 (N.D. Ill. 1963).
386. Section 2254 Rules, supra note 375, at Rule 2(e); Section 2255 Rules, supra note 73, at
Rule 2(d). Cf. Ono v. United States Parole Comm'n, No. 82-5800 (9th Cir. July 28, 1983) (over-
turning district judge's rejection of a form). See generaly Ziegler & Hermann, The Invisible Liti-
gant: An Inside View ofPro Se Actions in the Federal Courts, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 157, 179 (1972) (in
late 1960's and early 1970's, some courts required forms and rejected noncomplying submissions).
387. Section 2254 Rules, supra note 375, at Rule 2(e); Section 2255 Rules, supra note 73, at
Rule 2(d).
388. See, eg., D.C. Okla., Information and Instructions for Motion to Reduce or Correct
Sentence Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Fed. R. Crim. P., Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a
Person in Federal Custody, Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person Attacking a State
Detainer at 2 ("Petitions or motions which do not conform to these instructions will not be filed,
but will be returned by the clerk with a notation as to the deficiency.") [hereinafter cited as
Oklahoma Form].
389. Interview with Prof. William Genego, University of Southern California Law Center
(Oct. 1983) (regarding habeas practice in the Central District of California) [hereinafter cited as
W. Genego].
390. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982). E.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 526-27 n.6 (1979); Green v.
Carlson, 581 F.2d 669, 671 (7th Cir. 1978), aft'd, 446 U.S. 14 (1980); Walker v. McCune, 363 F.
Supp. 254, 255 (E.D. Va. 1973). For a discussion of the overlap between claims under section
2254 and under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Lee v. Winston, 717 F.2d 888, 892-93 (4th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 1924 (1984).
391. 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1982). E.g., United States v. Huss, 520 F.2d 598, 604-05 (2d Cir. 1975);
Stover v. Carlson, 413 F. Supp. 718, 721 (D. Conn. 1976).
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tional bases.392 In addition, the forms demand answers to a series of
questions, some of which are irrelevant to many claims.393 Further, the
forms direct applicants to order the information in an unsympathetic
light, and even when prisoners are represented by counsel, some courts
require that the forms, rather than or in addition to documents drafted
by lawyers, be filed.
394
Finally, the forms do not explain the import of the questions
posed, and the small space provided for answers limits prisoners' op-
portunities to explain themselves. One circuit court recently disap-
proved of a trial court's dismissal of a habeas petition based upon an
answer on a form. Noting that the forms' instructions require "brief'
responses and that space limitations are imposed, the Seventh Circuit
concluded that summary dismissal, predicated upon the meager infor-
mation elicited by the form, was improper.395
The Rules, combined with amendments to the Federal Magistrates
Act, have also changed the personage of the decisionmaker in many
habeas cases; magistrates are now authorized to discharge the "duties"
of judges in rendering habeas decisions.396 By this curious twist, some
magistrates sit to review the prior work of both state and federal judges.
Congress and the Court have thus developed a radical procedural
model; hierarchically inferior actors may review and correct the work
of their superiors, with the limitation that magistrates' habeas recom-
mendations and proposed findings are not final until filed by district
judges.3 97 But the authority granted to magistrates in habeas corpus
cases is disproportionate to that granted in the rest of their work, most
of which reflects the traditional hierarchy. Magistrates are exceedingly
dependent upon federal judges, who select, appoint, and discharge
magistrates, and who determine what kinds of cases magistrates decide
and whether to adopt magistrates' recommendations. 398 Authorizing
review of judges' work by magistrates, the lowest tier available, de-
392. Eg., Section 2255 Rules, supra note 73, at appendix of forms.
393. For example, the question, "Did you testify at the trial?", id at question 7, has no rele-
vance to claims about a conviction by a guilty plea or to claims about alleged sentencing errors.
394. See C.D. CAL. R. 26.1 (requiring petition for writ of habeas corpus or motion filed under
28 U.S.C. § 2255 to be submitted on the forms approved and supplied by the court); W. Genego,
supra note 389.
395. Robinson v. Fairman, 704 F.2d 368, 371 (7th Cir. 1983). See also Oklahoma Form, supra
note 388 (disallowing extra pages, briefs, or arguments).
396. Section 2254 Rules, supra note 375, at Rule 10; Section 2255 Rules, supra note 73, at Rule
10; Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-77, 90 Stat. 2729, 2729 (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b) (1982)).
397. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (1982).
398. Id §§ 631, 636(b)(1).
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creases the stature of the task and implicitly assumes that corrections
will occur infrequently.
3 99
3. The Growing Relevance of Time
a. Revisionism: A last innovation of the Rules parallels recent
caselaw developments. The Rules provide two additional grounds for
dismissal of habeas claims: delayed filings causing "prejudice" to the
government, and "successive" petitions.4°° Although the Advisory
Committee Note to Rule 9 states that the Rule only codifies prior
habeas case law,"' lower courts have interpreted Rule 9 as authorizing
further restrictions on the availability of the writ.40 2 These new limita-
tions are congruent with the concerns that dominate Supreme Court
case law. Finality is prized, first tier decisionmaking is protected from
reconsideration, and litigant autonomy is invoked to justify findings of
waiver or forfeiture of a merits review.
Rule 9(a) permits a dismissal if three conditions are met: (1) the
petition is filed belatedly; (2) "it appears that the government has been
prejudiced in its ability to respond"; and (3) the petitioner shows that
the petition "is based on grounds of which he could not have had
knowledge by the exercise of reasonable diligence before the circum-
399. Habeas petitioners succeed less often when magistrates, rather than federal district
judges, review prisoners' habeas filings. Allen, Schachtman & Wilson, FederalHabeas Corpus and
Is Reforn An Empirical Analysis, 13 RUTGERS L.J. 675, 726-27 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
RUToERS STUDY]. See also Hayes v. Cowan, 547 F.2d 42, 43 (6th Cir. 1976), rep'd sub nom.
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (a case dismissed initially by a magistrate as "patently
without merit" but ultimately decided on the merits by the Supreme Court), rehk denied, 435 U.S.
918 (1978).
400. Section 2254 Rules, supra note 375, at Rules 8(b), 9(a); Section 2255 Rules, supra note 73,
at Rules 8(b), 9(a).
401. Section 2254 Rules, supra note 375, at Rule 9 Advisory Committee Note; Section 2255
Rules, supra note 73, at Rule 9 Advisory Committee Note.
402. See Pacelli v. United States, 588 F.2d 360, 365 (2d Cir. 1978) (laches not specifically
applicable to section 2255 motions, but delays can be taken into account), cert. denied, 441 U.S.
908 (1979). But see Section 2255 Rules, supra note 73, at Rule 9 Advisory Committee Note (prece-
dent for the inclusion of the laches concept); Davis v. Adult Parole Authority, 610 F.2d 410, 415
(6th Cir. 1979) (doctrine of laches had previously existed in habeas law but had not been so
labeled).
Several Supreme Court cases conclude that delayed habeas filings do not preclude relief. See
Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415,420 (1959) (Stewart, J., concurring) (in section 2255 proceed-
ings, "as in habeas corpus, there is no statute of limitations, no resfudicata, and ... the doctrine
of laches is inapplicable.") (emphasis in original); Pennsylvania ex rel. Herman v. Claudy, 350
U.S. 116, 123 (1956) (citing several cases in which filings were made seven, eight, or eighteen years
after conviction and reversing Pennsylvania's refusal to entertain a claim of coerced confession
filed eight years after conviction). See also McKinney v. United States, 208 F.2d 844, 847 (D.C.
Cir. 1953) (delay of 15 years not excessive because "tardiness is irrelevant").
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stances prejudicial to the state occurred." 3 The Rule is deliberately
ambiguous on several counts. First, Rule 9(a) is unclear about the
length of time that constitutes a delay. The drafters of the Rule had
included a presumption of prejudice after five years, but, according to a
committee report, Congress concluded that it was "unsound policy to
require [that] the defendant . . . overcome a presumption of
prejudice."404 As a result, Congress deleted the specifics about what
interval constitutes a "delay." But the refusal to specify has not obvi-
ated the problem of determining which time periods count as "delay."
The Rule has also prompted a problem of measurement. Some
state prosecutors have claimed that the time begins to run as soon as a
criminal defendant is convicted.40 5 A few courts have rejected the fiat
inclusion of all time between conviction and the filing of a habeas. In-
stead, courts have counted as "delay" only the interval from the date a
new legal right was announced (such as the right to counsel in certain
misdemeanor offenses) to the time the habeas petition was filed.40 6
Other courts have been faced with requests to count only the years after
a defendant learned that a conviction could cause harm, such as when a
suspended sentence is revoked, or a prior conviction is to be used for
enhancement of punishment for a subsequent offense.40 7
Many Rule 9(a) opinions have not carefully examined the circum-
stances surrounding the "delay in filing" to determine which years may
justly be counted against a claimant.4°8 To the extent that, by eliminat-
ing a specific time figure, Congress thought it had avoided a "presump-
tion of prejudice," case law has not borne out its aspiration. Further,
given the documentation on the number of years consumed in exhaust-
403. Section 2254 Rules, supra note 375, at Rule 9(a); Section 2255 Rules, supra note 73, at
Rule 9(a) [hereinafter cited as Rule 9(a)].
404. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, RULES ON HABEAS CoPus, H.R. REP. No. 1471,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1976), reprined in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2478, 2481 (foot-
note omitted).
405. Marks v. Estelle, 691 F.2d 730, 732 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3090 (1983).
406. Alexander v. Maryland, 719 F.2d 1241, 1245-46 (4th Cir. 1983) (time to consider when
reviewing challenge to conviction is not from time conviction became final to time of filing but
from time new legal right was announced); Marks v. Estelle, 691 F.2d at 732-33.
407. Eg., Arnold v. Marshall, 657 F.2d 83 (6th Cir. 1981) (sentence enhancement), cert. de-
nied, 455 U.S. 922 (1982).
408. See, e.g., Tippett v. Wyrick, 680 F.2d 52, 54 (8th Cir.) (entire ten year period from con-
viction to filing included), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 350 (1982). In Toppelt, the petitioner's counsel
had died three years after the conviction, and, since the claim involved a guilty plea coerced by the
attorney, the attorney's death, not the elapsed time, was the source of the "prejudice" to the gov-
ernment. Id. at 53. Although the delay itself did not cause the prejudice, as required by Rule 9(a),
the court nevertheless dismissed the petition under Rule 9(a). Id. at 54.
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ing state remedies,40 9 Congress may have been shortsighted in not pro-
viding greater guidance.410
The second ambiguity in the Rule relates to the question of
prejudice. The Rule requires a court that finds delay to ask a second
question: whether, because of the delay, the government has been
"prejudiced in its ability to respond." Once again, respondents to
habeas petitions have offered diverse interpretations of what constitutes
prejudice. Some have argued that "prejudice in its ability to respond"
should be interpreted to include situations in which the government
can show it would have difficulty retrying an individual. The Ninth
Circuit flatly rejected this interpretation as contrary to the "plain mean-
ing" of "ability to respond." '' Chief Justice Burger, commenting
upon the denial of certiorari in that case, argued that, with narrow ex-
ceptions, Rule 9(a) should be construed to allow summary dismissal of
habeas petitions when a state can establish that the "lapse of time has
made reprosecution impossible."
41 2
The Chief Justice persuaded drafters of the Habeas Rules of the
merits of his position. In August of 1983, the Advisory Committee pro-
posed an amendment to Rule 9(a).41 3 That amendment would author-
ize the dismissal of a habeas petition if a state could show prejudice in
its ability "to retry" the petitioner.41 4 The proposal incorporates
409. See Clinton, Rule 9 of the Federal Habeas Corpus Rules: A Case Study on the Needfor
Reform ofthe Rules Enabling Acts, 63 IoWA L. REv. 15, 27 (1977) (typical to spend five years or
more exhausting state remedies in Iowa). For an example of a four year delay in processing
transcripts for appeal, see Connecticut v. Johnson, 103 S. Ct. 969, 973 (1983). Further, the "total
exhaustion" rule, as construed in Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982), obliges federal courts to
send prisoners who submit partially exhausted claims back to state court-thereby taking more
time.
410. Cf. Habeas Corpus Legislation of 1983, supra note 144, at 2 (proposed one year statute of
limitations would exclude from the statute the time spent exhausting state judicial remedies).
411. Spalding v. Aiken, 684 F.2d 632, 633-34 (9th Cir. 1982), ceri. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1795
(1983).
412. 103 S. Ct. at 1797 (Burger, C.J., statement concerning the denial of certiorari).
413. In August of 1983, the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the
Judicial Conference of the United States circulated the proposals for comments. 98 F.R.D. 337
(1983) [hereinafter cited as 1983 Proposed Amendment to Rule 9(a)]. The Advisory Committee
met in the spring of 1984 to review the proposal. In the summer of 1984, the Advisory Committee
sent its recommendations about rule changes to the Standing Committee for review. The Stand-
ing Committee recommends rule amendments to the Judicial Conference, which, in turn, sends its
recommendations to the United States Supreme Court. The Court promulgates final rules that
become effective absent congressional action. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3771, 3772 (1982); 28 U.S.C. § 2072
(1982).
The proposed amendment discussed here is the Advisory Committee's preliminary draft cir-
culated in August of 1983. That proposal was under reconsideration as this article went to press,
414. 1983 Proposed Amendment to Rule 9(a), supra note 413, 98 F.R.D. at 413.
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"sandbagging" concerns. As the Chief Justice explained: "a prisoner
has an incentive to 'store up' technical challenges to his conviction and
then press his claims seriatim when reconsideration of his allegations is
difficult and when reprosecution is impossible. .. .
Such a rule could presumably have barred Charles Noia from ever
having his claim heard on the merits, for Rule 9(a)'s concern regarding
"prejudice" relates solely to the injury suffered by the government.
Even under the current Rule, judges have no mandate to weigh the
balance of hardships. Rather, the only defense to government
prejudice claims is that the prisoners "could not have had knowledge
by the exercise of reasonable diligence before the circumstances preju-
dicial to the state occurred."4 16 Thus, Rule 9, like the Sykes-Isaac test,
could provide the basis for dismissal regardless of the nature of the
claims. The factually or legally innocent, as well as the guilty, may be
precluded, and the risk of error is placed upon the petitioners.41 7
Cases interpreting Rule 9 have found delay, prejudice, and no "ex-
cuse" in a wide variety of circumstances, many of which are beyond
prisoners' control, if not their imaginations. It seems unlikely that in-
mates would wait to file habeas petitions until after a building with
relevant records has burned or an attorney's files have been lost. 418 Not
only are these events uncertain, they are frequently beyond prisoners'
knowledge. An assumption that such events are the predicates to filing
habeas claims is troublesome, for it not only assumes knowledge of oc-
currences outside of prison but also sophistication about legal claims.
The sandbag theory simply does not explain many cases-such as one
in which an inmate fied an ineffective assistance of counsel claim seven
years after the death of the allegedly inadequate lawyer.419 If the in-
415. Spalding v. Aiken, 103 S. Ct. at 1797 (Burger, C.J., statement concerning the denial of
certiorari) (footnote omitted).
416. Section 2254 Rules, supra note 375, at Rule 9(a); Section 2255 Rules, supra note 73, at
Rule 9(a). The provision appears to protect those petitioners seeking habeas relief based upon a
change in law or upon newly discovered evidence. Section 2254 Rules, supra note 375, at Rule 9
Advisory Committee Note. That Note also states that Rule 9(a) dismissals are "permissive rather
than mandatory."
417. Cf. Radin, Cruel Punishment andRespectfor Persons: Super Due Processfor Death, 53 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1143, 1148-63 (1980) (risk of error analysis in death penalty cases).
418. See, e.g., Moore v. Smith, 694 F.2d 115, 118 (6th Cir. 1982) (destroyed records), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 1442 (1983); Tippett v. Wyrick, 680 F.2d 52, 54 (8th Cir.) (absent witnesses, lack
of records because no appeal taken, and futility of appeal no excuse), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 350
(1982); Cotton v. Mabry, 674 F.2d 701, 705 (8th Cir.) (lost file), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 374 (1982);
Mayola v. Alabama, 623 F.2d 992, 999-1000 (5th Cir. 1980) (lost voir dire transcripts), cert. denied,
451 U.S. 913 (1981).
419. Tippett v. Wyrick, 680 F.2d at 54.
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mate had been waiting until a retrial would be difficult or his claim
uncontradicted, why did he wait so many years after the death of his
attorney?
When Rule 9(a) is applied in section 2255 cases, it provides yet
another example of how the language of that section is ignored and the
barriers to habeas relief are raised. Congress' choice of words in sec-
tion 2255 indicates that it rejected both legal and equitable statutes of
limitations for federal prisoners seeking relief under that section. The
statute states that a section 2255 motion "may be made at any time."
Rule 9(a)'s application in section 2255 cases, however, seems to ignore
the literal meaning of these words.420
If Rule 9 is revised to authorize dismissals because of prejudice to
the state's ability to retry petitioners, almost every habeas case will be
eligible for dismissal. After trial and before habeas review, prisoners
need time to obtain transcripts, exhaust state remedies, and gather in-
formation of alleged illegalities. The proposed Rule amendment
makes no mention of exempting any of this time from a "delay" calcu-
lation. Since "delay" will exist by definition, and since "prejudice in its
ability to retry" could be defined as states' difficulties in relocating wit-
nesses, marshalling evidence, and recommitting resources to prosecu-
tions already completed, prejudice may fairly be alleged in most cases.
Habeas corpus will be confined, indeed obliterated, by a statute of limi-
tations constructed to cover almost every case.
What is the logic behind such a rule? That the right to reconsider-
ation of allegedly unconstitutional convictions extinguishes over time?
That the alleged unconstitutionality itself diminishes over time? That
inept litigants and a slow court system provide the appropriate ratio-
nales for refusals to review convictions? Adding "prejudice in the
state's ability to retry" will exacerbate arbitrariness in determining
which inmates receive a merit review.
b. Differentiation: Dismissal for a belated first filing is not the
only obstacle Rule 9 places before habeas applicants. In a second sub-
division, Rule 9 states that courts may dismiss "successive" petitions if
420. The literal meaning of section 2255 is ignored in other situations. See discussion of Hill
v. United States, supra notes 316-21 and accompanying text. See also Sanders v. United States,
373 U.S. 1, 12-15 (1963) (interpreting the "at any time" language of section 2255 not to require
courts to entertain a second or successive motion for relief and concluding that "§ 2255's language
cannot be taken literally"; but holding that section 2255 would be ineffective if it imported res
judicata principles into federal prisoners postconviction remedies).
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the first has been decided "on the merits.142 1 Further, even if "new and
different grounds" are alleged, courts may dismiss upon a finding that
the failure to assert such grounds earlier constituted an "abuse of the
writ."
4 2 2
The innovation of Rule 9(b) is not that it permits dismissal of
claims previously decided on the merits; that principle had been estab-
lished by case law42 and statutes.424 Rule 9(b)'s innovation is that it
authorizes dismissal of claims never before litigated; dismissal is per-
missible if a judge finds that the failure to raise "new and different
claims" was an "abuse of the writ.
425
What is the abuse? The underlying assumption is, once again, that
prisoners recognize but withhold viable claims because over time,
either respondents will have difficulty establishing the invalidity of
their claims or the possibility of retrial diminishes. Since many habeas
applicants arepro se,426 Rule 9(b) also assumes that the litigants them-
421. Section 2254 Rules, supra note 375, at Rule 9(b); Section 2255 Rules, supra note 73, at
Rule 9(b) [hereinafter cited as Rule 9(b)].
422. Id.
423. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 15 (1963) held that "only if (I) the same ground
presented in the subsequent application was determined adversely to the applicant on the prior
application, (2) the prior determination was on the merits, and (3) the ends ofjustice would not be
served by reaching the merits of the subsequent application," could relief under section 2255 be
denied. The Sanders principle has been applied to section 2254 cases as well. Paprskar v. Estelle,
612 F.2d 1003, 1005 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 885 (1980).
424. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 states "the sentencing court shall not be required to entertain a second
or successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner." Id. § 2244(a) provides for
finality in state habeas cases; it authorizes dismissal of a prior determination of the "legality" of
detention has been made, no new ground "not heretofore presented and determined" is presented,
and the "ends ofjustice" do not require another inquiry. See also id § 2244(b)-(c).
425. Rule 9(b), supra note 421. Rule 9(b) permits judges to include res judicata concepts
when defining "abuse of the writ." See, e.g., Jones v. Estelle, 722 F.2d 159, 165-67 (5th Cir. 1983)
(en banc) (abuse of the writ because petitioner, represented by counsel, had not raised all claims
earlier, inadequate counsel no excuse). Cf Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 291 (1948) (dismissal
of three petitions does not justify dismissal of a fourth, raising a new claim, if there was justifica-
tion not to raise that claim earlier).
Courts have also relied on Rule 9(b) to dismiss cases in which no prior evidentiary hearing
was held. See United States v. Kearney, 682 F.2d 214, 217-18 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (upholding denial
of section 2255 petition when denial was based solely upon consideration of files, record of case,
and district court opinion). Cf. Morgan v. United States, 696 F.2d 1239, 1240 (9th Cir. 1983)
(Rule 9(b) dismissal proper only if first decision to dismiss made after an evidentiary hearing).
But see Paprskar v. Estelle, 612 F.2d 1003, 1005 (5th Cir.) (interpreting Rule 9(b) as not changing
habeas corpus standard), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 885 (1980).
426. P. ROBINSON, supra note 216, at 9-10 (79.2% of cases reviewed in the study were filed pro
se); RUTGERS STuDY, supra note 399, at 714. See also Turner, When Prisoners Sue: 4 Study of
Prisoner Section 1983 Suits in the Federal Courts, 92 HARV. L. REv. 610, 611 (1979) (majority of
prisoner civil rights litigants also pro se). But see Shapiro, supra note 77, at 343 (counsel was
appointed or present in 45% of the habeas actions studied). Most of the Habeas Rules implicitly
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selves, and not attorneys, are the "sandbaggers" who have decided that
the chances of late success outweigh the disadvantages of waiting, usu-
ally in prison,4 2 7 for the payoff.42 8 The frequent absence of counsel,
however, makes other assumptions plausible: that failures to include
all allegations in first petitions are due to prisoners' lack of legal knowl-
edge or to inadvertence.
To the extent that sandbagging is a realistic concern, the Rule
might have been drafted to penalize the sandbagger and not the unwit-
ting litigant. Deliberate bypass could have been the standard for
"abuse of the writ." The Rule, however, provides no such constraints
and, under its mandate, courts have dismissed petitions without mak-
ing findings that the prisoners actually recognized but deliberately
withheld claims.429
Rule 9(b) received Supreme Court approval in Barefoot v. Es-
telle,43° a recent death penalty case exhibiting the Burger Court's con-
cerns for finality. In 1978, a Texas jury found Thomas Barefoot guilty
of murdering a police officer, and Barefoot was sentenced to death. In
1980, the Texas Court of Appeals affirmed the lower state court, but the
assume that habeas petitions and section 2255 motions are filed pro se. See, e.g., Section 2254
Rules, supra note 375, at Rule 2; Section 2255 Rules, supra note 73, at Rule 2 (mandating the use
of forms designed for nonlawyers); Section 2254 Rules, supra note 375, at Rules 6(a), 8(c); Section
2255 Rules, supra note 73, at Rules 6(a), 8(c) (providing for appointment of counsel to conduct
discovery and evidentiary hearings).
427. Not all habeas petitioners are incarcerated. The Supreme Court has interpreted the "in
custody" requirement to include those on bail and on parole. E.g., Hensley v. Municipal Court,
411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973) (petitioner released on own recognizance "in custody" for purposes of
habeas corpus); Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 242-43 (1963) (state prisoner under custody
and control of state parole board "in custody" pursuant to section 2241). Some petitioners' claims,
however, have been mooted by their release from the custody of a correctional department. E.g.,
Lane v. Willianm, 455 U.S. 624, 631 (1982).
428. The Supreme Court has created one incentive for state prisoners to withhold claims de-
liberately. Under the Supreme Court's recent interpretation of the exhaustion requirement, state
prisoners' petitions cannot be decided in federal court unless all claims raised have first been
presented to state courts. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518-19 (1982). Thus, rather than waiting
in prison until all claims have been exhausted, a prisoner may want to withhold unexhausted
claims in the hopes of winning release on exhausted claims. Id at 529 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
On the other hand, Rule 9(b) can be applied to penalize such an approach. See Jones v. Estelle,
722 F.2d 159, 168-69 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (Rose v. Lund cannot be avoided by withholding
unexhausted claims; Rule 9(b) dismissal proper).
429. See, e.g., Jones v. Estelle, 699 F.2d 793, 794 (5th Cir.) (district court finding of intentional
withholding of claim unsupported by evidence), rev'den banc, 722 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. 1983); Mays
v. Balkcom, 631 F.2d 48, 51 (5th Cir. 1980) (petitioner contended sole reason certain claims were
not included in first petition was that he had learned of new grounds after filing first application;
district court found abuse of writ); Frazier v. Harrison, 537 F. Supp. 17, 21 (E.D. Tenn. 1981)
(inmate might have deliberately withheld claim), aft'd, 698 F.2d 1219 (6th Cir. 1982).
430. 103 S. Ct. 3383, reh'g denied, 104 S. Ct. 209 (1983).
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United States Supreme Court stayed Mr. Barefoot's execution pending
its decision on a writ of certiorari, which was subsequently denied.43
The execution was stayed a second time while Mr. Barefoot first sought
state and then federal habeas corpus relief. After losing in the federal
district court, Mr. Barefoot requested permission to appeal.432 The dis-
trict court granted certification, and Mr. Barefoot's lawyers filed a no-
tice of appeal in the Fifth Circuit in November of 1982. Texas set
January 25, 1983 as the new date for execution.433
On January 14, eleven days prior to the scheduled execution, Mr.
Barefoot's attorneys requested a stay pending determination of the
habeas appeal. On January 17th, the Fifth Circuit responded by in-
forming the parties that they would have "unlimited opportunity to
brief and argue the merits" 43 4 on January 19th. The day after oral ar-
gument, the Fifth Circuit denied the stay and stated that, upon a review
of the claims, the petition had no "substantial merit."435
Mr. Barefoot thereafter obtained a stay from the Supreme Court,
which agreed to consider the procedural adequacy of the Fifth Circuit's
actions. On July 6, 1983, the Supreme Court concluded that the Fifth
Circuit's "course" was "within the bounds of our prior decisions"
436
and affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief. The Court did
not entirely endorse the Fifth Circuit's behavior; Justice White's major-
ity opinion noted that the preferable route for the circuit would have
been to have affirmed the lower court on the merits as well as deny the
stay. But a majority of the Justices declined to insist upon such
formalism.
Barefoot is notable because the Court used it as an occasion to
instruct federal courts about the "proper procedures" for entertaining
habeas applications from the "increasing number of death-sentenced
petitioners. 437 First, the Court cautioned against leniency in granting
habeas appeals filed by death row petitioners: "the severity of the pen-
alty does not in itself suffice to warrant the automatic issuing of a certif-
431. Barefoot v. Texas, 453 U.S. 913 (1981).
432. 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (1982); FED. R. APP. P. 22(b). For interpretation of the certificate re-
quirement, see Davis v. Jacobs, 454 U.S. 911, 917 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (congressional
purpose in requiring certificate of probable cause as prerequisite to appeal in habeas proceeding is
to terminate frivolous appeals).
433. 103 S. Ct. at 3390.
434. Id.
435. Barefoot v. Estelle, 697 F.2d 593, 600 (5th Cir. 1983).
436. 103 S. Ct. at 3392.
437. Id. at 3393.
1984]
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icate [of probable cause]. 43 8 Second, while the Court insisted that
courts must decide the merits of appeals, the Court approved expedited
appellate procedures, including the consolidation of decisions on stays
and the merits. Third, the Court invoked Rule 9(b) and invited lower
courts to deny some death-sentenced habeas petitioners' "second and
successive"43 9 federal habeas corpus petitions. "[E]ven where it cannot
be concluded that a petition should be dismissed under Rule 9(b), it
would be proper for the district court to expedite consideration of the
petition."" Finally, the Court warned that, in ruling on requests for
stays filed concurrently with writs of certiorari, the Court itself would
place "considerable weight" on the decisions of the appellate courts
regarding stay applications." 1
Barefoot, and several subsequent death penalty cases,442 illustrate
the same concerns that animate both Rule 9 and the rest of the
Supreme Court majority's view of habeas corpus-exasperation with
revisionism. Barefoot is not, however, a redundant example of
Supreme Court efforts to narrow procedural opportunities. Barefoot is
within a category of cases formerly thought unique and, in some sense,
immune from the value decisions made in other parts of the docket.
Barefoot is a death penalty case, and this country has a long history of
differentiating such cases, of providing extra process to protect the sen-
tenced prisoner.443 In Barefoot, however, only a shadow of special con-
cern remains; Justice White's majority decision in Barefoot has a
slightly moderated tone. Unlike Justice O'Connor in Frady and Justice
Rehnquist in Sykes, who saw the trial as the definitive event, Justice
White discussed appeals as an important part of the decisionmaking
process: "direct appeal is the primary avenue for review of a convic-
438. Id at 3394.
439. Id. at 3395.
440. Id
441. Id. Cf A.B.A. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standards 21-2.5(c) (Supp. 1982)
(execution should be stayed automatically when an appeal is instituted).
442. E.g., Woodard v. Hutchins, 730 F.2d 953 (4th Cir.), stay vacated, 104 S. Ct. 752 (1984)
(per curiam); id. at 752-53 (Powell, J., concurring) (arguing that the lower courts need not have
entertained the petition because it was a successive petition, constituting an abuse of the writ); Id
at 755 (Brennan, J., dissenting), (concerned about the "indefensible. . .rush to judgment"); Au-
try v. Estelle, 706 F.2d 1394 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub non. Autry v. McKaskle, 104 S. Ct.
1458, 1459 (1984) (Marshall & Brennan, JJ., dissenting) ("IT]his case ... is part of a pattern of
recent decisions in each of which the Court has shown an unseemly desire to bring litigation in a
capital case to a fast and irrevocable end."), stay denied, cert. denied 104 S. Ct. 1462 (1984) (Bren-
nan & Marshall, JJ., disenting).
443. See Radin, supra note 417, at 1150 (special consideration should be undertaken in death
penalty cases).
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tion or sentence, and death penalty cases are no exception." 444 But,
with the conclusion of appellate proceedings and the denial of certio-
rari, "a presumption of finality and legality attaches to the conviction
and sentence. The role of federal habeas proceedings, while important
in assuring that constitutional rights are observed, is secondary and
limited." 445
After Barefoot, death penalty cases still command special treat-
ment. To the degree that differentiation remains, however, it cuts
against extra protection for the death-sentenced prisoner.4 6 In non-
capital habeas appeals and in most civil appeals, appellants typically
do not need quick appellate decisionmaking and do not request stays.
As a consequence, appellants are given time, including occasional ex-
tensions, to compile information from often voluminous records and to
prepare briefs. Death row appellants, however, have no such luxury.
If states set execution dates before the expiration of the ordinary appel-
late briefing schedule, death penalty petitioners must request stays and
risk losing the time for thorough appellate presentation. Capital pun-
ishment habeas litigants may now have less time to prepare their ap-
peals than other litigants." 7
c. Litigants' autonomy: As in other habeas cases, the Barefoot
majority implicitly assumed that many capital petitions are frivolous,
are filed to stall for time, and include claims deliberately withheld from
previous habeas petitions."4 Litigant autonomy is once again twisted
into sandbagging, and this sandbagging argument is premised on the
belief that death-sentenced prisoners have even greater incentives to
sandbag than do other prisoners. To substantiate this belief, one must
assume that (a) the probability of retrial diminishes over time; (b)
death-sentenced prisoners believe that, if retried, they are likely to be
444. 103 S. Ct. at 3391.
445. Id.
446. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Adams, 104 S. Ct. 2183, 2183-84 (1984) (vacature of stay) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting) (arguing against the Court's granting an application to vacate a stay of execu-
tion "after having had less than a day to consider the judgment of the Court of Appeals ....
The haste and confusion surrounding this decision is degrading to our role as judges"; and
describing the Court's denial of his own "motion to defer its action for 24 hours" so that the
Justice could "write a more elaborate dissent"); Autry v. McKasle, 104 S. Ct. 1458, 1459 (1984)
(denial of certiorari) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe Court is dramatically expediting its normal
deliberative processes to clear the way for an impending execution.").
447. The trend, begun in Barefoot, to treat capital cases like other kinds of cases, continued
when the Court decided Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984) (sixth amendment
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at capital sentencing subjected to the same standard as
those made against trial counsel in noncapital cases).
448. Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct. at 3405.
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reconvicted, but not sentenced to death; (c) death-sentenced prisoners
would prefer to spend a life in prison rather than be executed; (d)
death-sentenced prisoners have knowledge of several possible claims
and of the likelihood of the success of each; (e) death-sentenced prison-
ers have control over their (usually) volunteer counsel and direct their
attorneys as to which claims to file and in what order; and (f) death-
sentenced prisoners are able to predict the interval from sentencing to
execution so as to decide when to file the "best" claims. Under such
conditions, it would indeed be possible to demonstrate that a rational,
utilitarian death-sentenced prisoner would be more likely to "sandbag"
than would a utilitarian prisoner not sentenced to death. However,
many of the foregoing assumptions are highly problematic if not false.
Gary Gilmore's case alone casts doubt upon at least two of these as-
sumptions: that such prisoners prefer life in prison and exercise great
control over their attorneys.449
Moreover, the case law on death-sentenced prisoners suggests that
the underlying premise, that most claims filed are frivolous, is itself
untrue. As Justice Marshall's dissent noted, of the thirty-four capital
habeas cases decided on the merits by federal appellate courts since
1976, petitioners prevailed in twenty-three, or seventy percent of the
cases.45° In the Fifth Circuit alone, fifteen of twenty-one prisoners suc-
ceeded on appeal.451  But arguments about probabilities, like moral
claims about the special nature of death penalty cases, did not move the
Barefoot majority, which insisted that "the administration of justice
ought not to be interfered with on mere pretexts. 452
d. Finality: When the strictures of Rule 9 are read in conjunc-
tion with the Sykes, Isaac, and Frady holdings, time or "delay"
emerges as central to the habeas decisionmaking process. Sykes and
Isaac mandate that objections be made at trial or on appeal, even when
the claims appear far fetched under governing law. Under Frady, the
penalty for failure to raise such claims is the almost insurmountable
test of "actual and substantial prejudice." Rule 9(a) demands that
449. Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1015 n.4 (1976) (death-sentenced prisoner withdrew
request for Supreme Court review and fought his attorneys, who wanted to pursue the litigation
despite the client's wishes). See also Jones v. Barnes, 103 S. Ct. 3308, 3314 (1983) (nothing in the
Constitution requires appointed counsel for an indigent defendant "to raise every colorable claim
suggested by the client").
450. Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct. at 3405 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (relying on research by
the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc.).
451. Id.
452. Id. at 3391 (citation omitted).
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postconviction claims be made promptly, while Rule 9(b) counsels that
claims not raised in a first postconviction effort may be precluded.
Since delay is generally understood as "bad," 45 3 the attempted
elimination of delay in habeas proceedings might be understood as
"good," as appropriately installing finality in an arena previously im-
pervious to such concerns. As Chief Justice Burger, a principal propo-
nent of limiting habeas applications, maintains, the "privileges of the
writ of habeas corpus are not unlimited. ' 454 The Chief Justice has crit-
icized habeas because it "undermines . . .[finality], degrades the im-
portance of trials, frustrates penalogical goals and drains the resources
of the judicial system. ' 455 He has also argued that the lack of finality
of convictions prevents prisoners from ever "making peace" with soci-
ety,456 and he has proposed time limits and other preclusion rules as
ameliorative.
But the difficulty with the various delay-based preclusion rules is
that they instill enormous arbitrariness into the postconviction process.
A poignant example of that arbitrariness and of the distance between
the Warren and Burger Courts' procedural models is a recent Eleventh
Circuit case, Smith v. Kemp.457 In Smith, three individuals were in-
volved in a murder-for-hire scheme that resulted in two deaths. The
state prosecutor apparently offered the individual against whom it had
the strongest case a bargain in exchange for his agreement to testify
against the others.458 He accepted the deal, testified against the others,
and received a prison term of several years with parole eligibility.
459
The "mastermind" of the crime, Machetti, went to trial and lost.46 °
However, in her state habeas petition, her attorneys argued that the
453. Commentators have begun to understand the issue of delay as more complex; the new
nomenclature is "pace," and questions are raised about how long cases "should" take. See, e.g., J.
ADLER, W. FELSTINER, D. HENSLER & M. PETERSON, THE PACE OF LITIGATION: CONFERENCE
PROCEEDINGS v-xiii (1982) (reporting proceedings on conference regarding the pace of legal pro-
ceedings and society's dissatisfaction with "delay"); Church, The "Old and the New" Conventional
Wisdom of Court Delay, 7 JusT. Sys. J. 395, 396 (1982) (analyzing and evaluating recent studies of
court delay).
454. Spalding v. Aiken, 103 S. Ct. 1795, 1796 (1983) (Burger, C.J., statement concerning the
denial of certiorari).
455. Id at 1797.
456. Id See also Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 25 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (also
claiming that finality of convictions was necessary for prisoners to make peace with society).
457. 715 F.2d 1459 (11th Cir.), cert. deniea 104 S. Ct. 510 (1983).
458. Id at 1463-66, 1473-76.
459. Id at 1476.
460. Id at 1462; Machetti v. Linahan, 679 F.2d 236, 237 (1lth Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.
Ct. 763 (1983).
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jury pool from which her jury had been selected was unconstitutional;
the custom had been to accept automatically requests by women for
exclusion. 461 Although Machetti lost in state court,4 62 she succeeded in
her federal habeas claim because of the Supreme Court rule that, when
a state habeas court decides the merits of a claim not raised at trial, the
federal court may do likewise.46 3
The third defendant, Smith, was not so lucky. He had also gone to
trial in the same county, at about the same time as Machetti, and the
same jury selection procedures were in effect. Although five days before
his trial, the Supreme Court had held per se exclusions of women from
jury pools unconstitutional, 4 '4 Smith's attorneys failed to object to the
jury's composition at trial and failed to raise the claim in state habeas
corpus proceeding or in the first federal habeas proceeding.465 As a
result, relying on Sykes, Isaac, and Rule 9(b), the Eleventh Circuit held
that Smith had properly been precluded from arguing the issue in his
second habeas petition.46 As the dissent described the outcome: "be-
cause his lawyers did not timely raise the unconstitutionality of the jury
pool, he faces death by electrocution. . . . Judicial economy. . . dic--
tate[s] that we not reach the [issue] ... 467 On December 15, 1983,
Smith was executed.
468
Smith is a replay of Fay v. Noia, twenty years later. Codefendants
had identical claims about why convictions were constitutionally inva-
lid. One codefendant had and used an open procedural avenue and
succeeded, while the other did not. Twenty years ago, the United
States Supreme Court found that a state's refusal to treat codefendants
consistently was offensive. Now, under new Supreme Court case law,
the federal courts are authorized to make such distinctions, even when
the "grisly choice" 469 is that one codefendant lives and another dies.
When discussing Fay v. Noia, I asked: what if the second decision
center had values no different from the first? Is a procedural model
461. 715 F.2d at 1469; 679 F.2d at 238.
462. Smith v. State, 236 Ga. 12, 16, 222 S.E.2d 308, 313, cer. deniea 428 U.S. 910, reh'g
denied, 429 U.S. 874 (1976), rehkg denied 429 U.S. 1055 (1977).
463. 679 F.2d at 238 nA. Cf United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 183-84 (1981) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (complaining of majority's refusal to permit the same collateral review possibilities for
federal prisoners).
464. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
465. 715 F.2d at 1469.
466. Id at 1469-71.
467. Id at 1476 (Hatchett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
468. N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1983, at A23, col. 1.
469. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 440 (1963).
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that permits duplication still worthwhile? My atirmative answer as-
sumed that the second forum would reconsider the merits of the first's
decision. However, if the federal courts rubber stamp most state court
decisions without deciding the constitutional claims, the ritual begins to
look grotesque. My criticism is that recent Supreme Court procedural
pronouncements so narrow the federal inquiry that any semblance of
coherence about who wins and loses on the merits of federal constitu-
tional claims is obliterated. Arbitrariness becomes pervasive; rational-
ity, norm enforcement, and consistency are all lost.
D. TWENTY YEARS: A RETROSPECTIVE
1. Documentation of the Changes
During the years between Fay v. Noa and Sykes, Isaac, and
Frady, federal courts' concern for prisoners peaked and is now abating.
Sympathy has been replaced by judges' coldness, if not hostility.470
And the "principle that there must be some end to litigation," a princi-
ple "relegate[d] to the back seat" in 1963,4 7' is now up front.
Explanations of the changes can be found in events in the courts
and in society as a whole. First, the composition of the Court has
changed; new members, now a majority, have different views, reflecting
in part the concerns of the executive branch. The legislature has also
played some role-although for the most part, Congress has sat si-
lently, neither confirming nor disapproving the major innovations in
the interpretation of the "scope" of habeas corpus.
472
Another critical difference is the increase in prisoner cases in rela-
tion to other types of cases in the federal courts. In 1944, there were
470. See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3202 (1984) (prisoners have no expectation
of privacy in their cells, and therefore no fourth amendment protections); Boyce v. Alizaduk, 595
F.2d 948, 953 (4th Cir. 1979) (reprimanding district court that too quickly found prisoner's com-
plaint frivolous).
471. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. at 22 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
472. Congressional acceptance (with some modification) of the Section 2254 Rules, supra note
375, and the Section 2255 Rules, supra note 73, and congressional authorization of an expanded
role for magistrates suggest that Congress has been at least a limited partner in the retrenchment.
But the legislative history of congressional response to the Section 2254 Rules and the Section
2255 Rules states that the "legislation is intended neither to approve nor to disapprove" of Stone
v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), rendered the previous year. See HoUsE JUDICIARY COMM., RULES
ON HABEAS CORPUS, H.R. REP. No. 1471, 90th Cong., 3d Sess. (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2478, 2479.
As of this writing, the Senate (but not the House) has substantially adopted many of the
Burger Court's rules. See Habeas Corpus Legislation of 1983, supra note 144. For a discussion of
legislative proposals in the 1980's, see generally Yackle, supra note 141.
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1,312 prisoner cases (constituting 3.4% of the federal civil docket), filed
by state and federal prisoners in federal district court.473 Those cases
included suits filed under habeas corpus statutes as well as other kinds
of claims. In the years from 1944 to 1959, prisoners' cases constituted
an average of approximately 2% of the total civil filings.
4 74
By 1963, the year in which Fay v. Noia was decided, the number of
all prisoner filings had increased to 4,254, or 6.7% of the civil docket.4 "
From 1961 to 1967, the rate of growth of prisoner filings, as a percent-
age of the total federal docket, was fairly constant, increasing approxi-
mately 1.5 to 2.7% a year. By 1968, prisoner filings comprised 15.6% of
the federal civil docket.476
In 1971, the Administrative Office of the United States Courts be-
gan attempts to tally separately habeas cases and prisoners' civil rights
cases. That decision was made because prisoners were filing increasing
numbers of complaints about conditions of confinement, as contrasted
with habeas challenges to convictions. In that year, there were 11,378
"habeas" actions (12.2% of the federal civil docket), and 3,129 "civil
rights" actions (3.4% of the civil docket). Prisoner litigation as a whole,
including "parole board review" and "mandamus" actions, represented
473. 1944 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 215, at 82 table C-2. State prisoner habeas petitions
constituted 1.6 percent of the total civil docket for federal district courts, while federal prisoner
habeas petitions constituted 1.8 percent. Id.
474. See Appendix B. These figures were derived from the 1945-1960 ANNUAL REPORTS,
supra note 215, at table C-2.
Then, as now, "United States as defendant" denotes federal prisoner petitions, and "Private
cases" denotes state prisoner petitions. Over the years, however, new categories of petitions have
been added.
In 1949, the year after 28 U.S.C. § 2255 was enacted, the Administrative Office began to
count section 2255 cases separately, in a "motions to vacate sentence" category applied to federal
prisoners. Compare 1948 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 215, at 132-33 table C-2 with 1949 ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 215, at 130-31 table C-2. In 1960, the Administrative Office added a category
of "parole board reviews" for federal prisoners. Compare 1959 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 215,
at 184-85 table C-2 with 1960 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 215, at 231-32 table C-2. The Office
added a parallel category for state prisoners in 1961. Compare 1960 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note
215, at 230-31 table C-2 with 1961 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 215, at 238-39 table C-2. In 1963,
the Office delineated a category of "prison officials mandamus" for both federal and state prison-
ers. Compare 1962 ANNUAL REPORT, supranote 215, at 197 table C-2 with 1963 ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 215, at 199 table C-2. Beginning in 1971, the Office added a "civil rights" category for
both state and federal prisoners. Compare 1970 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 215, at 232 table C-2
with 1971 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 215, at 263 table C-2.
475. See 1963 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 215, at 199 table C-2.
476. From a total federal district court civil docket of 71,449 cases in 1968, prisoners' cases
numbered:
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17.4% of the caseload.477 The absolute number of prisoner filings rose
in 1983 to a total (for both federal and state prisoners and including all
kinds of claims) of 30,775 cases, or 12.7% of the civil docket.47 8 How-
ever, the peak for total prisoner claims as a percentage of the total civil
docket was reached more than a decade earlier: in 1970, there were
15,997 filings, constituting 18.3% of the federal civil caseload.4 79
The increase in the absolute number of cases over the last thirty
Category of
petitions filed






Federal prisoners' total filings






















State prisoners' total filings 8,301 11.6
Prisoners' total filings 11,152 15.6
* Less than one-half of one percent.
1968 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 215, at 194-95 table C-2.
477. From a total federal district court civil docket of 93,396 in 1971, prisoners' c
numbered:
Category of Number Percent of total
petitions filed of petitions federal civil docket






























State prisoners' total filings 12,145 13.0
Prisoners' total filings 16,266 17.4
* Less than one-half of one percent.
1971 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 215, at 263 table C-2. Cf. Shapiro, supra note 77, at 328 n.40.
Shapiro counted habeas filings in the clerk's office for the Federal District Court of the District of
Massachusetts. His personal tallies differed, by three to five applications per year for 1970-1972,
from those for Massachusetts set forth in the ANNUAL REPORTS.
478. 1983 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 215, at A-7 table C-2.
479. 1970 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 215, at 232 table C-2. See Appendix B.
ases
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years has been substantial. Assuming a relationship between case law
developments and filing rates, commentators speak about the flood of
prisoners' cases and the need to change the law to stem the tide.4 80
However, numbers other than filing rates and factors other than
changes in legal doctrine are necessary to understand the reasons for
the increase in absolute filings and the impact such filings have on the
federal judiciary.
First, the number of prisoners has also grown dramatically.481 In
1944, the prison population was estimated to be 132,456.482 In 1963,
the number of prisoners had increased to 217,283.83 By 1982, the
480. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT: FEDERAL REVIEW OF STATE
PRISONER PETITIONS HABEAS CORPUS 2 (1984) (700% increase in filings of state prisoners peti-
tions in past 20 years) [hereinafter cited as BJS SPECIAL REPORT]. See also Parker Committee
Report, supra note 292, at 3-6 (some members of that committee, at work in the early 1940's, were
concerned about limiting the number of habeas filings; in those years, both the absolute numbers
and percentages of filings were at much lower levels than currently); Smith, Title 28, § 2255 of the
U.S. Code, 40 NOTRE DAME LAW. 171, 175-76 (1964) (listing the rise in number of filings to
demonstrate "abuse" of the writ).
Many other commentators have bemoaned the rising number of filings. These authors have
assumed a causal link between "liberal" case law and filings. Typically, when discussing the in-
crease in filings, these commentators do not analyze any factors other than changes in legal doc-
trine. See, e.g., Hopkins, Federal Habeas Corpus: Easing the Tension Between State and Federal
Courts, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 660, 667 (1970) (new federal constitutional protections increase
burden); Wick, Apportionment of the Judicial Resources in Criminal Cases: Should Habeas Corpus
BeEliminated?, 21 DE PAUL L. REV. 740,745-51 (1972) (complaining about the number of filings,
considering only absolute numbers and attributing increases in filings to Supreme Court decisions;
proposing that counsel be provided for inmates, that they be required to file promptly, and that,
absent the discovery of new evidence, they be permitted only one postconviction application);
Documentary Supplement, State Post-Conviction Remedies and Federal Habeas Corpus, 12 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 149, 159-70 (1970) (comparing case law changes and filing rates). Cf. Shapiro,
supra note 77, at 346-48 (noting that only 12 of the 257 petitions filed in the federal District Court
for Massachusetts from 1971 to 1973 raised a Fay v. Noia issue and that, of the 12, not a single
claim would have been decided differently had Fay v. Noia come out the other way; suggesting,
however, that the indirect impact of Noia might be to increase federal courts' general willingness
to consider petitions' merits and to overlook procedural defaults); Wright & Sofaer, Federal
Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners: The Allocation ofFact-Finding Responsibility, 75 YALE L.J.
895, 921 n.77 (1966) (number of hearings held does not indicate whether amount is appropriate or
not).
481. See Olsen, Judicial Proposals to Limit the Jurisdictional Scope of Federal Post-Conviction
Habeas Corpus Consideration of the Claims ofState Prisoners, 31 BUFFALO L. REV. 301, 306 n.27
(1982) (comparing numbers of state prisoner federal habeas petitions with New York state pris-
oner populations and concluding that the number of petitions filed was small compared to the
prisoner population); BJS SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 480, at 3 (habeas corpus filings peaked in
1970 and have decreased since then; prison populations in years from 1970 to 1982 have increased
117%).
482. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATIsTICs-1973, at 350
(1973) [hereinafter cited as SOURCEBOOK 1973].
483. Id.
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prison population was at a record high of almost 400,000,484 and the
figures for 1983 demonstrate that the population surge is unabated.4 85
A comparison of the number of prisoner filings to the number of incar-
cerated prisoners is thus in order.
Because some prisoners are "repeat players,"4 6 who file many
claims, it is not accurate to assume that each lawsuit is filed by a differ-
ent inmate. Further, not all habeas claims are filed by prisoners. Con-
temporary interpretations of the "in custody" requirement permit
individuals on bail, parole, and probation to seek habeas relief.
4 7
Moreover, neither the figures on prison populations nor those on the
number of prisoner cases filed are completely accurate.488 For simplic-
ity, however, I have ignored these limitations and have assumed that all
prisoners file only one claim, that only prisoners file claims, and that
the numbers on prisoners' filings and on prison populations are
accurate.
With these assumptions, I have calculated an estimate of the
number of filings of state and federal habeas and civil rights claims
per 100 inmates. Thus, some 0.99 prisoners per hundred filed federal
actions in 1944,489 and some 1.96 prisoners per hundred filed in
484. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN 2 table 2 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as 1982 STATISTICS BULLETIN].
485. The prison population in 1983 exceeded 438,000. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN 1 (1984) [hereinafter cited as 1984 STATISTICS BULLETIN].
486. Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead" Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 LAW & Soc'y REv. 95, 149 (1974).
For a discussion of repeat filings by the same prisoner, see Goodman, Use andAbuse of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus, 7 F.R.D. 313, 315 (1947) (increases in prison filings largely due to succes-
sive petitions filed by the same prisoners). See also Avichai, CollateralAttacks on Convictions (1):
The Probability and Intensity of Filing, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 319, 347 (1977) (review
of filings in three states; "high activity of collateral attacks perceived by the various authorities
stems from a high number of filings generated by a small proportion of prisoners"); BJS SPECIAL
REPORT, supra note 480, at 6 (30% of all state prisoners filings in federal court had previously filed
one or more habeas petitions).
On the other hand, many prisoners are not repeat fiers; "nearly half of the filers do not ever
file again." Avichai, supra, at 336 (emphasis in original).
487. See supra note 427; Justices of Boston Mun. Court v. Lydon, 104 S. Ct. 1805, 1810 (1984)
(petitioner "in custody" even though his first conviction had been vacated and he was released on
his own recognizance).
488. See infra notes 510-13 and accompanying text. See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE,
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICs-1981, at 474 (1982) (noting the changes in num-
bers as prison officials update records) [hereinafter cited as SOURCEBOOK 1981].
489. My calculations assume a total of 132,456 prisoners (114,317 state and 18,139 federal)
and thus .530 petitions per hundred state prisoners, 3.892 petitions per hundred federal prisoners,
A58 state prisoner petitions per hundred total prisoners, and .533 federal prisoner petitions per
hundred total prisoners for 1944.
To arrive at these estimates, I have used the 1945 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 215, at 82
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1963. 41 The rates from 1961 to 1970 rose from 1.19 to 8.14, at a pace
of about an additional one petitioner per hundred per year.491 In 1971,
the rates began to level off, decreasing from 8.21 in 1971 to 8.03 in
1975.492 Thereafter, the rates dropped to 7.33 per hundred inmates in
1979,491 rose to 7.51 in 1981, 4 94 and dropped to 7.01 in 1983.
491
table C-2 for the number of prisoner petitions and the SOURCEDOOK 1973, supra note 482, at 350
for the prison populations figure. As a result, additional caveats are in order. First, the statistics
in the ANNUAL REPORTS are compiled by fiscal years ending June 30th, while the SOURCEBOOK
uses the calendar year ending December 31st.
Second, other commentators have provided somewhat different data on prisoner populations.
See, e.g., Turner, supra note 426, at 626 n.86 (total number of prisoners in state institutions was
254,961 in 1976, 229,685 in 1975, and 196,105 in 1974; the numbers were derived from data from
the National Criminal Justice Information Service, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration,
Prisoners in State and Federal Institutions on December 31, 1976 (advance report Mar. 1977),
and National Criminal Justice Information Service, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration,
Prisoners in State and Federal Institutions on December 31, 1975 (1977)).
490. 1963 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 215, at 199 table C-2 (the number of prisoner peti-
tions); SOURCEBOOK 1973, supra note 482, at 350 (prisoner populations). The filings for a total of
217,283 prisoners, 194,155 state and 23,128 federal, in 1963 are:
Number of
petitions fied
by state prisoners State prisoners' petitions filed per 100 state prisoners
2106 1.085 Habeas





by federal prisoners Federal prisoners' petitions filed per 100 federal prisoners
1457 6.300 Habeas and motions to vacate





both state and State and federal prisoners' petitions fied per 100
federal prisoners prisoners in the total prisoner population
3563 1.640 Total habeas and motions to vacate
98 0.045 Total parole board review
593 0.273 Total mandamus
4254 1.958 Total
491. See Appendix D.
492. 1971 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 215, at 263 table C-2; 1975 ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 215, at 347 table C-2; SOURCEBOOK 1973, supra note 482, at 350 for prison populations in
1974 and 1975.
493. 1979 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 215, at 362 table C-2; SOURCEBOOK 1981, supra note
488, at 474.
494. 1981 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 215, at 367 table C-2; 1982 STATISTICS BULLETIN,
supra note 484, at 2.
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When habeas claims are considered separately, as they can be
from 1971 on, the rates are 5.74 per hundred prisoners filing habeas
actions in 1971,496 4.66 per hundred in 1975,4 9 7 2.89 per hundred in
1981,498 and 2.68 for 1983. 4 9  In short, by considering the ratio of fil-
ings to the number of people in prison, the increase in the absolute
number of cases becomes less surprising. Moreover, while there has
495. 1983 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 215, at 246 table C-2; 1984 STATISTICS BULLETIN,
supra note 485, at 1.
496. 1971 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 215, at 263 table C-2; U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE,
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATIsTICs-1976, at 686 (1977). In 1971, the Administra-
tive Office designated prisoner civil rights actions as a category distinct from habeas corpus. See
supra note 474. The 1971 numbers for 198,061 prisoners, 177,113 state and 20,948 federal, are:
Number of
petitions filed Petitions filed per 100 prisoners
8372 4.727 Habeas petitions per hundred state prisoners
3006 14.350 Habeas petitions and motions to vacate per hundred
federal prisoners
Cf Avichai, supra note 486, at 338 (habeas corpus filings per hundred prisoners in four state courts
in 1971: 14.0 in Illinois, 26A in California, 7.5 in Texas, and 46.0 in Colorado). Avichai's num-
bers compare to my estimates of 5.8 federal habeas petitions filed in 1971 by both state and federal
prisoners. See supra note 477.
497. 1975 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 215, at 347 table C-2; U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE,
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICs-1975, at 617 (1976). The numbers for 240,593
prisoners, 216,462 state and 24,131 federal, are:
Number of
petitions filed Petitions fied per 100 prisoners
7843 3.623 Habeas petitions per hundred state prisoners
3372 13.974 Habeas petitions and motions to vacate per hundred
federal prisoners
498. 1981 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 215, at 367 table C-2; 1982 STATISTICS BULLETIN,
supra note 484, at 2. The numbers for 368,772 prisoners, 340,639 state and 28,133 federal, are:
Number of
petitions fied Petitions fied per 100 prisoners
7790 2.287 Habeas petitions per hundred state prisoners
2877 10.226 Habeas petitions and motions to vacate per hundred
federal prisoners
Cf. Robinson, Proposal and Analysis of a Unitary Systemfor Review of Criminal Judgments, 54
B.U.L. REv. 485, 496 n.33 (1974) (referring to the ANNUAL REPORTS, which showed number of
habeas petitions declining from 1671 to 1368, but describing an increase in filings and an esti-
mated one filing per six federal prisoners in 1972, or 17 per hundred prisoners).
In a preliminary report, Avichai found that less than ten percent of state prisoners in the four
states he reviewed sought collateral relief. Avichai, supra note 486, at 325. He concluded that the
probability of filing increased over the time of incarceration. Id. at 328-34.
499. 1983 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 215, at 246 table C-2; 1984 STATISTICS BULLETIN,
supra note 485, at 1. The numbers for 438,830 total prisoners, 406,904 state and 31,926 federal,
are:
Number of
petitions fied Petitions filed per 100 prisoners
8532 2.097 Habeas petitions per hundred state prisoners
3225 10.101 Habeas petitions and motions to vacate per hundred
federal prisoners
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been an increase in the rate of filings per hundred prisoners since 1944,
the rate of habeas filings per hundred inmates has declined since 1971.
A second relevant set of numbers is that of federal trial judges. In
1944, there were 185 authorized federal district court judges;500 in 1963,
306 judges;51 in 1971, 394 judges;50 2 and in 1983, 515 judges. 50 3 Since
the 1976 amendments to the Magistrates Act, magistrates may also
make initial decisions in habeas claims, so their numbers are also rele-
vant. As of the spring of 1983, there were 238 authorized full-time
magistrates, 5°4 yielding a total of 753 first tier decisionmakers able to
respond to prisoners' complaints.
The figures on judges and magistrates permit consideration of the
number of claims proportionate to the number of decisionmakers. In
1944, the 185 judges handled 1,312 claims, or about 7.1 each. In 1963,
the 306 judges handled 3,563 claims, or 11.6 each. In 1971, the 394
judges handled 11,378 habeas cases, or 28.9 each, and 3,129 civil rights
cases, or 7.9 each. In 1981, the 724 judges and magistrates had 10,667
habeas cases, or 14.7 each, and 16,473 civil rights cases, or 22.8 each.50 5
In 1983, the 753 judges and magistrates heard 11,757 habeas cases, or
15.6 each, and 18,477 civil rights cases, or 24.5 each. When magistrates
are excluded from the 1981 and 1983 calculations, each federal judge
decided 20.7 habeas and 31.9 civil rights cases in 1981, and 22.8 habeas
and 35.9 civil rights cases in 1983.
Of course, prisoners' cases are not evenly distributed among the
judges. While section 2255 was enacted to alleviate the disproportion-
ate impact of federal prisoners' filings and has in large measure accom-
plished its purpose, some federal courts have more criminal cases than
others, and therefore may have more section 2255 cases. Further, those
judges who sit in districts in which state prisons are located continue to
receive a disproportionate number of state prisoners' filings.
50 6
500. Act of Dec. 22, 1944, ch. 663, 58 Stat. 887, 887.
501. Act of July 30, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-562, § 3, 76 Stat. 247, 248.
502. Act of Dec. 18, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-208, § 3(d), 85 Stat. 741, 742.
503. 1983 ANNuAL REPORT, supra note 215, at 119 table 15.
504. Id. at 47 table 25 (also noting 225 part time magistrates and 13 "combination positions").
505. These numbers include filings by both federal and state prisoners. These figures were
calculated on the assumption that judges spend very little or no time reviewing magistrates' re-
ports and recommendations in habeas cases. But see BJS SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 480, at 6
(only 45% of all habeas cases filed were referred to a magistrate for review).
506. See BJS SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 480, at 3 table 3 (state prisoners' habeas corpus
filings, as percent of civil filings per circuit, range from .8 (D.C. Circuit) to 5.9 (Eleventh Circuit)).
My calculations include "motions to vacate" as "habeas" cases. If Zeigler & Hermann's 1971
figures are readjusted to reflect that addition, the disparity in filings within a state can be ex-
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The growth in prison litigation must also be viewed in the context
of the federal docket as a whole. The number of civil actions filed in
1944, 1953, 1963, 1973, and 1983, respectively, were 38,499, 64,001,
63,630, 98,560, and 241,842.507 Thus, in the last twenty years alone, the
federal civil docket increased by 380.1%. Although prisoner cases have
risen disproportionately since the mid 1970's, prisoners' filings have
stabilized and in 1983 constituted approximately 13% of the federal
court's civil docket.
Not all cases, of course, are equally time-consuming. Hearings are
held less frequently in habeas applications than in other kinds of cases.
In 1982, 2.4% of habeas cases reached trial, as compared with 6.1% of
all civil cases.5 08 Thus, even though habeas claims comprised roughly
5% of the civil caseload, these cases took less than five percent of a
court's trial time.
Finally, the increases in prison populations, in the number of fed-
eral judges, and in the federal docket do not capture many other
changes during the last twenty years. I have not described a host of
variables, both internal and external to the courthouse, such as changes
in substantive law, availability and funding of attorneys, the civil rights
amined. In the Northern District of New York, each federal district judge handled 40.5 "habeas"
cases, in the Eastern District, 42.0, in the Southern District, 19.2, and in the Western District,
46.7-all compared with the 28.9 average nationwide. Zeigler & Hermann, supra note 386, at 172
n.53 table 2.
For analysis of filings in another federal district court, see Bailey, The Realities ofPrisoners'
Cases Under 42 U.S. C. § 1983: A Statistical Survey in the Northern District of Illinos, 6 Loy. U.
CHI. L. 527, 557 (1975) (in 1973, some judges in the Northern District of Illinois had as few as
three state prisoners' habeas petitions while others had as many as 22). The national average, as I
estimated it for that year, was about 20 per judge.
For the number of state habeas applications in the District of Massachusetts in 1970, 1971,
and 1972, see Shapiro, supra note 77, at 329 table I. In all three years, there were six authorized
federal judges in Massachusetts. Pub. L. No. 91-272, 84 Stat. 294, 295 (1970). Using Shapiro's
tally, the average of these cases per judge was 12.5 in 1970, 16.7 in 1971, and 13.7 in 1972. These
figures compare with a nationwide average (assuming 394 authorized judgeships) of 23.0 in 1970,
21.2 in 1971, and 20.2 in 1972. See also Turner, supra note 426, at 614 n.27 (Western District of
Virginia had 156 section 1983 prisoner cases per authorized judgeship, as contrasted to a national
average of less than 21 per judgeship).
507. 1944 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 215, at 4; 1953 ANNUAL REPORT at 148, table C-2;
1963 ANNUAL REPORT at 198 table C-2; 1973 ANNUAL REPORT at 324 table C-2; 1983 ANNUAL
REPORT at 4 table 5.
508. 1982 ANNUAL REPORT, supranote 215, at 60 table 28. See Clark, Adjudication toAdmin-
istration: A Statistical Analysis ofFederal District Courts in the Twentieth Century, 55 S. CAL. L.
REv. 65, 146 (1981) (calculations, derived from the 1980 ANNUAL REPORTS, showing 99% of fed-
eral prisoners' civil litigation in federal district court terminated without trial, and 97% of state
prisoners' civil litigation terminated without trial). But see BJS SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 480,
at 7 ("some type of hearing" conducted in 6% of the cases studied).
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movement, and litigants' altered expectations of the courts. 50 9 While I
do not underestimate the impact of these factors, even a long article has
its limits.
2. The Meaning of the Numbers
The statistics on prisoner filings are helpful to our understanding
of litigation trends. One caveat, however, is appropriate: these num-
bers must be understood as estimates, because the reporting agencies
do not have the capacities to collect information directly.
A principal source of statistics on case filings by prisoners is the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, which, since its crea-
tion in 1939, has been compiling data on the federal courts' caseloads.
Information on prison populations comes from data collections com-
piled by the Department of Justice, while the National Center for State
Courts is the source for statistics on the workload in state courts. The
Administrative Office, the Department of Justice, and the National
Center do not generate their own data; rather, the information comes
from other sources.
For example, the Administrative Office relies upon district court
clerks and litigants to respond to the Administrative Office's catalogu-
ing requests. For simplicity, the Administrative Office requires that
each case be counted under one category, for example as a "habeas"
case or as a "civil rights" case, but not as both.
The difficulty with that approach is that prisoners' lawsuits may
include both habeas and civil rights challenges.51 0 The insistence on
allotment of all cases to one pile or the other sometimes results in mis-
identification, either by the individuals filing the cases or by court
clerks. One researcher, examining all prisoner files in a single federal
district court, found that "less than 60% of the [cases denoted as] state
prisoners' habeas applications were attacks on the validity of state
criminal convictions."51'
509. See Turner, supra note 426, at 627-37 (noting that states with high prison populations
were not necessarily those in which prisoners filed the most civil rights cases; other factors in-
cluded prison conditions, overcrowding, prison regulations, substantive law, availability of law-
yers and of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms).
510. See supra text accompanying notes 390, 391. See also Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
475, 499 (1973) (distinguishing state prisoners' section 2254 and section 1983 filings and noting
possible overlap).
511. Shapiro, supra note 77, at 330. Shapiro criticized other data gathered by the Administra-
tive Office and the Federal Judicial Center. Id. at 335-36. Problems with Administrative Office
record keeping were also described in Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal Foundations and an Em-
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The categories delineated for federal prisoners' cases are also
problematic. Since 1949, federal prisoners' "habeas corpus petitions"
have been listed separately from "motions to vacate," filed under sec-
tion 2255. But the Supreme Court has interpreted section 2255 to be
habeas corpus for federal prisoners. Therefore, section 2255 claims
should be included in the "habeas" category. Further, it is unclear
which federal prisoner cases are labeled "civil rights," although a
number have been so designated since 197 1.512 In short, because of the
coding and categorization problems, there are identifiable weaknesses
in the numbers generated by the Administrative Office. Comparable
difficulties exist with the other data sources.
5 13
As a consequence of the categorization problems, I have altered
the Administrative Office's numbers in one respect; my estimates of
federal prisoners' habeas filings combine those petitions listed in the
"habeas" category and those tabulated as "motions to vacate." Thus,
my estimates of federal prisoners' habeas filings are generous. For the
most part, however, I rely upon the major contributions of data
sources, like the Administrative Office, for providing insight into the
question of volume. While recognizing that the delineation between
prisoners' habeas and civil rights cases is a rough one, I have adopted
it. Statistics are an important part of an evaluation of whether the fed-
eral courts' weariness with habeas cases and the Supreme Court's con-
cerns for economy and finality stem from overwork.
Unquestionably, the numbers indicate that over the past forty
years, prisoner litigation has grown to occupy far more of the federal
docket than the 1,312 cases considered burdensome in 1944. Judges are
correct in perceiving that many more prisoners' cases are filed now
than were" filed years ago. But the rhetoric of the boom has outlasted
pirical Study, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 482, 533-36 (1982); Mayers, Federal Review of State Convic-
tions: The Need for Procedural Reappraisal, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 615, 630 n.62 (1965-66);
Zeigler & Hermann, supra note 386, at 170 n.43.
512. Cases coded as "civil rights" actions by federal prisoners are "those cases with the U.S.
as the defendant.... There is no definition provided to the courts on what is or is not 'civil
rights.' If the case is filed and the prisoner or his or her counsel alleges a civil rights violation and
specifies the nature of the violation then the clerk indicates this on the statistical card" Letter
from James A. McCafferty, Chief of Statistical Analysis and Report Division of the Administra-
tive Office to Judith Resnik (Oct. 20, 1983) (on fie with Southern California Law Review). Fur-
ther, the Administrative Office counts cases filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 as "habeas cases," id at
2, but those cases may include federal prisoners' civil rights claims. See supra note 390 and accom-
panying text.
513. Eg. NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS:
ANNUAL REPORT 1980, at 3-8 (1984) (discussion of limitations on court data collection and the
variation in reporting periods).
19841
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the reality. Even with inclusive calculations, prisoners' habeas peti-
tions have declined, and that decline began in the early 1970's, long
before the major cases and rules restricting habeas relief were in place.
Habeas cases, at their peak in 1971, occupied 12.2% of a federal judge's
civil docket, or 28.9 cases per judge. In 1983, habeas cases were about
5% of the civil docket.
The volume of prisoners' civil rights litigation now overwhelms
that of habeas claims. Of the roughly 470 civil cases per federal district
judge in 1983, 22.8 were habeas cases and 35.9 were prisoner civil rights
cases. 51 4 Many civil rights cases are filedpro se, and some involve fac-
tual disputes and necessitate hearings. Civil rights cases may also be
filed as class actions, challenging system-wide conditions of confine-
ment. By 1981, some 30 state prison systems were under federal court
order, and hundreds of local jails were also involved in federal litiga-
tion. 15 Such "public law" cases are time-consuming.51 6 The blurring
of civil rights cases with habeas cases may give rise to an impression of
prisoners' "litigiousness."
Habeas cases themselves may also present particular difficulties for
federal judges. Like prisoners' civil rights cases, the vast majority of
habeas actions are litigated pro se.517 Because the petitions are not
drafted by lawyers, the information presented may be incomplete.
Judges, magistrates, or law clerks must often search through habeas
petitions to decide if a "case" exists, and they must sometimes employ
special mechanisms to obtain additional relevant information.-" 8 In
addition, more prisoner cases conclude by adjudication than do other
kinds of cases. In contrast to the high settlement rates in criminal and
civil cases, prisoner cases are a subset in which settlement is virtually
nonexistent. Thus, unlike the rest of the docket, judges have to make
decisions in an inordinately large percentage of prisoner cases.5 9
514. 1983 ANNuAL REPoRT, supra note 215, at 119 table C-2.
515. New Report on Prison Conditions Shows More Tragedies Possible, CORRECTIONS DIo.,
Dec. 14, 1983, at 1.
516. See Chayes, supranote 71, at 1284 (judge plays central role in fashioning and supervising
implementation of remedy). But see Turner, supra note 426, at 638 (out of five district courts
studied, court personnel in only two districts believed prison cases were a "serious burden").
517. See RUTGERS STuDy, supra note 399, at 733 (79.2% of petitions studied were filed pro
se).
518. See, e.g., Section 2254 Rules, supra note 375, at Rule 6(a); Section 2255 Rules, supra note
73, at Rule 6(a) (appointment of attorneys to conduct discovery).
519. See BJS SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 480, at 4 (only 56% of civil cases require judicial
action whereas about "88% of all state prisoner habeas corpus case terminations involved some
type of court action") (footnote omitted).
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Moreover, habeas cases may be emotionally draining. These law-
suits often pose painful choices between fidelity to process values and
the desire to keep unlikeable, if not evil, individuals in confinement.
Some judges may experience habeas cases as taking a good deal of
their time, even if, on either an absolute or a proportionate basis, the
cases do not account for a large percentage of the judges' work. Judges
who do not distinguish habeas claims from civil rights complaints may
regard all prisoner cases as a mass (or morass) and feel overwhelmed
by the accumulation of complaints. Finally, judges may suspect pris-
oners' motives and thus find the resulting work especially troubling.
Some judges have expressed concern about prisoners' incentives for fl-
ing.520 With little or no work, many prisoners have time to draft docu-
ments. With no resources, most prisoners file in forma pauperis; with
few other avenues of recourse,521 many prisoners turn to the federal
courts.
To summarize, the numbers do not reveal the dynamics of the
cases but do permit some generalizations. In 1983, habeas cases occu-
pied "as much" or "as little" as five percent of the federal courts'
docket. In 1983, "only" or as "many" as approximately 2.68 per 100
state or federal prisoners filed for habeas relief in federal district court.
3. The Normative Questions
Is it objectionable that federal judges devote 5% of their docket to
prisoners' habeas claims? An easy answer is no; since prisoners seek
adjudication of federal claims, why not obtain answers from the ex-
perts-federal judges? But the pervasive tone of disapproval in the
case law demands that the more difficult, affirmative answer be ex-
plored. What is the source of the objection to federal judges spending
as much time as they do on habeas corpus?
One possibility is that devoting time to prisoners' cases takes fed-
eral judges away from other, presumably more important, cases. Yet
no clear statement emerges from the case law about what these other,
more important cases are. A view does emerge, however, that many
prisoner cases are frivolous and therefore that the quantity distracts
520. See, e.g., Friendly, supra note 13, at 150 (prisoners file habeas petitions "as matter of
course during long incarceration").
521. Administrative grievance systems have been instituted in some institutions but not all are
effective. Breed & Dillingham, Djspute Resolution in Corrections, in II PRISONERS RIGHTS
SOURCEBOOK 139, 143 (I. Robbins ed. 1980).
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from meritorious claims of all kinds.: 22
Frivolous claims exist in all parts of the docket, however, and even
if judges are aware of many prisoners' lack of success, 523 failure rates
alone do not sufficiently explain judges' disdain. First, some prisoners
have had some extraordinary successes. 24 Justice Marshall cited a 70%
reversal rate in death penalty cases;52 5 that figure contrasts dramatically
with what one researcher calls "norms of affirmance" in most criminal
appeals. 26 Second, prisoners' civil rights litigation has produced a re-
markable number of court-ordered changes in conditions of confine-
ment.527  Third, some individual habeas cases stand as landmarks of
our constitutional history-Gideon v. Wainwright, 28 for example. Al-
though a large proportion of prisoners' cases do end by dismissal or
default, 29 the same is true for the rest of the docket .
30
But perhaps the vantage point is wrong. The perception may not
be that prisoner filings have a negative impact on other cases but that
prisoner cases are per se objectionable because prisoners simply do not
deserve federal court attention. The notion that prisoners as a group
are unworthy was commonplace not so long ago, when prisoners were
barred from litigating civil actions and many judges said "hands off" to
522. See, e.g., Friendly, supra note 13, at 149 (the volume also interferes with judges' ability to
find meritorious prisoner claims).
523. See BJS SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 480, at 5 (of 1899 cases studied, 3.2% were granted
in whole or part; "1.8% ... resulted in any type of release of the petitioner") (footnote omitted).
Cf Olsen, supra note 481, at 307 n.28 (most commentators describe success rates of habeas corpus
filings as under 5%).
524. For example, although Shapiro's study found that only 16 out of 247 petitioners were
released, Shapiro concluded that those numbers did not "mean that at least 247 petitioners during
the period studied wasted their own time and that of the court. There were a number of cases in
which a petitioner made a significant gain even though the matter prayed for was not granted."
Shapiro, supra note 77, at 340. His examples of gains included the resumption of state postconvic-
tion remedies, decisions to drop charges, the provision of counsel and intangible benefits. Id. at
341-42.
525. Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct. 3383, 3405 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
526. Davies, supra note 74, at 591. See also Kanner & Uelmen, Random Assignment, Random
Justice, L.A. LAW., Feb. 1984 at 10, 14-15 (1984) (California's reversal rate on appeal was 5.8
percent in 1981-82, with a "remarkable variance" in reversal rate from appellate court to appellate
court; civil cases had a much higher reversal rate than criminal cases).
527. See Bronstein, Offenders Rights Litigation: Historical and Future Developments, in II
PRISONERS RIGHTS SoURcE3ooK: THEORY, PRAcrIcE, LIIGATION 10-25 (1. Robbins ed. 1980) (a
number of federal courts have provided "sweeping relief").
528. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
529. RUTGERS STUDY, supra note 399, at 756 n.369.
530. See 1981 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 215, at 390 table C-5A (of 148,046 civil cases
disposed of by the federal district courts, only 10,607 were disposed of by trial).
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prisoners' complaints.53' Perhaps it is time to reject the revolution of
the sixties, with its conception of prisoners as persons who retain digni-
tary rights. 32 Perhaps courts should stop considering conditions of
confinement or remedying occasional misbehavior by police officers,
district attorneys, or judges. Even the most ardent opponents of prison-
ers' litigation, however, do not go that far. They concede that prisoners
should have some access to courts to correct prison officials' failures to
provide adequate air, food, and minimal health care or to remedy
grave miscarriages of justice that may result in the wrongful confine-
ment of individuals.533
To assume a moral consensus that all prisoners' problems cannot
be ignored, however, is not to conclude that federal courts should re-
spond. Prisoners could bring their claims of unlawful confinement or
of unconstitutional conditions of confinement to state courts. Of
course, few would suggest that federal prisoners seek redress in state
courts. Federal sovereignty interests have long limited the authority of
state judges over federal officials. 534 But, insofar as 10.8% of the federal
court docket in 1983 was devoted to habeas and civil rights claims by
state prisoners, perhaps the simple solution is to send all of these cases
to state courts.
That argument has been made explicitly for some categories of
prisoners' claims. In Swain v. Pressley,535 Justice Powell wrote that the
constitutional prohibition of "suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus"5 36 mandated only that some court be available to review claims
of unlawful confinement; nowhere was it required that the federal
courthouse doors be open.5 37  In Parratt v. Taylor,538 the Supreme
531. Bronstein, supra note 527, at 6-9. Cf. D. RUDENSTINE, THE RIGHTS OF Ex-OFFENDERS
155 (1979) (ex-prisoners have also been shunned by the legal system).
532. See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194 (1984) (prisoners are not persons protected
by the fourth amendment from searches or destruction of personal, noncontraband items in their
cells; Justice Stevens, in dissent, described the majority's view as declaring "prisoners to be little
more than chattels, a view I thought society had outgrown long ago." Id at 3215).
533. See, e.g., Spalding v. Aiken, 103 S. Ct. at 1797-98 (Burger, C.J., statement concerning the
denial of certiorari) (habeas claims should be permitted if "the petitioner can make a colorable
claim of innocence, demonstrate that a significant miscarriage ofjustice has occurred or show that
his claim is based on grounds that, with the exercise of reasonable diligence, could not have been
discovered earlier"); Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 5 n.2 (1978) (plurality opinion) (Burger,
C.J.) ("It is true that inmates lose many rights when they are lawfully confined, but they do not
lose all civil rights.").
534. Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397, 407 (1872).
535. 430 U.S. 372 (1977).
536. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 2; 430 U.S. at 381.
537. Cf. Paschal, The Constitution andHabeas Corpus, 1970 DuKE L.J. 605, 607 (Constitution,
of its own force, vests jurisdiction in federal and state courts for habeas review).
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Court concluded that not all claims of due process violations should be
heard in federal court. Rather, when deciding whether a prisoner has
been deprived of rights without due process of law, federal courts must
assess the adequacy of state court procedures. Where state courts offer
adequate remedies, no due process violations can exist.539 Swain and
Parratt, when read in light of other rulings about exhaustion of state
remedies, 5" the distinctions between torts and constitutional viola-
tions,541 and the degree of deference to be accorded prison officials,
542
suggest a Supreme Court heading towards a consensus that federal
courts are not the proper forum for presentation of complaints by pris-
oners and other civil rights claimants.5 4 3 Perhaps, then, we are moving
towards an era when no federal court review will be available for pris-
oners. While we understand that incarcerated populations produce a
certain number of claims, 5" and while we believe that some avenues of
redress are necessary, perhaps we will soon conclude that prisoners
should be sent elsewhere-to prison grievance systems, mediation, and
state courts.
But are we actually prepared to leave all prisoners' rights enforce-
ment to alternative process, to administrative decisionmaking, and to
state courts? Incarceration and the imposition of the death penalty are
the most severe sanctions this society imposes. Prison, in which the
minutiae of inmates' lives are controlled, is the quintessential example
of state action. Once we are committed to the propositions that states
are limited by the Constitution in the ways they treat individuals, that
prisoners are people, and that courts function as a buffer to constrain
states' treatment of individuals, must it not follow that the federal
courts have some role to play? Are we prepared either to leave all fed-
eral norm enforcement to the state courts and suffer the resulting dis-
parity or to conclude that prisoners are not individuals entitled to
538. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
539. Id at 543-44.
540. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982) (district courts required to dismiss habeas
petitions containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims).
541. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 142 (1979) (distinguishing violations of constitu-
tional rights from violations of duty of care arising out of tort law).
542. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 540 (1979) (prisoners' due process rights subject to
reasonable limitations because of institutional security concerns, as defined by prison
administrators).
543. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 103 S. Ct. 1660 (1983) (chokehold victim lacks stand-
ing to enjoin police officers' conduct).
544. As do other populations; see Trubek, Sarat, Felstiner, Kritzer & Grossman, The Costs of
Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. Rav. 72, 86-87 (1983) (civil lawsuits filed at a rate of 50 suits per
1000 disputes).
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constitutional treatment?545
It might be helpful to return to the numbers and look at them dif-
ferently. Instead of complaining that seven prisoners per hundred filed
a federal lawsuit in 1983, and that 2.68% of prisoners filed habeas
claims, we might perceive that quantity of cases as relatively small.
Given the myriad and incessant ways in which prisons exercise control
over prisoners, the fact that only some seven per hundred file lawsuits
is reassuring. Furthermore, because all prisoners have been convicted
and could, in theory, frame a challenge of constitutional dimensions to
their convictions, we might find substantial solace in the statistic that
fewer than three per hundred sought habeas relief in federal court in
1983 or that, even in the heyday of prisoner claims, only some 5.7 per
hundred filed federal habeas actions. Thus, we could conclude that
prisoner cases are not such a "burden" on federal courts, and that the
number of applicants, in contrast to the number of possible disputes, is
not very great. Rather than perceive a problem, we might see the pris-
oner caseload as reasonably under control.
This perspective, however, does not address several other argu-
ments. First, to the extent that federal habeas corpus is understood as
"intruding" upon states' affairs, saying there is not much habeas work
only means that federal courts' "intrusions" are infrequent. Yet there
are arguments to be made for "intrusion," if that label is correct. Pur-
suant to the supremacy clause, federal courts have authority to correct
state courts that make federal constitutional errors. Moreover, state
representatives-senators and members of Congress-created the stat-
utes that give federal courts jurisdiction over habeas cases, and these
representatives have not seen fit to retract them. Finally, the "intru-
sion" is minimal; when a habeas petitioner is successful, no general
injunction is issued, only an individual is freed.
But perhaps the harm from federal "intrusion" is not to the states,
but to society. Opponents of habeas corpus argue that its availability
results in declining respect for the criminal process.546 That proposi-
tion, however, is made problematic by the fact that few habeas corpus
cases ever succeed; many are dismissed, and rarely is an individual
freed. 47 As a result, habeas corpus cases do not undermine the finality
545. The holding in Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194 (1984) (prisoners have no fourth
amendment protection in their cells) suggests that the answer, at least for five members of the
Court, may be "yes."
546. Smith, TheAbuse ofHabeas Corpus Statutes Must Be Stopped, JUST. ASSISTANCE NEWS,
Apr. 1982, at 2-3.
547. See BJS SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 480, at 5 (1.8% of petitions filed resulted in any
1984]
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of criminal convictions, although the availability of habeas corpus does
make possible the perception of unending litigation.
The fact that few prisoners succeed in their habeas applications
raises another complaint against the practice. Given the rarity of suc-
cess, does the expenditure of resources justify the effort? Judge
Friendly has argued that federal judges are spending time on meritless
claims instead of addressing genuine problems, and therefore that
habeas is simply a waste of resources.5 48 Because petitioners have
neither external fiscal constraints, nor lost opportunity costs, courts
must constrain them. Further, some believe that the very existence of
habeas corpus may have a negative impact. Justice O'Connor believes
that habeas review demoralizes state judges, 549 while, in the Chief Jus-
tice's view, habeas delays prisoners' rehabilitation by keeping open the
promise of a key to the prison gate.550 Given these possible detrimental
effects and that so very few cases ever succeed, why not give habeas up?
The counterargument is that the rare occasion in which a habeas
applicant succeeds makes the resource expenditures and the intrusion
on the states (or, in the case of federal prisoners, the reappraisal of
federal judges' decisions) worthwhile; the possibility of revisionism re-
mains alive for cases involving an individual's liberty or life. The ad-
herents of this view believe that review curbs tendencies to relax
constitutional safeguards and serves to strengthen the integrity of the
legal process. 55' The procedural redundancy differentiates and symbol-
izes the importance accorded incarceration decisions; the added ritual
legitimates the decisions. As suggested at the outset, one's approach to
this question depends upon one's value preferences.
type of release of the petitioner); P. ROBINSON, supra note 216, at 4(c) (less than 5% of district
court petitioners obtained any relief on appeal).
548. See Friendly, supranote 13, at 148-49 (the most serious evil of the proliferation of collat-
eral attack is the drain on the time of judges, lawyers, and prosecutors).
549. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. at 128-29 (issuance of habeas writs undercuts states' ability
to enforce procedural rules and frustrates states' power to punish criminals).
550. See Spalding v. Aiken, 103 S. Ct. at 1797 (Burger, C.J., statement concerning the denial
of certiorari) (because courts entertain belated habeas claims, prisoners do not reconcile them-
selves to imprisonment).
551. See Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2077 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(constitutional guarantees and collateral review serve "to ensure that convictions are obtained
only through fundamentally fair procedures") (footnote omitted); Kaufman v. United States, 394
U.S. 217, 226 (1969) (adequate protection of constitutional rights relating to the criminal trial
process requires the continuing availability of a mechanism for relief).
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4. The Court's Implementation of Its Own Values
The current Supreme Court has made plain its interpretation of
the changing numbers of prisoner cases. Has the Court's majority suc-
ceeded in structuring a litigation system that reflects its views? Have
the recent rulings decreased the workload of the federal courts, pre-
served the finality of the initial decision, and enhanced the power of
first tier decisionmakers?
a. Economy: Deciding whether court resources are economically
utilized is difficult. At least four criteria are relevant: (1) the interval
from filing to disposition of cases; (2) the number of hours spent by the
court in deciding cases; (3) the time and expense invested by litigants;
and (4) the accuracy of decisionmaking.5 52 At present, we have insuffi-
cient data to determine whether federal courts are more economical in
processing habeas claims than they were prior to the doctrinal develop-
ments of Stone v. Powell, Wainwright v. Sykes, Engle v. Isaac, the other
recent cases, and the new Rules. But with the available data and some
educated guesses, I can offer some assessments of the impact of the new
doctrines.
In 1974, the median time from filing to disposition of most (80%)
federal prisoners' habeas actions was one month; the median time from
filing to disposition of most state prisoners' habeas claims was two
months.553 Ten percent of the cases had a median time to disposition
of less than one month, while 10% had a median time to disposition of
more than eleven months.5 5 4 In 1983, the median time from filing to
disposition for most state prisoners' habeas claims was 5 months,555
while in 10% of the cases, the median time to disposition was greater
than 20 months. 6 Thus, if causal connections can be shown,557 re-
cently imposed restrictions on habeas have not made for speedier
dispositions.
To my knowledge, few studies directly address the question of the
552. See generally Resnik, supra note 26, at 417-25 (discussing efficiency measures in federal
courts).
553. 1974 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 215, at 432-33 table C-5b.
554. Id.
555. 1983 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 215, at 285 table C-5b.
556. Id.
557. Attribution problems are great because of the multiple factors that affect disposition
rates. See generally Luskin, Building a Theory of Cases Processing Time, 62 JUDICATURE 115
(1978) (criticizing models of court case processing because of the failure to consider the variety of
factors involved, such as individual case characteristics, motives of participants, and reward struc-
ture of court).
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number of hours judges and magistrates spend deciding habeas
cases." 8 It is possible, however, to consider the decisions that a judge
must make and to extrapolate how long those issues might take a jurist
to decide. A trial judge or magistrate who receives a habeas petition
performs a number of preliminary inquiries to determine whether re-
view on the merits is permissible. First, the petition must be scrutinized
for its compliance with the format prescribed by Rule 2 of the Habeas
Rules. Researchers report that petitions are returned with some fre-
quency559-indicating that the liberal pleading rules for pro se liti-
gants560 have not been applied to habeas claimants. In cases in which
forms are rejected and prisoners never file again, decisions have been
rendered in a minimal amount of time. In a sense then, the mandatory
forms are economical. On the other hand, we have no way of knowing
whether prisoners who fail to file a second form are those who are un-
deserving of a decision on the merits. Because accuracy is relevant to
economy, and accuracy in this context is defined as permitting prison-
ers with constitutional claims to be heard, we do not know whether the
forms are economical.
Assuming that a prisoner has filed a form properly in the first in-
stance, or completes it successfully a second time, the trial court must
then make several other determinations. In state prisoners' cases, pris-
oners must "totally exhaust" state court remedies; federal courts must
reject petitions if any claims are presented to them that had not been
558. The Federal Judicial Center (FJC) and the Administrative Office (AO) have asked se-
lected judges to keep time records to achieve a "weighted" caseload index, which distinguishes
time consuming cases from less time consuming ones. See generally 1962 ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 215, at 118-24 (discussing the development of weighted caseload statistics). From those
records, the FJC and the AO have classified cases and weighted "prisoners petitions, including
habeas corpus." The 1964 weight of these cases was a ".3" on a .05 to 8.0 scale. 1971 ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 215, at 167-79 table 35. The 1971 time study described prisoner petitions in
various categories and valued them at .55 to 1.0 on a scale of .29 to 3.89. Id at 174-75 table 33.
Subsequent weighted caseload studies are described in the 1980 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note
215, at 290. Federal prisoners' "habeas" petitions were .1767, on a scale of 0 to 33.7115. Federal
prisoners' "motions to vacate" were .5831; state prisoners' habeas petitions were .3412 and state
prisoners' civil rights cases were .4103. Id at 626 table X-2. For a more detailed discussion, see
THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, 1979 FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT TIME STUDY (1980). A much
earlier study by another researcher reported that judges spend 3.8 hours per federal habeas peti-
tion, and 4.8 hours per state habeas petition. Speck, Statistics on FederalHabeas Corpus, 10 OHIO
ST. L.J. 337, 338 (1949).
559. P. ROBINSON, supra note 216, at 13 (noting local district court clerks' rejections of forms).
See also Zeigler & Hermann, supra note 386, at 176-81 (study of district court for the Southern
District of New York found thatpro se applications were frequently returned for failure to comply
with technical requirements).
560. See, e.g., Haines v. Kernes, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) (pro se complaints should be read favora-
bly to the pleader).
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made first to state courts.5 6 To decide the exhaustion question, courts
sometimes request copies of state court decisions (if any were published
or written), of briefs filed, or of transcripts. 6 Delay in the transcription
of testimony and prisoners' lack of access to records and photocopiers
hinders the provision of information. Evidence of these difficulties
comes from empirical research. In one study of almost 1,900 habeas
petitions filed in the federal courts, 55% were rejected because of proce-
dural failures, 67% of which were dismissed because of failure to
exhaust.
563
Evaluating the economy of the exhaustion rule is difficult. In the-
ory, exhaustion offers states an opportunity to correct errors; in prac-
tice, it is difficult to learn whether state courts revise judgments on
postconviction collateral attack." Furthermore, the "total exhaustion"
rule obliges prisoners to scurry back and forth between state and fed-
eral court. At each instance, some federal judge time is spent determin-
ing whether more federal judge time must be spent or whether federal
review must await the investment of state judges' time. Some potential
habeas applicants are probably deterred from filing because of the ex-
561. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509,522 (1982). See generally Note, State Waiver and Forfeiture
of the Exhaustion Requirement in Habeas CorpusActions, 50 U. CHi. L. REv. 354-56 (1983) (discus-
sion of circuit courts' views on whether a state may waive or forfeit the exhaustion requirement).
562. See Daye v. Attorney Gen., 663 F.2d 1155, 1156 (2d Cir. 1981) (attempting to provide
district courts with guidance about how to decide if claims have been presented to state courts),
vacated, 696 F.2d 186 (2d Cir. 1982) (en banc), reheard, 712 F.2d 1566, 1572 (2d Cir. 1983) ("[T]he
trial judge's conduct approached but did not cross the line that permits us to rule that the Consti-
tution has been violated.").
563. P. RoBINSON, supra note 216, at 13. In other words, 37% of all petitions were dismissed
for failure to exhaust. Robinson examined a total of 1,899 habeas cases filed from 1975 to 1977 by
state prisoners in six federal district courts and one appellate court. See also RUTGERS STUDY,
supra note 399 (analyzing the same data); id. at 694 n.73.
Shapiro's study of state habeas corpus petitions filed from 1970-1972 in the Massachusetts
Federal District Courts reached similar conclusions. He found that 40 of the 72 cases dismissed in
1970, 51 of the 96 cases dismissed in 1971, and 44 of the 75 cases dismissed in 1972 were dismissed,
either in whole or in part, because of failure to exhaust. Shapiro, supra note 77, at 334. In Sha-
piro's view, state remedies were not always "easy" to exhaust, and the exhaustion requirement
generated a fair amount of wasted effort. Id. at 358. On balance, however, he favored the ex-
haustion rule because he believed it had a salutory effect on state court postconviction proceed-
ings. Id.
564. There are few studies available on this issue. Davies, supra note 74, does, however, pro-
vide a summary of "interventions" (reversals or modifications) in the California Court of Appeal
for the First Appellate District. Of 396 habeas cases decided, that court intervened in 20 (5%). Id.
at 574 table 6. Davies provided extensive data on the low reversal rate on direct appeal in crimi-
nal cases. Id. at 591-95. In his view, appellate judges review cases to see if trial courts' decisions
were within acceptable bounds. I assume that Davies' so-called "norms of afflirmance," id. at 591,
apply on collateral attack as well. Cf. Oliver, Post-Conviction Applications Viewed by a Federal
Judge-Revisited, 45 F.R.D. 199, 208-15 (1969) (praising Missouri for revision of its postconvic-
tion remedy process to include evidentiary hearings).
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haustion requirement, while others, whose petitions are refused for fail-
ure to comply with the exhaustion requirement, may never return.
Whether the number of persons deterred or the number of cases finally
decided by state courts is worth the costs of the exhaustion search is
unknown. If exhaustion cannot be justified on economy grounds, how-
ever, it may be justified on others, such as giving power to state court
judges.
Once a petition complies with the formal requirements and passes
the exhaustion test, courts must decide other threshold matters. If the
petitioner filed some time after conviction, the petition could be dis-
missed under Rule 9(a) for a belated filing causing prejudice to the
government.565 If the petitioner has filed previously, dismissal might
occur under Rule 9(b) for "abuse of the writ." Assuming that a peti-
tioner avoids these obstacles, the court must then consider a series of
other issues: whether, if state court findings were made, the "presump-
tion of correctness" precludes further review;1 66 whether, if a fourth
amendment claim has been raised, an opportunity for a "full and fair"
hearing was provided;5 67 whether, in the absence of a contemporaneous
objection, "cause and prejudice" has been shown 5 68 and so on.5 69 In
other words, given the doctrinal developments of the last few years,
federal judges and magistrates must do a substantial amount of work
prior to consideration of the merits. In a vast number of cases, courts
do not reach the question of whether a trial or conviction occurred in
565. Cf. P. ROBINSON, supra note 216, at 9 (belated filings were rarely a problem; most cases
filed within one and one-half years of conviction, although the average interval from conviction to
filing was just over two years); RUTGERS STUDY, Supra note 399, at 702 n.97, 703 (analysis of same
data, but concluding time interval from conviction to trial was approximately two years); Avichai,
supra note 486, at 340 (finding half of those filing a first petition had been incarcerated for more
than a year).
566. See, e.g., Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 547, on remand, 649 F.2d 713 (9th Cir. 1981),
vacated and remanded, 455 U.S. 591 (1982) (per curiam), on remand, 696 F.2d 1244 (9th Cir.),
vacated and remanded, 104 S. Ct. 386 (1983) (with directions to dismiss the appeal as moot) (pre-
sumption of correctness also applies for state appellate court "findings of fact").
567. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976).
568. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167 (1982); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 129 (1982);
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977); See, e.g., Roland v. Mintzes, 554 F. Supp. 881, 887
(E.D. Mich. 1983) (after examining case to determine Rule 9(a) questions, the court decided that
the petition had to be dismissed under "cause and prejudice" test).
569. Other legal issues that could be the basis for dismissals include Lane v. Williams, 455
U.S. 624, 631 (1982) (holding prisoners' habeas claims moot); Preiser v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 475,
500 (1973) (inmates who seek release may not pursue claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 but must file
such claims under 28 U.S.C. § 2254). See generally Haar, A Research Proposalfor Studying Fed-
eral Habeas Corpus Review of State Court Criminal Convictions, 1983 INST. OF JUD. AD. 4 (pro-
posed analysis of what courts actually do in habeas cases) (on file with the Southern California
Law Review).
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violation of the Constitution and whether such violation constituted a
fundamental miscarriage of justice.
Can all this spade work be justified as economical? Once again, it
is virtually impossible to know. We have no control group, no world in
which the doctrinal developments have not occurred. We do know that
the proportionate decline in habeas filings predated both the Burger
Court's innovations and the 1977 Habeas Rules, but that information
may not tell us very much. Legal doctrine may be but one of many
determinants of litigation rates.570 Perhaps the decline in filings is due
to better performance by the first tier, in which case the Burger Court is
correct to perceive habeas as an unnecessary use of resources. But the
improvement, if extant, in performance by the first tier may be depen-
dent upon the threat of habeas supervision. Furthermore, while we
could assume that the many procedural obstacles erected by the Burger
Court deter some filings, we do not know whether those deterred are
prisoners who have meritorious claims.
My own guess is that the time saved by virtue of the cases not filed
is far outweighed by the time spent picking through the cases filed to
decide whether to think about the merits.57' While the Court has con-
stricted the number of applications that may be considered on the mer-
its, the Court has not made the search for those rare petitions easier or
quicker.
There is another argument embedded in the economy rationale;
federal courts' economy may be equated with their avoidance of consti-
tutional claims and of so-called "advisory" opinions. This premise is
used to justify the Supreme Court's mandate to trial courts to decide
whether a prisoner has met the "cause and prejudice" test or other
threshold requirements before deciding whether any constitutional vio-
lation has occurred;5 72 if no cause and prejudice is found, then a court
need never determine the validity of a conviction. 3
570. See, e.g., Kagan, Cartwright, Friedman & Wheeler, The Business of State Supreme
Courts, 1870-1970, 30 STAN. L. REv. 121, 131 (1977) (state supreme courts' caseload has decreased,
reasons behind change complex).
571. See also Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 600 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Once again
the Court's preoccupation with procedural necessities has needlessly complicated the disposition
of a federal habeas petition."). See generally Goodman & Sallett, Wainwright v. Sykes: The
Lower Courts Respond, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1683, 1689 (1979) (discussing the difficulty lower courts
have applying Supreme Court habeas doctrine).
572. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982).
573. In addition to the threshold cause and prejudice determination, the Supreme Court has
also authorized lower courts to make other prejudice determinations prior to deciding whether a
constitutional deprivation has occurred. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2069
1984]
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But questions of cause and prejudice or of other "threshold" issues
can be as knotty and as time consuming to decide as the question of
whether a constitutional violation has occurred. And, if no violation is
found, the inquiry into the "threshold" questions is a wasted, in some
sense "advisory," effort. Given that there are at least two questions to
be determined (such as whether a petitioner can establish cause and
prejudice and whether a constitutional error occurred), there is no way
to decide in advance which question can be adjudicated more quickly,
or to determine the economical ordering of the questions.574 There is,
however, a reason to prefer a decision first on the constitutional ques-
tion: determining the merits of those issues helps illuminate what kinds
of errors are cognizable on habeas corpus and which errors fall below
the requisite level of injury.5 75 Placing questions such as cause and
prejudice first stunts the development of criminal constitutional law.
Although lower federal judges are busy working on habeas cases and
the number of reported habeas opinions is large, the effort gives us little
information about public norms other than the desire for first tier
power and finality.
b. Finality: The Supreme Court has had somewhat more success
in its efforts to enshrine finality, but that success is far from absolute.
The Court's procedural modeling has worked in the sense that first tier
decisions are rarely revised, but the Court has not yet succeeded in
leaving the first decision unquestioned. Instead, habeas litigation is
now litigation about finality. In the fourth amendment context, and in
those instances in which state court rulings rest upon factual findings,
habeas litigation centers around the question of whether the first op-
portunity to litigate was adequate. If the opportunity was adequate, the
outcome may not be reconsidered. In many other kinds of habeas cases,
the issue is whether petitioners have forfeited their rights to review be-
cause of failures to complain at trial, soon after conviction, or thereaf-
(1984) ("[A] court need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before exam-
ining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of alleged deficiencies.").
574. The Supreme Court explicitly recognized this ordering problem in a related context. In
Str'ekland v. Washington, the Court held that, to decide the merits of a sixth amendment ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel claim, a court must establish (I) whether counsel's errors were "so seri-
ous that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment" and
(2) whether the "deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Id. at 2064. The Court author-
ized lower courts to decide the questions in whatever order was easiest to avoid "burdensome"
inquiries. Id at 2069.
575. See Bice, Anderson and theAdequate State Ground, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 750, 760-61, 764-
65 (1972) (discussing why such opinions would not violate the constitutional requirement that
federal courts decide only "cases" or "controversies").
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ter. The Court has not stopped habeas litigation, it has only reshaped
and diluted the utility of the questions litigated.
c. Thepower of thefirst tier: The Court has had its clearest suc-
cess in making first tier decisions authoritative. First tier decisions now
have enduring, almost unshakable consequences. The Court has not,
however, altered the process by which the first tier reaches its decisions;
rather, the Court has simply instructed federal courts not to think about
whatever problems may have occurred.
Take, for example, Rose v. Lundy, in which the Court announced
its "total exhaustion" rule. 76 The lower federal courts that had re-
viewed Lundy's trial and conviction had determined that the state
judge had so mishandled the trial that it could not be considered
"fair." '5 77 The Supreme Court concluded that the federal courts should
not have decided that question because Lundy had filed a "mixed" pe-
tition, that is, some of his claims had not been presented to the state
courts. 8 Lundy must remain incarcerated while he exhausts his
claims. Assuming that the lower federal courts were correct in their
evaluation of Mr. Lundy's trial, he is now serving time that federal
judges have determined to be unconstitutionally imposed. His current
incarceration flows, in some sense, from his inexperience as a litigator.
The first tier's power has been preserved, and federal court review post-
poned, if not precluded, but to what purpose?
What impact will the absence or marked decrease of federal re-
view have on state criminal court proceedings? Given the constriction
of habeas corpus, the existence of other doctrines that virtually prevent
576. 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982).
577. Lundy v. Rose, 624 F.2d 1100 (6th Cir. 1980) (mem.), rev'a 455 U.S. 509 (1982) (dis-
cussed at 455 U.S. 509, 511-13). Finding numerous instances of "flagrant prosecutorial miscon-
duct," ofjudicial limitations of cross examination of the rape victim, and of misinstructions to the
jury, the district court concluded that Lundy had not received "a fair trial, his Sixth Amendment
rights were violated and the jury poisoned." 455 U.S. at 513. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit affirmed the judgment, Lundy v. Rose, 624 F.2d at 1100, but the Supreme Court reversed,
Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. at 522. Justice Blackmun concurred in the judgment but argued that a
"total exhaustion" rule was a grave mistake; "it operates as a trap for the uneducated and indigent
pro se prisoner-applicant;... it delays the resolution of claims that are not frivolous; and.., it
tends to increase, rather than to alleviate, the caseload burdens on both state and federal courts."
Id. at 522.
578. 455 U.S. at 518-19. For an argument for strict interpretation of the Rose v. Lundy rule,
see Justice O'Connor's dissent to the denial of certiorari in MeKaskle v. Vela, 104 S. Ct. 736, 738
(1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[Habeas petitioners, and not the state court judges, bear the
burden of severing the bad from the good and of raising those errors supportive of an alleged
constitutional claim.").
1984]
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federal courts from enjoining state criminal proceedings,5 79 and the rar-
ity of direct review by the Supreme Court,580 state courts have been left
to their own devices. 581 Does such absence of review improve "mo-
rale," as Justice O'Connor claims,58 2 or does it make trial and interme-
diate appellate judges less concerned about rights enforcement?
Providing opportunities for revision, be they on direct appeal or
on collateral review, is premised upon the concern that, absent such
oversight, first tier decisionmakers will be sloppy. Besides concerns
about "judicial despotism," revision is animated by a more sympathetic
view of first tier actors. The assumption is that first tier actors are very
busy people, beseiged by too many cases, many of which are litigated
by harried district attorneys and overloaded public defenders. Addi-
tional tiers permit revision, not so much to supervise or "demoralize"
but to provide some backup for overstressed systems that cannot be
expected to function very well at least some of the time. The current
Court's presumption of a well functioning lower tier583 does not create
well run trial courts. Rather, this presumption simply insulates the
lower tier from scrutiny, as well as from help.
III. THE VALUE CHOICES: THE REST OF THE DOCKET
The developments detailed above could be categorized as peculiar
to "habeas corpus cases" and, therefore, as necessarily somewhat devi-
ant. As a consequence, it is worth enlarging the scope of the inquiry.
In other areas of law, a majority of the Burger Court has shown its
willingness to limit examination of first tier decisions by new applica-
579. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971) (comity and equity requires federal
courts not to intervene in state criminal proceedings absent exceptional circumstances).
580. In the 1982-83 term, the Supreme Court reviewed 21 state court criminal convictions. In
1978, 13,734,879 criminal prosecutions were begun in state courts. NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE
COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT 1978, at 450 table B [hereinaf-
ter cited as 1978 STATE STATISTICS].
581. Proportionately, it appears that federal convictions reach the Supreme Court more fre-
quently than do state convictions. In 1978, 34,624 criminal cases were commenced in federal dis-
trict courts. 1978 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 215, at 236 table 47. As noted, supra note 580,
state criminal prosecutions are in the millions. During its 1982-83 term, the Court decided 7
federal criminal cases and 15 state criminal cases. The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, 97 HARV. L.
REv. 70, 302 table III (1983).
582. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. at 128-29 n.33.
583. This presumption, as applied to defense counsel's performance, was stated, repeatedly, in
Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2065 (1984) ("Judicial scrutiny of counsel's perform-
ance must be highly deferential .... [A] court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.").
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tions of preclusion doctrines, by expansive interpretation of magis-
trates' authority, and by narrowing the scope of appellate review.
There are, of course, some instances in which the Supreme Court
has refused to let first tier decisions stand. 8 4 Several of the cases I
examine are parts of other pictures--ones in which the Court has di-
minished access to federal courts by restrictive construction of jus-
ticiability doctrines,5 85 by narrow interpretation of what constitutes
constitutional violations,586 by stringent proof requirements,587 and by
reduction of permissible remedies.5 88 But the import of viewing the
development of a trend throughout diverse areas is not diminished by
finding other trends or exceptions. Although habeas corpus provides
the clearest example of the Court's use of procedure to implement its
values, habeas corpus is not unique. The Supreme Court has been in-
stalling the Single Judge/Finality and Single Judge plus Limited Re-
view Models across the litigation spectrum.
A. REs JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL: THE REFUSAL
TO DIFFERENTIATE
Res judicata instructs us that litigants may not repeatedly bring
the same claim to court; once a final judgment has been entered, it may
not be disturbed by renewed litigation. 9 In my terminology, res judi-
cata is a strong endorsement of the Single Judge plus Limited Review
584. See, e.g., Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 431 (1982) (state agency pro-
vided inadequate procedures, and plaintiffs fourteenth amendment claim was therefore cogniza-
ble), discussed in Smolla, The Displacement of Federal Due Process Claims by State Tort Remedies:
Parratt v. Taylor and Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Company, 1982 U. ILL. L. F. 831.
585. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 103 S. Ct. 1660, 1670 (1983) (no standing for
injunctive relief against the police when an individual had suffered past injury but could not
demonstrate a sufficient likelihood of future injury).
586. See, eg., Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543 (1981) (no fourteenth amendment claim
when state court procedures provide adequate process). Parratt's holding (that federal courts
cannot hear claims when state procedures are adequate) parallels Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,
495 (1976) (federal relief unavailable where state "has provided an opportunity for full and fair
litigation" of a constitutional claim). For criticism of the Parratt decision, see Travis & Adams,
The Supreme Court's Shell Game: The Confusion of Jurisdiction and Substantive Rights in Section
1983 Liigation, 24 B.C.L. REv. 635 (1983).
587. See, e.g., Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 103 S. Ct. 3221, 3236 (1983) (Powell,
J., concurring in the judgment) (proof of discriminatory intent required for violation of Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d to 2000d-6).
588. See, eg., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19 (1979) (no
implied cause of action for damages under the Investment Advisors Act of 1940). See also Leh-
man v. Lycoming County Children's Servs. Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 512 (1982) (habeas corpus pro-
vides neither federal court jurisdiction nor remedy for child custody disputes).
589. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CVL PaocEDuRE 529 (2d ed. 1977).
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Model.590
Res judicata, or "claim preclusion, 591 is applied only if the same
parties or their "privies" seek to relitigate claims that have been or that
could have been brought before. Under old forms of action, the reach
of the doctrine was fairly narrow because the definition of what "could
have been brought" in round one was restrictive. For example, in some
jurisdictions equitable actions could not be joined with legal actions;
therefore, parties who had brought an equitable action would not have
been precluded from bringing a second, legal action. 92
By comparison, the related doctrine of collateral estoppel, or "is-
sue preclusion,''59 permits a former judgment to preclude additional
litigation on related matters. For collateral estoppel to apply, the issues
to be precluded must in fact have been litigated, decided by the tribu-
nal, and necessary to the merits of the decision. 94 In its traditional
form, collateral estoppel applied only if "mutuality of estoppel" was
possible-that is, if both parties to the second litigation were bound by
the outcome of the first.595 For example, a litigant who had lost an
effort to establish the validity of a patent would have been precluded
from claiming the patent's validity in a second action only if the party
against whom the claim was made was also a litigant in the first
round.
596
Liberal rules of pleading and of joinder (of both claims and par-
ties) have expanded the definition of what "could have been brought"
in the first round.597 Further, the opportunities for representative liti-
gation have grown; class actions and similar devices permit individuals,
either court-appointed, statutorily-designated or self-selected, to come
590. See Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981) (res judicata bars
relitigation of unappealed adverse judgment even when other plaintiffs in similar actions against
common defendants successfully appeal judgments).
591. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 589, at 532-33.
592. Id at 530-32.
593. Id at 563.
594. Id at 563-73.
595. See Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111, 127 (1912)
("principle of general elementary law that estoppel of a judgment must be mutual").
596. This formulation was not rejected until Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University
of Ill Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971) (abrogating mutuality of estoppel for patent actions). See
also infra notes 602-38 and accompanying text.
597. See, eg., Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v. Los Angeles Branch NAACP, 714 F.2d
935, 941 (9th Cir. 1983), reh'ggranted, 725 F.2d 1257 (9th Cir. 1984) (claims of dejure segregation
from 1968 to 1981 could have been coupled with claimed de facto segregation from 1963 to 1968,
and, as a result, renewed litigation is barred).
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forward on behalf of absentees. 98 Statutory rights have also increased
the claims available and the number of eligible claimants. Technologi-
cal innovations have produced toxic torts and mass disaster litigation.
In short, the possibility of multiple lawsuits on similar or the same
claims is substantial.5 99 New questions have thus arisen about the
reach of res judicata and collateral estoppel doctrines.600 The Supreme
Court's answers have generally" 1 expanded those doctrines so as to
preclude renewed litigation on claims or issues litigated elsewhere.
1. Expanding the Reach -f Collateral Estoppel
A few years ago, the Supreme Court settled a question that had
been open for some thirty years: whether litigants in a second case,
who had not been parties to a first action, could use their opponents'
prior losses against them. The California Supreme Court had been the
first to decide that "mutuality of estoppel" was not required when the
598. See, e.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 310 (1950) (court-
appointed representative on behalf of beneficiaries of pooled trusts); Civil Rights of Institutional-
ized Persons Act § 3, 42 U.S.C. § 1997a (Supp. V 1981) (United States Attorney General author-
ized to sue on behalf of institutionalized populations); FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (self-appointed
individual may pursue representative litigation on behalf of similarly situated members of a class).
599. See, e.g., Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank, 104 S. Ct. 2794, 2801 (1984) (after EEOC had
brought an action in which private plaintiffs had intervened and a class had been certified, and the
classwide claims lost, individual plaintiffs were permitted to proceed); General Tele. Co. of North-
west v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 333 (1980) (EEOC need not obtain class action certification to pursue
Title VII claims on behalf of individuals who may also litigate such claims on their own behalf).
600. A spate of law review articles and a new edition of the Restatement of Judgments have
followed these changes. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS passim (1980) (reflecting
the increasingly restrictive nature of the law of res judicata and collateral estoppel and the inverse
relationship between restrictive rules governing preclusion of a second action and liberal rules
governing procedures at initiation). Compare Pielemeier, Due Process Limitations on the Applica-
tion of Collateral Estoppel /Against Nonparties to Prior Litigation; 63 B.U.L. REV. 383, 439 (1983)
(advocating limited use of preclusion) with Vestal, The Restatement (Second) of Judgments: .4
Modest Dissent, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 464, 465 (1981) (Restatement did not go far enough in its
preclusion rules). See also Gunn, The Offensive Use of Collateral Estoppel in Mass Tort Cases, 52
Miss. L.J. 765, 782 (1982) (advocating limited use of offensive issue preclusion). See generally
Symposium on the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 401 (1981) (discuss-
ing the Restatement (Second) of Judgment's treatment of preclusion).
601. But see Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank, 104 S. Ct. 2794, 2801 (1984); United States v.
One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 104 S. Ct. 1099, 1107 (1984) (gun owner's acquittal on criminal
charges involving firearms does not preclude a subsequent forfeiture proceeding to obtain the
firearms); United States v. Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. 568, 571 (1984) (government is not collaterally
estopped from litigating an issue adjudicated against it in another lawsuit brought by a different
party); Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 25 (1980) (declining to apply collateral estoppel to
preclude the government's effort to convict a criminal defendant for giving a bribe that another
defendant had been found not guilty of receiving); Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 138 (1979)
(where debtor asserts new defense of bankruptcy, res judicata does not bar creditor from introduc-
ing new evidence).
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party sought to be estopped had had a "day in court. 602 The United
States Supreme Court gave its support to the proposition in 1971, but in
the limited context of a patent case.6°3 In 1979, in Parklane Hosiery Co.
v. Shore,6° the Court conclusively ended the mutuality of estoppel re-
quirement in the federal courts and authorized the use of nonmutual
offensive collateral estoppel.
Parklane occurred in the context of a single system, the federal
courts. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) initiated a
lawsuit, accusing Parklane Hosiery of filing misleading proxy state-
ments. After a four-day bench trial, a judge found Parklane liable and
enjoined it from continuing its misleading practices.6 °5 In a separate
action for damages, Leo Shore, representing dissatisfied shareholders
of Parklane, asserted that Parklane should be estopped from relitigat-
ing the defense it had unsuccessfully made in the SEC action. 6  The
Supreme Court concluded that, given what it deemed to be the equality
of procedural opportunities afforded in the SEC case and in the dam-
age action,607 Parklane had had "its day in court." Despite the fact that,
had the SEC lost, Shore would not have been estopped from relitigat-
ing alleged misrepresentations by Parklane, the company was pre-
cluded from relitigating questions already adjudicated in the SEC suit.
In general, the Court concluded that nonmutual preclusion was appro-
priate in a case where: (1) the litigant against whom the doctrine is
asserted has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim in a
prior action; (2) the litigant against whom the doctrine is asserted has
had ample incentives to litigate fully in the first round; (3) the first
court has decided the question; and (4) no reasons exist to distrust the
first decision.6 °8
A second case to address the question of mutuality of estoppel is
602. Bernhard v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 813, 122 P.2d 892, 895
(1942).
603. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 340 (1971).
604. 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
605. SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 422 F. Supp. 477 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'4 558 F.2d 1083 (2d
Cir. 1977).
606. Shore v. Parkiane Hosiery Co., 565 F.2d 815, 818 (2d Cir. 1977) (on interlocutory appeal
from the Southern District of New York), afd, 439 U.S. 322 (1979). Shore had filed his action
before the SEC filed its lawsuit, but the SEC case went to trial and judgment first. 439 U.S. at 332
n.18.
607. Parklane argued that a procedural inequality existed because the first case had been tried
by a judge, while in the second case, Parklane had the right to a jury trial. The majority termed
the availability of the jury a "neutral" factor. 439 U.S. at 332 n.19.
608. Id at 331-33.
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Allen v. McCurry,6 °9 but this case arose in a context more complex than
Parkiane and diverged from Parkiane on several points. In his Mis-
souri criminal prosecution, Willie McCurry had unsuccessfully sought
to suppress evidence of his illegal possession of heroin. After a hearing
on the suppression issue, the state trial judge ruled that the police, who
had searched McCurry's home without a warrant, had illegally seized
evidence from inside McCurry's dresser drawers. Other evidence
found "in plain view," however, was deemed lawfully seized and there-
fore admissible. Thereafter, McCurry was convicted.6"'
Subsequently, McCurry filed a pro se civil suit against the police
officers involved. He alleged that the officers had conspired to violate
his constitutional rights by illegally searching his home and assaulting
him.61 1 The Supreme Court, per Justice Stewart, held that McCurry
could not be heard on his illegal search claims.612 The state court deci-
sion, upholding the search in part, precluded McCurrv's federal civil
rights lawsuit.
Preclusion issues such as the one raised in Allen v. MeCurry had
given judges, commentators, and the drafters of the Second Restate-
ment of Judgments grounds for pause. Although believing that most
state court decisions should be given preclusive effect by federal courts,
many considered federal civil rights actions special.613 After all, Con-
gress had given the federal courts a "supplementary" role in civil rights
cases.6 14 That grant of jurisdiction reflected a concern about the special
federal nature of the problem-that state officials might not pay ade-
quate attention to federal rights. Given the purpose of providing fed-
eral jurisdiction in section 1983 claims,615 some federal courts were
609. 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
610. State v. McCurry, No. 77-862 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Jan. 6, 1978), af'a State v. McCurry, 587
S.W.2d 337 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
611. McCurry v. Allen, 466 F. Supp. 514 (E.D. Mo. 1978), rev'a4 606 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1979),
rev'd, 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
612. The question of the legality of the assault had not been raised in the suppression hearing
and was not before the Supreme Court. 449 U.S. at 93 n.2.
613. See, e.g., Comment, Res Judicata and Section 1983: The Effect of State Court Judgments
on Federal CivilRights Actions, 27 UCLA L. REv. 177 (1979) (proposing that civil rights actions,
like habeas actions, be an exception to res judicata doctrine). But see Currie, Res Judicata" The
Neglected Defense, 45 U. CM. L. Rav. 317, 327-32 (1978) (civil rights actions are not exceptional
for res judicata purposes). For a general discussion of the problems of preclusion in the criminal
context, see Vestal, Issue Preclusion and Criminal Prosecutions, 65 IowA L. REv. 281 (1980).
614. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961).
615. See Neuborne, supra note 138, at 1109-10 (federal jurisdiction provided due to "thinly
disguised assumptions of nonparity between state and federal courts"); Peller, supra note 13, at
666-68 (disparity between state and federal court treatment of constitutional claims).
1984]
HeinOnline -- 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. 969 1983-1984
SOUTHERN CALIFORNII LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:837
reluctant to accord preclusive weight to state court decisions on civil
rights issues. They argued that section 1983 actions, like habeas corpus
actions, demanded special treatment.
616
Cases like Allen v. MeCurry pose additional problems. First, in
such cases, the constitutional issues are raised involuntarily, as defenses
in criminal prosecutions.6 1 7 Second, because of the criminal proceed-
ings, defendants have had no opportunity to cross-claim for damages, a
remedy typical of many civil rights actions.6 18 Third, the procedural
opportunities in the criminal proceedings are not equivalent to those
provided in civil cases. For example, more discovery is available in
civil actions.619 Fourth, the issues decided in suppression hearings are
* whether searches were so bad as to compel exclusion of damning evi-
dence. Given qualms about the exclusionary rule, judges' decisions in
suppression hearings may well be affected by the thought that finding
seizures illegal will yield a sanction so many dislike. Had the state
judge in McCurry been able to admit the information and yet assess
damages against the government (as has been suggested by some dis-
satisfied with the exclusionary rule),620 we do not know how the judge
would have ruled. Finally, in McCurry, the fourth amendment claim
could not, by virtue of the Supreme Court's decision in Stone v. Powell,
receive federal habeas review. Absent the minute chance of direct re-
view of McCurry's criminal conviction by the Supreme Court, a federal
judge would hear McCurry's claim of state officials' violations of his
constitutional rights in the section 1983 case or not at all. These were
the arguments that persuaded the Eighth Circuit not to apply collateral
estoppel to McCurry's case.
62'
Reversing, the Supreme Court held that the collateral estoppel
doctrines enunciated in non-civil rights cases apply with full force in
section 1983 litigation.622 Further, the Court expanded the preclusion
616. Eg., Lombard v. Board of Educ., 502 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1974).
617. Parkiane Hosiery was also a defendant, forced to litigate at a time not of its choosing.
618. For discussion of the role of remedy in McCurry, see The Supreme Court, 1980 Term, 95
HARv. L. REv. 17, 280-90 (1981).
619. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), 34(a) (any document, not privileged, relevant to sub-
ject matter of action discoverable) with FED. R. CIUM. P. 16(a)(1)(C) (documents may be discov-
ered only if material to the preparation of the defense, intended to be introduced into evidence by
the government, or obtained from or belonging to the defendant).
620. Eg., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 500-01 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring); Bivens v.
Six Unknown Fed. Narcotic Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 422-23 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
621. 606 F.2d at 798-99.
622. The Court did not decide the more limited question of the preclusive effect of suppres-
sion hearings on subsequent damage actions predicated on the fourth amendment. Rather, the
Court's holding applies to all civil rights litigation. Further, the Court twice relied upon Mc-
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doctrine by assuming that the police officers, not in privity with the
state, could use the state's prior victory. A single state court judge's
ruling on a suppression question thereby precluded the federal system
from considering a damage action for claimed unconstitutional acts of
state officials.
Like the doctrines emanating from the habeas cases, the Parklane-
McCurry preclusion rules succeed in ensuring finality but do not pre-
vent all litigation about whether finality should attach. Courts must
spend substantial time investigating what was decided in a first lawsuit
to determine the propriety of estoppel. Moreover, as recognized by the
Court, these preclusion rules may increase trial judges' work in two
ways. First, offensive collateral estoppel, unlike defensive collateral es-
toppel, permits a possible plaintiff to "wait and see' 623 how one case
goes and to proceed if a decision could be advantageously used. To
discourage such uneconomical practices (a form of reverse "sandbag-
ging"), the Court authorized lower courts to decline to give collateral
estoppel effect "where a plaintiff could easily have joined in the earlier
action. ' 624 Of course, that solution results in a second full litigation,
with its attendant costs. But the approach does sanction the putative
plaintiff by prohibiting reliance upon a defendant's prior loss and does
give a defendant additional persuasive opportunities.
Second, the possible collateral use of a decision by nonparties in-
evitably "ups the stake" of the first action, thereby providing incentives
for parties to invest heavily in the first round. Although such invest-
ment may be an appropriate reflection of the value of an action,625 the
fear of collateral use of decisions may artificially increase investments,
which in turn may waste parties' resources and courts' time. To mini-
mize the possible inflationary aspect of its ruling, the Court provided
another exception to the application of collateral estoppel: where a first
action involves small stakes and future cases are not foreseeable, collat-
eral estoppel should not be applied.626
Curry's "opportunity" to litigate rather than the fact of actual litigation-thereby spawning the
confusion it later resolved in Haring v. Prosise, 103 S. Ct 2368 (1983), discussed infra notes 631-35
and accompanying text. Justice Blackmun, in dissent, complained of the unnecessary breadth of
the majority's decision. 449 U.S. at 112-13 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The majority disclaimed
such a problem. Id. at 94 n.5.
623. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. at 330.
624. Id at 331.
625. For example, in Parklane, Shore had filed a stockholder's class action damage suit before
the SEC sought injunctive relief. Id. at 324.
626. Id. at 330.
1984]
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In McCurry, the Court discussed its concern for resource conserva-
tion and its belief in the importance of federal courts' according finality
to first tier, state court decisionmakers. 627 Rejecting the opportunity for
differentiating particular categories of cases (civil rights claims against
state officials, or criminal litigation followed by civil rights litigation, or
fourth amendment claims in which habeas review is unavailable), the
Court held that, regardless of the kind of case, collateral estoppel was
to apply.
628
The Court in McCurry did purport to leave open one exception to
its rule: the Court said that preclusion "cannot apply when the party
against whom the earlier decision is asserted did not have a 'full and
fair opportunity' to litigate that issue in the earlier case."' 629 But the
Court rejected McCurry's arguments that a fourth amendment suppres-
sion hearing was not a "full and fair" opportunity in which to litigate
an issue central to the damage claim under section 1983. Reiterating its
confidence in the first tier, the Court concluded that preclusion was
proper.
The Court's value choices should not be overstated. Some ambiv-
alence about the preclusion rule was evident in McCurry, the Court
stated that it had reserved "questions as to the scope of collateral estop-
pel. '' 630 To the surprise of some lower courts, 631 in 1983, a unanimous
Court held that a criminal defendant's guilty plea did not have preclu-
sive effect on a subsequent civil damage action that raised issues which
had not actually been litigated in the criminal case. In Haring v.
Prosise,632 as in McCurry, a convicted criminal defendant had filed a
section 1983 damage action and had alleged that the search of his
apartment by police officers had violated the fourth amendment. How-
ever, unlike McCurry, Prosise pleaded guilty. Further, when taking the
guilty plea, the state court entertained some discussion of the search but
held no suppression hearing and made no decisions about its
627. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. at 95-96 ("[R]es judicata and collateral estoppel. . . pro-
mote the comity between the state and federal courts that has been recognized as a bulwark of the
federal system.").
628. Id at 101-05. The Court has decided that, although nonmutual offensive collateral es-
toppel may be used against private defendants, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322,
337 (1979), nonmutual collateral estoppel may not be used against the United States. United
States v. Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. 568, 571-74 (1984).
629. 449 U.S. at 95 (citations omitted).
630. Id at 93 n.2.
631. Eg., Prosise v. Haring, 667 F.2d 1133 (4th Cir. 1981), rev' 103 S. Ct. 2368 (1983); Ivers
v. United States, 581 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1978); Nathan v. Tenna Corp., 560 F.2d 761 (7th Cir.
1977).
632. 103 S. Ct. 2368 (1983).
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legality.633
The Prosise Court justified its ruling of no preclusion by invoking
concerns largely ignored in McCurry and, in turn, by ignoring some of
the concerns that weighed heavily in McCurry. This time, little men-
tion was made of court resources.634 Instead, the Court spoke of the
"important interests in preserving federal courts as an available forum
for the vindication of constitutional rights.1
635
But Prosise is not a return to the discarded values of dual forum
decisionmaking, differentiation, revisionism, and diffusion of power.
Prosise and McCurry together stand for the proposition that criminal
defendants must choose between litigating claims in the course of their
criminal defense or litigating claims after conviction or acquittal by
means of a second, civil action. The criminal case remains a preclusive
threat; in essence, these opinions result in an election of remedies rule.
Prosise does not authorize consideration of the same issue by two fora.
Rather, it adheres to a Single Judge plus Limited Review Model but
declines to force all possible issues into a first action.
To summarize, in recent Supreme Court cases discussing collateral
estoppel, the Court has generally opted for expansive preclusion
rules.636 Furthermore, despite the usual characterization in hornbooks
and the Court's own descriptions of collateral estoppel as a "discretion-
633. Prosise v. Haring, 667 F.2d at 1142 n.16.
634. Those issues were relegated to a footnote. 103 S. Ct. at 2377 n. 11.
635. Id. at 2378. As in Allen v. McCurry, the Court considered the impact of 28 U.S.C. § 1738,
the Full Faith and Credit statute. Because the statute required federal courts to give a state court
judgment the same effect it would be accorded by the state in which the judgment was rendered,
the Court examined Virginia's collateral estoppel rules. Although Virginia had not decided the
question, the Court concluded that Virginia would not treat the entry of a guilty verdict as preclu-
sive in this situation. 103 S. Ct. at 2373-75. Further, the Court determined that, apart from full
faith and credit concerns, Prosise should not be found, by virtue of his guilty plea, to have waived
a civil action. Id. at 2376-77. Cf. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266-68 (1973) (guilty pleas
preclude habeas claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred before the
defendant pleaded guilty).
A guilty plea can, however, have impact beyond a criminal case. For example, a guilty plea
constitutes an admission of responsibility that may be used in later civil actions against a defend-
ant. Hazard, Revisiting the Second Restatement of Judgments: Issue Preclusion and Related
Problems, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 564, 577 (1981).
636. See also Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 104 S. Ct. 892, 898 (1984)
(preclusion of section 1983 claims due to prior state court contract action); United States v. Stauf-
fer Chem. Co., 104 S. Ct. 575, 578-80 (1984) (doctrine of mutual collateral estoppel applied to the
United States); Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 162-64 (1979) (United States estopped
from challenging judgment when it had financed and controlled the first litigation). But see
Limbach v. Hooven & Allison Co., 104 S. Ct. 1837, 1843 (1984) (no collateral estoppel in tax
litigation due to prior litigation involving different years). See generally Pielemeier, supra note 600
(arguing that preclusion of nonparties is permissible in certain circumstances but not ifjustified
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ary" doctrine,6 37 the Court has overturned lower courts' refusals to pre-
clude litigation.638 In this area of law, as in habeas corpus, the message
is clear: finality and the preservation of resources are paramount, and
the technique by which to achieve those goals is endorsement of first
tier decisionmaking.63 9
2. Extending Res Judicata
Over the past few years, the Supreme Court has generally enforced
and extended the classic embodiment of finality concerns-res judicata.
The Court has limited the role for the second set of decisionmakers in
another arena of possible dual forum decisionmaking, Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act. Under that Act, state agencies must first decide
questions of alleged job discrimination. Thereafter, a federal agency,
the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission (EEOC), may re-
view those decisions.640 Finally, federal trial courts are given the
only by judicial economy); Shapiro, The Application of State Claim Preclusion Rules in a Federal
Civil Rights Action, 10 OHIO ST. U. L. REV. 223 (1983) (arguing for less preclusion).
637. E.g., McCurry, 449 U.S. at 94; Parklane, 439 U.S. at 331. See generally F. JAMES & G.
HAZARD, supra note 589, at 583.
638. For example, in Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394 (1981), the Court
reversed a circuit court decision declining to apply res judicata on the grounds of "public policy."
Seven sets of plaintiffs had filed virtually identical private antitrust actions, five in federal court
and two in state court. Defendants removed the two state actions to the federal court and then
won dismissal of all seven actions on the grounds of no cognizable injury. Weinberg v. Federated
Dep't Stores, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 880 (N.D. Cal. 1977). Five plaintiff groups appealed the district
court decision to the Ninth Circuit and won reversal. Moitie v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 608
F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1979). The two sets of plaintiffs who had originally filed their lawsuits in state
court brought new actions, again in state court, and attempted to frame the lawsuits as involving
violations of state law. Once again, defendants removed and requested dismissal, but this time put
forth res judicata as theirjustification. Defendants won in the district court, but the Ninth Circuit
reversed. Moitie v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 611 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1980). That court rea-
soned that, since the case upon which the preclusion was based had itself been decided under an
erroneous legal premise, and since the seven cases were so interwoven, "strict application" of res
judicata violated "simple justice." Id. at 1269-70.
The Supreme Court reversed. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, invoked finality as
preeminently important. Justice Rehnquist chastised the Ninth Circuit and ordered that "any
litigant in a predicament.. . of his own making," (more accurately, of their lawyers' making)
cannot expect a court "to upset the general and well-established doctrine of resjudicata." 452 U.S.
at 401 (emphasis in original) (quoting Reed v. Allen, 286 U.S. 191, 198-99 (1932)).
639. In Tower v. Glover, 104 S. Ct. 2820, 2827 (1984), the Court, sua sponte, suggested that
the lower court consider whether the plaintiff, who had lost in a criminal trial, was collaterally
estopped. from litigating a claim of conspiracy to violate his civil rights. The Court raised the
possibility for collateral estoppel, "[a]Ithough the issue was never raised by the parties, and...
has absolutely no bearing on the disposition of the case." Id (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall,
Blackman & Stevens, JJ., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
640. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1982). The EEOC must give "substatial weight" to state agency
findings.
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power to decide the cases again." In my terms, Congress authorized
first tier decisionmaking in states' administrative agencies and then in
two different fora, a federal agency and a federal court.
This model of diffused decisionmaking is a complicated scheme
devised to divide authority between agencies and courts and between
the state and federal systems. Congress adopted this allocation to ob-
tain enforcement of federally protected rights while distributing re-
sponsibility for implementation between the states and the federal
government.642 Congress was not explicit about what, if any, role state
courts were to play in its scheme. The EEOC, however, assumed that
Title VII was an example of a Single Judge (the state administrative
agency hearing officer) plus Limited Review (state courts) plus a Differ-
ent Forum, with somewhat Limited Review (the EEOC, which must
give "substantial weight" to the state agency's findings) plus a Different
Forum with Unlimited Review (the federal courts that are to make de
novo decisions) Model.' 43
Thus, when Rubin Kremer went to the EEOC in May of 1976 to
ask its assistance in resolving a discrimination claim against his former
employer, Chemical Construction Corporation (Chemico), the EEOC
sent him to the New York State Division of Human Rights (NYHRD),
the agency charged in New York with responding to discrimination
claims. 6 " After an "investigation" in which no witness was heard, no
discovery taken, and no official record made," 5 the NYHRD decided
that there was "no probable cause" to believe that Chemico's refusal to
rehire Mr. Kremer was based upon discrimination. 64
Mr. Kremer received notice of the NYHRD's decision on a form,
which also advised him that an appeal of the NYHRD ruling should be
made to the New York State Human Rights Appeal Board. Mr.
Kremer followed that route and, when he lost, relied upon the agency's
641. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1982). The EEOC decision may be admissible in Title VII
lawsuits, see, e.g., Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840, 863 n.39 (1976) (admissible via FED. R.
Evm. 803(8)(C)), but the civil action is to be "a trial de novo," id. at 845.
642. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2391, 2391, 2401. Congress may also have been acting at the behest of employers, who
perceived state agencies as unfair in their enforcement of nondiscrimination rules. Kremer v.
Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 474 (1982).
643. Brief for the United States and the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission as
Amici Curiae at 7-8, Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982).
644. N.Y. ExEc. LAW §§ 295(6), 296(l)(a) (McKinney 1982).
645. Petitioner's brief at 4, Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982). Respon-
dent's brief did not dispute these facts.
646. 456 U.S. at 464.
TIERS1984]
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form, which instructed him that "ANY COMPLAINANT... AG-
GRIEVED ... MAY OBTAIN JUDICIAL REVIEW .... Such
proceedings shall be brought in the Appellate Division of the Supreme
Court of the State .... ,", Mr. Kremer, unaided by counsel, went to
the Appellate Division, which concluded that the agency's decision had
not been "arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion.""' Thereaf-
ter, Mr. Kremer returned to the EEOC, which, relying upon the
NYHRD conclusions, found "no reasonable cause to believe that the
charge of discrimination was true."649 The EEOC also issued Mr.
Kremer a "right to sue" letter.6 10 Following the path mapped out by the
EEOC, Mr. Kremer, still pro se, filed a federal lawsuit in which he
alleged that Chemico had fired him and would not rehire him because
he was a Polish Jew.6 51 That lawsuit was eventually dismissed by the
Supreme Court, which held that, because Mr. Kremer had appealed to
a state court, he could not have access to the federal courts.
6 5 2
The Court's holding seems to conflict with the Congressional au-
thorization of federal court decisionmaking atop state and federal
agency decisions. The majority reconciled Title VII's mandate of fed-
eral court jurisdiction, the Court's own previous interpretation that
such a grant authorized federal judges to make de novo findings,653 and
the Kremer holding by noting that Mr. Kremer had not simply ob-
tained a state agency finding. Rather, he had appealed that judgment to
a state court, which had affirmed the ruling as neither arbitrary nor
capricious.654 The Court interpreted Title VII's silence on what role, if
any, state court judgments were to play as dispositive; because Con-
gress had not expressly exempted Title VII from the "full faith and
credit" statute and from res judicata doctrine, the Court held Mr.
Kremer barred.655 The Court concluded that Title VII permitted un-
647. Notice of Order, State of New York Executive Department, reprintedin Joint Appendix
at 17, Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982).
648. 456 U.S. at 464. That standard is provided by N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 7803 (McKinney
1981); N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 298 (McKinney 1982).
649. Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 623 F.2d 786, 787 (2d Cir. 1980), aj'd, 456 U.S. 461
(1982).
650. 456 U.S. at 465. See also Brief for the United States and the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission as Amici Curiae at 3, Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982)
(arguing to the Court that, despite Mr. Kremer's unsuccessful state court litigation, Title VII per-
mitted federal court decisionmaking).
651. Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 477 F. Supp. 587 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), a]J'a 623 F.2d 786
(2d Cir. 1980), aft'd, 456 U.S. 461 (1982).
652. Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982).
653. Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840, 845 (1976).
654. 456 U.S. at 476-78.
655. Id at 468-69.
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limited review in the new federal forum only if an individual had not
sought state court review of a state agency decision. In other words, the
Court's reading means that the "single judge" of the first forum consists
solely of an agency decision rather than of a bipartite decision made by
an agency and a court. 56
Under the Supreme Court's interpretation, Title VII claimants can
avoid preclusion only if they decline to seek review of state agency rul-
ings in state courts.65 7 If Kremer had ignored the form provided by
NYHRD and promptly filed a federal lawsuit, he would not have had
the "state court judgment affirming that a claim of employment dis-
crimination is unproved," 6 8 and would, presumably, have been eligi-
ble for federal adjudication.
While the Court's statement suggests that it was the state court's
judgment that functioned to preclude federal adjudication, the rest of
the Court's discussion indicates that state court judgments may not al-
ways be critical to a finding of preclusion-agency decisionmaking
alone might suffice. In the Court's words, it adopted its preclusion rule
with "no hesitation" because of the "panoply of procedures," both ad-
ministrative and judicial, offered to Mr. Kremer.659 When describing
the procedures sufficient to provide Mr. Kremer with constitutionally
656. Other than the Second Circuit, the appellate courts that had addressed the question had
reached the opposite conclusion. Jackson, Matheson & Piskorski, The Proper Role of.Res Judicata
and Collateral Estoppel in Title VII Suits, 79 MICH. L. REv. 1485, 1487-88 (1981).
657. Because the Supreme Court's rule provided an incentive for litigants to avoid state
courts, the ruling is at odds with federalism concerns. 456 U.S. at 504 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
The majority claimed federalism was important to its holding. Id at 472.
658. Id. at 485.
659. Id. at 484. The Court interpreted Title VIrs silence about its interaction with the Full
Faith and Credit statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, to mean that section 1738 applied and that, therefore,
Kremer was precluded. Id at 476.
Section 1738's impact on Mr. Kremer's problem was not as straightforward as the majority
suggested. Section 1738 provides that all federal courts give preclusive effect to "[t]he records and
judicial proceedings of any court of any.. .State. . .as they have by law or usage in the court
of such State ... from which they are taken." However, Title VII claims are not brought in state
courts after state employment discrimination claims are unsuccessful. Therefore, New York State
court's res judicata opinions do not directly indicate what effect New York would give state em-
ployment rulings if it were asked to consider them in the context of a subsequent, federal Title VII
claim.
Further, Title VII provides a scheme of state and federal remedies. At the only points at
which the statute addresses the question of preclusion, Title VII permits additional determina-
tions-by the EEOC and the federal courts. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1982). In addition, the legisla-
tive history is silent on congressional views of what impact state court judgments should have in
Title VII cases. 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2405-06.
The majority did express some concern because New York's factfinding was done by an ad-
ministrative agency, rather than a court. Section 1738 says that the proceedings of state courts
should be given preclusive effect in federal court; the statute is silent on the effect of state agency
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adequate opportunities to be heard, however, the Court relied almost
exclusively upon the procedures provided by the NYHRD and not
upon the minimal review provided by the New York State courts.
And, as is typical of res judicata discussions, the Court's emphasis was
on what might have occurred and not on what had occurred in fact.
"Opportunities" in the agency proceeding, not actualities, counted.6 0
Kremer suggests a future in which agencies, not courts, will issue deci-
sions that bar future litigants. 661
Preclusion by agency decisionmaking is not extraordinary. The
procedural model of agency factfinding plus very limited court review
is commonplace. For example, social security applicants denied bene-
fits may seek agency redress and, if unsuccessful, may ask federal
courts to overturn agency decisions. The courts, however, will affirm
the agency's factual findings if they are supported by "substantial evi-
factfinding in federal court, and understandably so, because it was first enacted in 1790, prior to
the emergence of agency adjudication.
The Supreme Court, however, interpreted section 1738 to apply to "state proceedingPS (em-
phasis added) and concluded that those "proceedings need do no more than satisfy the minimum
procedural requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause in order to qualify
for the full faith and credit guaranteed by federal law." 456 U.S. at 481. In the Court's view, the
state agency's factfinding, which permitted a claimant a "full opportunity to present on the record,
although informally, his charges," coupled with the appellate review by a state court was "ade-
quate" to meet the fourteenth amendment standards. Id at 485 (emphasis added). The Supreme
Court's interpretation of the full faith and credit clause is explored in Atwood, State Court Judg-
ments in Federal Litigation: Mapping the Contours of Full Faith and Credit, 58 IND. L.J. 59 (1982).
660. Apparently, "opportunities" in the NYHRD were not great. In 1981, a New York State
Bar Association task force issued a report concluding that the agency was "not satisfactorily dis-
charging its responsibilities under the Human Rights Law in large part due to inadequate budget-
ary appropriations." COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS OF THE N.Y. STATE BAR Assoc., REPORT OF THE
NEw YORK STATE BAR AsSOC. JOINT TASK FORCE ON THE PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES OF THE
N.Y. STATE Div. OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE N.Y. STATE HUMAN RIGHTS APPEAL BD. 9 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT]. "Shortcomings observed by the Task Force include
poorly conducted investigations, inadequate retention of notes, and the absence of sufficient infor-
mation to enable the Appeal Board to conduct an adequate review of no-probable-cause find-
ings .. " Id at 17. This report was submitted to the Supreme Court but is not mentioned by
the majority, which stated "[tlhe fact that Mr. Kremer failed to avail himself of the full procedures
provided by state law does not constitute a sign of their inadequacy." 456 U.S. at 485.
661. See Perschbacher, Rethinking Collateral Estoppel: Limiting the Preclusive Effect of Ad-
ministrative Determinations in Judicial Proceedings, 35 U. FLA. L. REv. 422, 463 (1983) (although
litigation "before an agency tribunal simply is not the equivalent of litigation in court," nonjudi-
cial bodies currently bar subsequent litigation in courts; criticism of that rule for its failure to
consider agencies' limitations). Cf. McDonald v. City of West Branch, 104 S. Ct. 1799, 1804
(1984) (unappealed arbitration award not preclusive in section 1983 claim); Thomas v. Washing-
ton Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 286 (1980) (no full faith and credit bar to a second action in the
District of Columbia for additional compensation following a Workman's Compensation award
in Virginia); Lee v. Winston, 717 F.2d 888 (4th Cir. 1983) (no full faith and credit given to state
proceedings because the proceedings denied due process), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1924 (1984).
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dence.116 62 Other agency decisions are subjected to standards set forth
in the Administrative Procedure Act; court review is limited to determi-
nations of "whether the agency action was arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, not in accordance with law, or unsupported by sub-
stantial evidence on the record taken as a whole. ' 663 Thereafter, the
rulings of the agency cum court prevent aggrieved individuals from re-
litigating or contesting the agency action in any other proceedings.
Perhaps Kremer is only another application of this model-Agency
Decisionmaking plus Very Limited Review.
Kremer, however, arose under Title VII, a statute distinct from
many that authorize agency decisionmaking. Title VII expressly grants
authority to lower federal courts to hear cases and imposes no limita-
tions on that activity.664 Therefore, the Court's preclusion rule in
Kremer should not be analogized to congressional statutes that envision
a very limited judicial role. Rather, Title VII is more aptly compared
to congressional litigation schemes like habeas corpus for state prison-
ers and section 1983 civil rights claims, both of which endow federal
courts with authority to decide the case on its merits and evidence con-
gressional concern that state courts should not alone enforce federal
rights. The Supreme Court's decision in Kremer never quite con-
fronted these distinguishing features of the Title VII litigation scheme.
The Court did, however, interpret the possibilities for dual deci-
sionmaking under Title VII litigation to be parallel to those that the
Court permits in habeas corpus and civil rights cases.665 In all three
areas, the Court has adopted a similar, restrictive model of procedure.
As in a habeas case governed by Stone v. Powell, a federal court review-
ing employment discrimination claims previously presented to state
agencies and not overturned by state courts may undertake only one
inquiry: whether the procedures in the first forum provided an ade-
quate opportunity for full and fair litigation.666 As in a habeas action
under Wainwright v. Sykes, a federal district judge in a Title VII case
662. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1982); see generaly B. SCHWARTz, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 210, at
591, 592 (1976).
663. Villa View Community Hosp. Inc. v. Heckler, 720 F.2d 1086, 1090 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)); 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (1982).
664. Congress' "intent" is fictional and not known. Congress' language permitted dual deci-
sionmaking, but the Court read that language narrowly so as to limit decisionmaking
opportunities.
665. 456 U.S. at 485 n.27.
666. Occasionally, this inquiry yields a negative answer. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush
Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982) (agency failure to hold hearing within time prescribed by statute renders
state procedure inadequate and therefore relief under section 1983 is available).
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must not ask what was litigated but what couldhave been litigated. Any
failure to raise claims (or, in Kremer's case, to use the investigation
possibilities described in the NYHRD regulations) is seen by the Court
as flowing naturally from a system that relies upon litigant autonomy.
Litigants who do not pursue all avenues are described as "sandbag-
gers'667 or are seen as misguided. Under either formulation, opportu-
nities missed are forfeited. Further, lower courts are neither invited to
inquire into the adequacy of counsel nor to make excuses, as one
might, for individuals who proceed pro se.66 s Finally, in Kremer, as in
Allen v. McCurry, the Court declined to announce different rules con-
cerning the role of either collateral estoppel or res judicata under
unique federal statutory schemes. Rather, the Court imposed "tran-
substantive" rules669 across the litigation spectrum.
In sum, most of the Court's choices in recent civil preclusion cases
mirror those made in its interpretation of habeas review.6 7° Finality
commands unlimited respect, and first tier decisionmaking is preferred.
Just as Justice O'Connor claimed in Isaac that habeas review by fed-
eral courts would result in reduced state court enforcement of federal
norms,671 so Justice White commented in Kremer:
[Sitripping state court judgments of finality would be far more de-
structive to the quality of adjudication by lessening the incentive for
full participation by the parties and for searching review by state offi-
cials. Depriving state judgments of finality ...would reduce the
incentive for States to work towards effective and meaningful an-
tidiscrimination systems. 672
To keep state incentives high, the decision of the sole NYHRD hearing
667. Although the Court in Kremer did not use the term "sandbaggers," the Court did state
that, if litigants were given alternatives to the state procedure, they might not participate fully in
the state adjudication. 456 U.S. at 478. The dissent raised doubts about the utility of such a
strategy. Id. at n.19.
668. E.g., Kremer, 477 F. Supp. at 593 n.10. Kremer has been applied to bar litigation even
when the allegedly aggrieved employees did not choose to go to state court but were "forced" into
state court by their employer's appeal of an adverse agency ruling. Gonsalves v. Alpine Country
Club, 727 F.2d 27, 27-28 (1st Cir. 1984).
669. The term is Robert Cover's. See Cover, supra note 372, at 718 (tension between an un-
yielding code of procedure, and one malleable and shaped to the needs of particular cases). In the
1984 term, the Court did carve out one exception. See McDonald v. City of West Branch, 104 S.
Ct. 1799, 1802 (1984) (unappealed arbitration awards do not preclude section 1983 litigation).
670. But see cases cited supranote 601; Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank, 104 S. Ct. 2794, 2800
(1984) (judgment in a class action establishing that employer did not engage in practice of discrim-
ination against employees of minority group did not bar class member from bringing subsequent
action alleging individual claim of racial discrimination); McDonald, 104 S. Ct. at 1799.
671. Isaac, 456 U.S. at 128.
672. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 478.
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officer, reviewing Mr. Kremer's claim of a civil rights deprivation, can
be subjected to no more searching consideration than whether it was
"arbitrary and capricious."
In Title VII litigation, as in civil rights and habeas corpus litiga-
tion, the Court has narrowly interpreted the procedural model created.
The dual decisionmaking centers that are possible under the legislation
have been ousted and replaced by a single decision center-at present,
state courts, perhaps in the future, state agencies. Moreover, in Kremer,
the Court applied the "usual rule" of collateral estoppel, with a novel
twist. As the Court described, the "usual rule" is that the "merits of a
legal claim once decided in a court of competent jurisdiction are not
subject to redetermination in another forum."673 In Kremer, however,
the "merits of a legal claim" were not decided by a state court but by a
state agency. The state courts decided only that the state agency had
been neither arbitrary nor capricious in its decisionmaking. Further,
the statute authorized three fora as competent and entitled litigants to a
succession of adjudications. Kremer demonstrates that the Court pre-
fers the decision of the first tier across a variety of litigation schemes,
both civil and criminal, including those in which Congress has ex-
pressly authorized some form of duplicative decisionmaking.674
There are two central points. First, all of the preclusion cases dis-
cussed above involved genuine value choices. The majority opinions,
conforming to a long tradition, recited their holdings as if the answers
were dictated by previous opinions.67 5 Not so. All these cases were
"hard. '676 The issues had prompted substantial discord among courts
and commentators, and in all the cases except Prosise, dissenters fied
opinions, some of which were quite vigorous.6 7 7
673. Id at 485 (emphasis added).
674. One window remains. See England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375
U.S. 411, 421 (1964) (a plaintiff may "reserve" federal issues for a federal court), discussed in
Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 104 S. Ct. 892 (1984). For a case applying what it
described as "a hybrid of the Englandand full-and-fair-opportunities exceptions" and declining to
apply the doctrine of res judicata, see Howell v. State Bar, 674 F.2d 1027, 1031 (5th Cir. 1982).
See also Quarles v. Sager, 687 F.2d 344, 346 (1 Ith Cir. 1982) (escaped prisoner not precluded from
resuming section 1983 claims that had been dismissed because of escape).
675. See, e.g., Parklane, 439 U.S. at 333 ('[Clontemporary law of collateral estoppel leads
inescapably to the conclusion that the petitioners are collaterally estopped from relitigating the
question ... ").
676. R. DwoRIuN, supra note 20, at 81 (discussion of how to decide problematic cases). The
difficulties were apparent in Nilson v. City of Moss Point, 701 F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1983) (en bane
split over res judicata in a Title VII case).
677. See, e.g., Kremer, 456 U.S. at 494 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("The Court's decision also
flies in the face of Title viI's legislative history.").
1984]
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Second, the value choices made were not easy. The majority opin-
ions read as if differentiation, diffusion of power, deliberate norm en-
forcement, additional persuasion opportunities, and revisionism
command little or no respect. Yet these valued features of procedural
models are the very reasons that the Court has had to decide these
cases. Almost all the lawsuits arose because Congress or the courts had
created litigation schemes that incorporated those features. The
Supreme Court's decisions to eliminate them do not address why such
complex procedures were made available in the first place.
B. CONCENTRATION OF POWER IN THE FIRST TIER
1. The Problem Posed by Article I Judges
As illustrated by Kremer, many first tier decisionmakers are not
judges. Federal and state agency hearing officers and judicial surro-
gates such as magistrates and bankruptcy judges find facts for the first
and sometimes the only time in a wide variety of disputes.
The increasing authority of both surrogate judges and agency ad-
judicators has altered the conception of what duties may be performed
only by specially situated federal judges. Because the drafters of article
III of the Constitution were concerned about political pressure and cor-
ruption,678 they insisted that federal judges be safeguarded. Article III
mandates that federal judges have life tenure and never face diminu-
tion of salary.679 At the time of the creation of lower federal courts and
for years thereafter, article III judges possessed unique authority in the
federal judiciary.680
However, life tenure and the guarantees against diminution of sal-
ary are not attributes necessary for an individual to be recognized as a
judge in the United States. In the First Judiciary Act, Congress implic-
itly acknowledged the authority of state judges, who are not article III
judges. State courts were then, and remain today, responsible for most
of the country's adjudication, and judges in many of these courts serve
678. 2 J. MADISON, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 428, 429 (M.
Farrand ed. 1937). Tim FEDERALIST Nos. 78 & 79 (A. Hamilton).
679. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
680. From the federal judiciary's inception, there were other federal "judges," such as those
who presided in territorial and in military courts. See American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. 685,
690-9 1, 1 Pet. 511, 546 (1828) (nonarticle III territorial judges may decide admiralty questions).
Further, there were court personnel, called United States Commissioners, who assisted judges.
Silberman, supra note 94, at 1297-98. But none of these 'judges" adjudicated cases in courts
created by Congress pursuant to article III.
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for limited terms and at risk of pay Cuts. 68 l
Since the First Judiciary Act, the federal government has ex-
panded enormously and consequently has required more decisionmak-
ing from its adjudicatory branch. Congress has added federal
adjudicators but, for a variety of reasons, 68 2 Congress has been reluc-
tant to augment generously the ranks of article III judges. Instead,
Congress has developed a series of auxiliary personnel-magistrates,
bankruptcy judges, and agency hearing officers. 683 All of these "article
I judges" 684 are, in a sense, under the aegis of the "rear' article III
judges. The questions of what relationships are appropriate between
article I and article III judges, of how much decisionmaking to super-
impose after surrogate judges reach their judgments are, in my lexicon,
questions of which models of procedure to choose.
Not surprisingly, no uniform answer has been provided. Diverse
models of procedure are evident in the relationship between article I
and article III judges. Some article I judges' decisions are not review-
able by courts (the Single Judge/Finality Model);6"5 some decisions are
subjected to limited review (the Single Judge plus Limited Review
Model);686 and others are subject to de novo review (the Single Judge
plus Unlimited Review Model).687
I am not interested, here, in the efforts of the Court and commen-
681. The 1789 Judiciary Act did not give federal judges authority to decide all cases within
the jurisdiction authorized by article III of the Constitution. An Act to Establish the Judicial
Courts of the United States, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 76-77 (1789). A notable gap, that of federal ques-
tion jurisdiction, was not conveyed until 1875. See Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stats. 470.
Thus, state judges did the bulk of the adjudication in the country, and in most states, judges were
not given life tenure. See generally L. BERKSON, S. BELLER & T. GRIMALDI, JUDICIAL SELECTION
IN THE UNITED STATES: A COMPENDIUM OF PROVISIONS (1981).
682. See Posner, Will the Federal Courts Survive Until 1984? 4n Essay on Delegation and
Specialization of the JudicialFunction, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 761, 764-65 (1983) (arguing that increas-
ing the number of federal appellate judges "seriously degrades the quality of federal appellate
justice"). See generally F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 39, at 230-40 (providing histori-
cal examples in which Congress refused, mostly due to political disputes, to provide additional
judgeships).
683. For a history of the increased reliance upon such surrogates, see Silberman, supra note
94, at 1297-1300.
684. Article I judges are those created by Congress, pursuant to article I; such judges lack the
article III attributes of life tenure and no dimunition of salary.
685. See, e.g., Addonizio v. United States, 442 U.S. 178, 184-90 (1979) (article III judges may
not review an agency decision about when to release an individual on parole).
686. The manner in which the Parole Commission makes decisions, however, is reviewable.
See, e.g., Drayton v. McCall, 584 F.2d 1208, 1214 (2d Cir. 1978) (Parole Commission must accord
procedural opportunities to prisoners subject to parole rescission).
687. See, e.g., Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1982) (after federal agency decision about
whether employment discrimination occurred, federal judges to make decisions again).
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tators to delineate the boundaries between decisions appropriately
made by article III judges and those permitted article I judges.688
Rather, I am concerned with the hierarchical arrangements between
article I and article III judges. These arrangements are based upon the
premise that article I actors are inferior to article III judges and there-
fore cannot make all adjudicatory decisions in the federal system.
The problem is illustrated by examining the allocation of decision-
making power between magistrates and article III judges. Over the past
fifteen years, Congress has enlarged the authority of magistrates to ap-
proximate more closely the functions of article III judges-albeit with
constraints on magistrates' power to issue final judgments.689
The enlargement of magistrates' authority poses an interesting di-
lemma for the Court, which over the past fifteen years has so vigor-
ously endorsed the power of the first tier and valued the finality of its
decisions. The conflict is one of self-interest. If the Court were to give
magistrates final authority over decisions, the Court would make article
III judges nonessential. The Court has been unwilling to take this posi-
tion. In their official capacities and in some extrajudicial activities,
members of the Court have insisted that the line between article I and
article III judges must be maintained. In Northern Pipeline Construc-
tion Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,690 the Court rejected an extension
of bankruptcy judges' authority. Since the Northern Ppeline decision,
members of the Court have also lobbied vigorously to prevent the
wholesale transformation of bankruptcy judges into article III
judges.691 Yet, to promote its preferences for first tier authority and
688. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982)
(Bankruptcy Act of 1978 unconstitutionally conferred article III judicial power on article I
judges); accord Krattenmaker, Article III and Judicial Independence: Why the New Bankruptcy
Courts Are Unconstitutional, 70 GEO. L.J. 297, 299-311 (1981).
689. See Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-577, 90 Stat. 2729, 2729-30 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b) (1982)) (permitting the assignment of additional duties to magistrates) [hereinafter cited
as 1976 Magistrates amendments]; Federal Magistrate Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-82, 93 Stat. 643
(codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 631, 633, 634, 636 (1982)).
See generally The Federal Magistrates System: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil
Liberties, and the Administration of Justice o/the Comm on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 59-
129 (1983) (presenting a report by the Judicial Conference of the United States on the operation of
the Federal Magistrate System); C. SERON, THE ROLES OF MAGISTRATES IN FEDERAL DISTRICT
CouRTS passim (1983) (survey of 191 full time magistrates in 82 federal district courts); Note,
Article III Constraints and the Expanding Civil Jurisdiction of Federal Magistrates: A Dissenting
View, 88 YALE L.J. 1023, 1040-54 (1979) (arguing that the 1979 amendments to increase magis-
trates' powers violate article Ill).
690. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
691. Chief Justice Burger's efforts to defeat legislation that would have given article III status
to all bankruptcy judges is chronicled in King, Unmaking of a Bankruptcy Court: Aftermath of
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finality, which in turn are supposed to beget economy, the Court must
cede a good deal of decisionmaking power to magistrates. The Court
finessed this conflict in United States v. Raddatz,692 the next example of
procedural modeling.
2. Expanding Magistrates' Power
Since the 1976 amendments to the Magistrates Act, federal judges
may designate magistrates to "hear and determine" some nondisposi-
tive pretrial matters.693 District courts review these magistrates' orders
by deciding whether the magistrates' decisions were "clearly erroneous
or contrary to law. ' 694 Thus, for such nondispositive matters, Congress
adopted the Single Judge plus Limited Review Model. Magistrates
may also decide some specified dispositive issues, such as suppression
motions and some prisoners' claims.695 In these cases, magistrates pro-
vide "reports and recommendations" to which parties may file written
objections within ten days. If objected to, these magistrates' decisions
are subjected to "de novo determination" by a district judge, who is
free to receive new information.696 For these cases, Congress chose the
Single Judge plus Unlimited Review Model-at least in theory.
Literally, a charge to make a "de novo determination" requires a
judge to make a decision "anew, again, ' 697 and perhaps as if the first
ruling had not occurred. De novo review, however, is also a legal term
of art. The phrase was used to describe appellate review in equity and
admiralty practice.698 Unlike the limited "writ of error" review avail-
able to those defeated in cases tried by juries, 699 litigants dissatisfied by
Northern Pipeline v. Marathon, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 99 passim (1983). For the subsequent
legislative response, see Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-353, 98 Stat. 333, 336-46 (bankruptcy judges have 14-year terms and are appointed by federal
judges).
692. 447 U.S. 667 (1980).
693. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (1982) (magistrates are not authorized, under this section, to
hear and decide summary judgment and preliminary injunction motions).
694. Id.
695. Id § 636(b)(1)(B). The 1976 Magistrates amendments, supra note 689, were enacted, in
part, in response to Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461, 469-73 (1974) (holding that magistrates
lacked statutory authority to decide habeas cases).
696. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (1982). See, e.g., Park Motor Mart, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 616
F.2d 603, 604-05 (Ist Cir. 1980) (a district judge is not required to make a de novo determination
unless written objections are filed).
697. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 602 (1966).
698. Orfield, supra note 75, at 564-70 (describing the appellate practice in English equity
courts). See R. POUND, supra note 94, at 269-70 (describing the shift away from this type of
review).
699. The seventh amendment provides that "no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reex-
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judges' decisions in equity or admiralty could "appeal." 7" The differ-
ence was explained by Chief Justice Ellsworth: "An appeal is a process
of civil law origin, and removes a cause entirely; subjecting the facts as
well as the law, to a review and retrial; but a writ of error is a process of
common law origin, and it removes nothing for re-examination but the
law."70 1 The one limitation on de novo "appeal" was that appellate
judges did not typically receive new evidence. Thus, when Congress
chose the de novo test for review of decisions by magistrates and em-
powered trial judges to "receive further evidence or recommit the mat-
ter to the magistrate with instructions, ' 70 2 Congress authorized trial
judges to undertake a kind of review akin to but broader than the old
equity appellate practice.
The Supreme Court interpreted the phrase "de novo determina-
tion" in United States v. Raddat. 703 In 1977, in a motion to the district
court, criminal defendant Herman Raddatz asked that incriminating
statements he had made be suppressed because, he claimed, the state-
ments were based upon an agreement, subsequently breached, that the
charges against him would be dismissed.7°4 Pursuant to the Magis-
trates Act and over Mr. Raddatz's objections, the district judge referred
the suppression motion to a magistrate. The magistrate heard testi-
mony from Mr. Raddatz and from the two Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco
and Firearms agents who had questioned Mr. Raddatz. The magistrate
found that Mr. Raddatz had "knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
made inculpatory statements," 70 5 and recommended that the suppres-
sion motion be denied. In support of his report, the magistrate stated
that he had found the testimony of the federal agents "more credi-
amined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law." U.S.
CONST. amend. VII.
700. See R. POUND, .supra note 53, at 290-304 (discussion of nineteenth-century review in
equity proceedings). On appeal, even with the de novo standard, it was not customary for the
reviewing court to accept new evidence. Orfield, supra note 75, at 594.
There was a brief time from 1789 to 1803 when Congress limited review, even in equity and
admiralty, to writs of error. See The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 22, 1 Stat. 72, 84; Act of Mar.
3, 1803, ch. 40, § 2, 2 Stat. 244, 244 (restoring "appeals" in equity and admiralty). An analysis of
the changes is provided in Clark & Stone, Review of Findings of Fact, 4 U. CHI. L. REv. 190, 194-
97 (1937); Note, Rule 52(a): Appellate Review of Findings of Fact Based on Documentary or Undis-
puted Evidence, 49 VA. L. Rlv. 506, 508-10 (1963).
701. Wiscart v. D'Auchy, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 321, 327 (1796).
702. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (1982).
703. 447 U.S. 667 (1980).
704. Id at 670-71; 592 F.2d 976, 978-79 (7th Cir. 1979), rev'a, 447 U.S. 667 (1980).
705. 447 U.S. at 671.
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ble."7 °6 Mr. Raddatz objected to the report and recommendation of
the magistrate-thereby obliging the district judge to make a "de novo
determination." 70 7 The district judge informed the parties that he had
considered the transcript of the magistrate's hearing, the parties' writ-
ten submissions, and counsels' arguments, and that he had "accepted"
the magistrate's report and recommendation.70 8
Having been found guilty, Mr. Raddatz appealed to the Seventh
Circuit, which reversed. The court concluded that when credibility of
witnesses was in issue, the district judge was obliged as a matter of due
process to hear the witnesses.70 9 The issues for the Supreme Court
were: (1) whether a review in which the trial judge took no testimony
satisfied the statutory requirement of the "de novo determination" and
(2) if so, whether Congress could have authorized such a procedure
consistent with the demands of article III and the due process clause of
the fifth amendment. In a decision in which five opinions were filed,71 0
a majority of the Court decided both questions in the affirmative. Once
again, in an arena where a congressional statute made possible (or, de-
pending upon one's reading, mandated) repeated, independent deci-
sionmaking, the Court opted for a minimalist model of procedure-a
Single Judge plus Limited Review Model.
All nine members of the Raddatz Court agreed that the Magis-
trates Act required federal judges to make new decisions. The dispute
was over technique. The majority believed that it was cognitively pos-
sible for a judge to make a de novo decision without repeating the tasks
performed by the first tier judge. Therefore, a trial judge could "ac-
cept" a magistrate's decision without hearing the witnesses whose cred-
706. Id at 671-72. The information adduced at the hearing and the contrary inferences that
might have been drawn are detailed in the Seventh Circuit's opinion, 592 F.2d at 978-79.
707. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (1982).
708. 447 U.S. at 672.
709. 592 F.2d at 986.
710. The majority opinion was authored by Chief Justice Burger. Justice Blackmun filed a
concurrence, stating he would preclude district judges who had not heard testimony from rejecting
magistrates' reports. 447 U.S. at 684 (Blackmun, J., concurring). The majority declined to decide
that question. Id. at 681 n.7.
Justice Powell filed an opinion in which he concurred in part and dissented in part; he too
would have reached the question addressed by Justice Blackmun. Id at 686. Justice Stewart, in a
dissent joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, argued that the 1976 Magistrates amendments
mandated that evidence be taken by the district judge in Raddatz' case. Id at 689 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting). Justice Marshall, in a separate dissent in which Justice Brennan joined, maintained
that the 1976 amendments, as construed by the Court, violated both the fifth amendment and
article III. Id. at 694 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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ibility was in issue.711
The idea that reviewing judges can make some decisions de novo
without listening to testimony is not novel. Appellate judges regularly
decide afresh the legal issues determined below, and they do so without
any presumptions in favor of trial judges' decisions. Further, de novo
decisions about factual findings can also be made without hearing wit-
nesses. If the evidence is based upon documents, undisputed stipula-
tions, or (as was generally the case in equity practice) written
statements of witnesses, the first tier judge has no special insight into
the facts. Because of this parity, some appellate judges have described
themselves as free to reach their own determinations about the validity
of such findings of fact.712
The problem takes on a different cast, however, when the first tier
decisionmaker must assess the credibility of information given orally.
If witnesses disagree about what transpired, the factfinder must decide
whom to believe. Because no generally agreed upon objective tech-
niques are available, 3 we have relied upon factfinders' intuitions
about which witnesses to credit. Under the Magistrates Act, Congress
gave magistrates a factfinding role but mandated that, upon a party's
request in some cases, trial judges were to make a de novo determina-
tion-to substitute their own intuitions for those of the magistrates.
How could such substitution, whether ending in acceptance or rejection
of magistrates' reports, genuinely occur without rehearing the testi-
mony? Without any independent indicia of credibility, the assessment
of witnesses' testimony comes through the eyes and the ears of the
beholder. 4
The Raddatz majority did not determine (as a concurrence and
one dissent proposed) that trial judges could make "de novo determi-
nations" without retaking evidence only in situations when witness
credibility was not determinative.71" Rather, the Court concluded that
711. Id at 675-76.
712. See, eg., Orvis v. Higgins, 180 F.2d 537, 539 (2d Cir.) (Frank, J.) ("[W]e are as able as he
to determine credibility, and so we may disregard his finding."), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 810 (1950).
713. See generally R. HARPER, A. WIENS & J. MATARAZZO, NONVERBAL COMMUNICATION:
THE STATE OF THE ART 2-18 (1978) (no consensus exists concerning correct research approaches
or theories); R. ROSENTHAL, J. HALL, M. DImATTEo, P. ROGERS & D. ARCHER, SENSITIVITY TO
NONVERBAL COMMUNICATION: THE PONS TEsTpassim (1979) (review of research on individuals'
ability to comprehend nonverbal clues) [hereinafter cited as R. ROSENTHAL].
714. Hence, the oft-stated "rule" that the person "who decides must hear." E.g., Morgan v.
United States, 298 U.S. 468, 481 (1936).
715. This reading of the 1976 Magistrates amendments, supra note 689, has a logical basis
because they require de novo "determinations" (as contrasted with de novo "hearings"). 28
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trial judges could render "de novo determinations" without replicating
much of magistrates' work.7 16 The majority interpreted "de novo" as a
state of mind-a perceived independence from the first tier's conclu-
sions, combined with the absence of any formal doctrines, such as pre-
sumptions of correctness, that mandate deference. Moreover, by
reserving the question of whether trial judges may reject magistrates'
reports without hearing testimony, the Court created incentives for
busy trial judges to agree with magistrates and thereby avoid rehearing
witnesses.717
With this interpretation of "de novo," the Raddatz Court contin-
ued its search for economy by augmenting the power of the first tier.718
By defining "de novo" as an internal process that occurs within a dis-
trict judge's head, the Supreme Court conformed its interpretation of
the Magistrates Act to its interpretation of the other congressional liti-
gation schemes reviewed herein. In all instances, the Court had the
opportunity to craft litigation structures rich with the possibility of revi-
sionism. In all these cases, the Court could have opted for differentia-
tion, for some procedural schemes more expansive than others. In each
case, the Court might have construed congressional language to permit
multiple decisions on the same questions. But, in each instance, the
Court chose to employ as few decisionmakers as possible.
In contrast to the Court's efforts in the habeas corpus area, the
Court's interpretation of the Magistrates Act is likely to achieve its
goals. Economy will be enhanced because witnesses need not be
reheard. Given the incentives for affirmance, magistrates' power will
grow as more of their decisions endure. District courts also retain their
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (1982). The choice of words permits the statute to embrace situations, such
as summary judgment motions, in which no oral testimony is taken.
716. The Court further concluded that, because the district judge is the formal author of the
opinion, article III requirements were met. Cf. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co., 458 U.S. 50,87 (1982) (bankruptcy judges' statutory authority to issue final judgments in
some cases is unconstitutional under article III).
717. 447 U.S. at 681 n.7. Justice Marshall argued that economy concerns were overstated
because suppression hearings occur in fewer than 4% of all federal criminal cases. Id at 701-02 &
n.5 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
718. The Court did, however, add one unclear caveat. In a footnote, the Court left open the
possibility that litigants, dissatisfied with magistrates' rulings, could renew their suppression mo-
tions at trial. Id at 678 n.6. If such actions were permitted, the Court's de novo interpretation
would only conserve resources in the many cases that do not reach the trial stage. Moreover, by
suggesting some reconsideration possibilities, the Court ignored the "law of the case" doctrine,
under which judges decline to reconsider prior decisions made in the course of a lawsuit. F.
JAMES & G. HAzARD, supra note 589, at 535-36.
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distinct article III status; trial judges delegate rather than relinquish
decisionmaking to magistrates.
3. Increasing Trial Judges' Power
In a series of recent decisions as well as a proposed rule amend-
ment, both the Supreme Court and the drafters of federal rules have
sought to restrict the role of intermediate appellate courts and, thereby,
to augment the power of first tier decisionmakers. Unlike some of the
cases described above, in which the Court has acknowledged the limits
it has placed upon revisionism, the Court's new constraints on appel-
late courts are cast as applications of long-held precepts. Yet, when the
"old" rules are applied to the evolving case law, a "new' message be-
comes clear. Appellate courts are to defer, generally, 1 9 to trial judges'
views.
a. The clear error rule: The drafters of the 1938 Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure combined the law and equity sides of federal court ju-
risdiction and created a single "form of action to be known as a 'civil'
action."720 As noted, prior to that joinder there had been two distinct
forms of review, one for cases at law and the other for cases at eq-
uity.72' With joinder, the drafters precipitated questions about the
standard and form of review to be applied to trial judges' decisions
made under the new, unified system.
i. "Writs of error" at law; "appeals" in equity: Different stan-
dards of appellate review stem, in part, from the Constitution. The
seventh amendment decrees that "no fact tried by a jury, shall be other-
wise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to
the rule of the common law." '722 Historians explain this provision as
intended, in part, to protect the citizens' decisionmaking from poten-
tially "imperialist" judges.7" To insulate juries, the seventh amend-
ment gave litigants at law only one round for fact determinations; jury
decisions followed the Single Judge/Finality Model. 2 However, dis-
719. But see Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 1949, 1965
(1984) (in cases raising first amendment issues, appellate court has an obligation to make an in-
dependent examination of the whole record).
720. FED. R. Civ. P. 2.
721. See generally Clark & Stone, supra note 700, at 192-207 (tracing historical development);
Orfield, supra note 75, at 586-96 (comparing appellate procedures in courts of law and equity).
722. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VII.
723. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REv. 639,
708-10 (1973).
724. Review ofjury decisions was possible if courts characterized factual issues as legal ones.
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satisfied litigants who claimed that presiding judges at jury trials had
made legal errors could obtain limited review-by filing "writs of er-
ror" before a superior court.725 The reviewing court was free to recon-
sider the legal conclusions of the trial judges because no presumption
of correctness attached to those decisions.
726
When the Bill of Rights was drafted, judges sat as facoinders in
equity. The seventh amendment, however, gave their rulings no pro-
tection.727 An unhappy litigant in equity could take an "appeal" from
lower court rulings. An "appeal" empowered the reviewing court to
engage in a wider range of activities than it could when acting upon a
"writ of error." Appellate courts could reexamine the first tiers' factual
and legal conclusions "de novo," so as to "do justice" in individual
cases.728 Equity exemplified a form of the Single Judge plus Unlimited
Review Model. Although limited to issues and facts raised below, the
second court had no formal obligation to defer to the first judge's views
on either legal or factual matters.
Logic, as well as the Constitution, supported the difference in stan-
dards of review for law and equity. In the two types of cases, litigants
presented evidence in different ways. For much of the period from
1789 to 1912, judges sitting in equity received written evidence, taken
in deposition form and either read by or read to the trier of fact.729 On
appeal, the entire written record went to the reviewing court.7 0 In con-
Orfield, supra note 75, at 579. Further, since the issue of whether the jury's verdict was supported
by substantial evidence was considered a "legal" question, courts could occasionally reverse jury
verdicts. Id. at 592.
725. Until 1928, the term "writ of error" was used. By the Act of January 31, 1928, Congress
ordered that any requests for review, whether at law or in equity, be called "appeals." Act of Jan.
31, 1928, ch. 14, § 1, 45 Stat. 54, 54. The standards on review, however, remained distinct until
1938. See Clark & Stone, supra note 700, at 204-06 (discussing the period from 1928-1938); Payne,
The Aboltion of Writs of Error in the Federal Courts, 15 VA. L. REV. 305, 314-20 (1929) (contem-
porary account of the debate surrounding the passage of the Act of January 31, 1928).
726. The reviewing courts could, however, only consider issues raised below. Orfield, supra
note 75, at 578-79.
727. The Constitution refers to factfinding twice. The seventh amendment protects juries'
verdicts, and article III, § 2 provides for the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction of both "law
and fact, with such exceptions and regulations as Congress shall, from time to time, make." For
an argument that the exceptions and regulations clause was written to protect juries' factual find-
ings, see Merry, Scope of the Supreme Court's Appellate Jurisdiction: Historic Basis, 47 MINN. L.
REV. 53, 57-68 (1962).
728. R. POUND, supra note 53, at 298-303; Orfield, supra note 75, at 565-66.
729. A detailed description of the techniques for presenting evidence in equity and the trans-
mittal of the record to the appellate court is provided in Griswold & Mitchell, The Narrative in
Federal Equity Appeals, 42 HAtv. L. REv. 483 (1929).
730. Id at 487. Between 1842 and 1912, the record was sometimes reduced to a narrative. Id
at 488-89. The narrative technique was twice instated and then discarded but, with the 1912 Eq-
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trast, at law, witnesses gave oral testimony, and the "record" sent to the
reviewing court on a writ of error consisted, generally, of the pleadings
and judgment.7 3 1 Greater deference to the factfinder at law followed in
part from the more limited knowledge possessed by the reviewing
court.
Over time, the line between law and equity became blurred in two
respects: the identity of the factflnder and the techniques for receiving
evidence. In 1865, Congress permitted litigants at law to waive jury
trials.732 Under this new procedure, the judge was substituted as the
factfinder. By statute, Congress gave such judges the protection that
the Constitution had given to jurors; "the findings of the Court upon
the facts. . . shall have the same effect as the verdict of a jury. '733 A
reviewing court could decide only whether the evidence was sufficient
to support the judgment.73 4 Between 1789 and 1912, Congress also re-
formed evidentiary rules in equity proceedings. For some periods of
time, judges sitting in equity could not only receive written evidence
but could also hear witnesses' testimony.735 Thus, the twin rationales
for distinguishing the role of reviewing courts in law and equity-the
special nature of the jury as factflnder and the differing evidentiary
practices-were undermined.
Not only were the theoretical distinctions shaken, but there was
some dispute about whether, in practice, reviewing courts actually be-
haved very differently when reconsidering legal as opposed to equitable
decisions. Given the state of technology and the logistics of judges'
riding circuit, written records on appeal in equity might not always
have been available and read. Absent archival and quantitative data,736
uity rules, was once again adopted. See Sup. Ct. R. 76, 226 U.S. 629, 672 (1912) [hereinafter cited
as 1912 Equity Rules]; Griswold & Mitchell, supra note 729, at 489-93.
731. Orfield, supra note 75, at 574. Sometimes judges certified various rulings against a party;
those rulings were included in a "bill of exceptions" and were part of the record. J. HALL & J.
ANDREWS, AMERICAN LAW AND PROCEDURE 378 (1913).
732. Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 86, § 4, 13 Stat. 500, 501.
733. Id.
734. Boogher v. Insurance Co., 103 U.S. 90, 97 (1880). To underscore the novelty of a judge
as the factfinder at law, the Court quoted an earlier opinion that, when the parties stipulate to a
judge in lieu of ajury, the judge "does not exercise judicial authority in deciding, but acts rather in
the character of an arbitrator." Id. at 95-96 (citation omitted).
735. Orfield, supra note 75, at 587-88. See, e.g., Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 30, 1 Stat. 73,
88-90 (equity and law cases have same method of receiving evidence). That evidentiary reform
was altered by the Act of Mar. 3, 1803, ch. 40, § 2, 2 Stat. 244, 244. In 1912, equity judges were
once again permitted to hear evidence, and that rule remained until the union of law and equity in
1938. 1912 Equity Rules, supra note 730, Rule 46, 226 U.S. at 661.
736. Clark and Stone undertook a limited empirical project. They reviewed 55 cases decided
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we can only speculate whether the practice mirrored the rhetoric of
judges and legal commentators. With an occasional dissent,737 com-
mentators have described the two reviews as methodologically dis-
tinct.738 However, the dimensions of the differences are difficult to
determine, in part because reviewing judges often described themselves
as undertaking, in the same case, degrees of review understood today as
mutually exclusive.
For example, after new equity rules were promulgated for the fed-
eral courts in 1912,739 the Seventh Circuit addressed the question of
whether those rules had altered the standard of review on appeal. A
litigant had argued that under the new rules, trial judges' factual find-
ings had become binding upon the reviewing court. Rejecting that
view, the per curiam appellate court said it had
the right, and owes to itself and to the parties the duty, of trying the
questions of fact de novo. . . . [T]he findings of the trial court were
entitled to be treated as very persuasive, and such findings were not
to be disturbed, unless it appeared quite clearly that the trial court
had either misapprehended the evidence or had gone against the
clear weight thereof.... [I]f the witnesses have been heard in open
court, one element that rightly enters into the reviewing court's con-
sideration of the evidence de novo is the opportunity of the trial judge
to estimate the credibility of the witnesses by their appearance and
demeanor on the stand.740
Some of this mixing of standards, the de novo statements coupled with
pronouncements of great deference to trial court findings, resulted from
differences in the kinds of evidence taken in equity. When trial judges
in equity heard witnesses, reviewing courts apparently paid greater at-
tention to their findings than when the evidence was written.74 ' On
appeal, reviewing courts also distinguished between conflicting evi-
dence, for which they gave substantial deference to trial courts' conclu-
sions, and undisputed evidence, the validity of which reviewing courts
perceived themselves as equally able to assess.
742
between 1900 and 1934 and concluded that reversals in equity because of errors of fact were
"comparatively rare" during that period. Clark & Stone, supra note 700, at 208.
737. Id. at 207-10.
738. Eg., Maxwell, Should Appellate Courts Review the Facts in Actions at Law 22 AM. L.
REv. 262 (1888); Orfield, supra note 75, at 590.
739. 1912 Equity Rules, supra note 730.
740. American Rotary Valve Co. v. Moorehead, 226 F. 202, 203 (7th Cir. 1915).
741. Clark & Stone, supra note 700, at 208; Orfield, supra note 75, at 594.
742. Orfield, supra note 75, at 594; Note, supra note 700, at 510-11.
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Ii. The 1937 compromise: When equity and law were
merged, the drafters of the rules had a major goal-uniformity of pro-
cedure, regardless of the kind of case. As a result, the group rejected
the suggestion to retain different standards of appellate review for law
and equity.743 However, the question of what single standard to adopt
was problematic. Given uncertainty about the actual scope of equity
review, a proposal to incorporate the equity test directly into the Fed-
eral Rules was unappealing.7 " Yet a majority of the drafters was un-
willing to insulate trial judges' decisions to the degree the Constitution
protected jury verdicts.745 The compromise was expressed in then draft
Rule 68, now Rule 52, entitled "Findings by the Court," which reads:
"Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and
due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge
of the credibility of the witnesses."746 The original commentary to the
Rule belied some of the compromise: the Advisory Committee Note
described the Rule as adopting equity practice, with its more searching
reconsideration of the whole case-including factual matters.747
Given the wording and the history of Rule 52, questions about its
interpretation arose quickly. When trial judges heard witnesses, the
Rule specifically mandated "due regard," which was understood as
obliging the reviewing court to accord "substantial deference" to trial
judges' findings. But the Rule's reference to live testimony and its si-
lence about documentary evidence prompted questions about whether
appellate courts could give less deference to trial judges' findings predi-
cated upon either undisputed or documentary evidence.
743. ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, in SUPREME COURT RULES OF CIVIL PROCE-
DURE 120-21 Rule 68 Note to the Supreme Court(1936) [hereinafter cited as 1936 ADVISORY COM-
MITTEE NOTE]. See also L. YANKWICH, NEW FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 66-68 (1938)
(the new rules authorize appellate courts to review factfinding in all civil actions as courts had
formerly reviewed findings of fact in equity).
744. 1936 ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE, supra note 743, at 120-21; Note, supra note 700, at
512-14.
745. See 1936 ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE, supra note 743, at 120 (jury verdicts are binding
on reviewing court, but cases tried without a jury are fully reviewable on appeal). The discussion
is chronicled in Ilsen & Hone, Federal Appellate Practice as Affected by the New Rules of Civil
Procedure, 24 MINN. L. REv. 1, 32-35 (1939).
746. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a).
747. FED. R. CIv. P. 52 Advisory Committee Note (1938). See also H. BALTER, FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 108 (1938) ("[Ihe equity practice appears to be retained although
the verbiage of the law practice is also used."). For criticism of the proposed rule, see Chesnut,
Analysis of ProposedNew FederalRules of CivilProcedure, 22 A.B.A. J. 533, 540-41 (1936) (urging
uniformity by requiring trial judges' findings to be final when supported by substantial evidence).
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That issue sparked a considerable controversy in which some of
the major proceduralists of the day participated. Judge Jerome Frank
and Professor James W. Moore took the stance that appellate courts
could make de novo determinations of documentary evidence and were
not required to apply presumptions in favor of trial judges' views.
7 4 8
Judge Charles Clark, with whom Professor Charles Alan Wright
agreed, viewed such a "gloss" as an incorrect interpretation; they ar-
gued that the "clearly erroneous" rule should be applied to all trial
courts' factual findings.74 9
There are other, intermediate positions. Courts and commentators
have distinguished between "ultimate facts," which are described as
approximating legal conclusions and thus are appropriately reviewed
more extensively,750 and "subsidiary facts," about which trial judges'
opinions weigh more heavily. Some courts varied the review with the
nature of the legal proceedings and the kind of relief ordered. For ex-
ample, on occasion the Second Circuit has appeared more willing to
reappraise district court findings when preliminary injunctions are
granted than in other circumstances.7  Commentators also claim that
many appellate courts reiterate presumptions in favor of trial courts'
findings but make independent assessments of the facts.752
The differing views about the appropriate level of appellate scru-
tiny reflect value choices. Judge Clark and Professor Wright justified
their preference to give power to the first tier on the grounds that final-
ity was critical and that, in light of the many demands on appellate
courts, resource conservation was imperative. Both claimed that trial
judges' morale and public respect for courts rested on limited appellate
748. Orvis v. Higgins, 180 F.2d 537, 539 (2d Cir. 1950) (Frank, J.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 810
(1950); 5A J. MooRE, W. TAGGART & J. WICKER, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 152.04 (2d ed.
1962) [hereinafter cited as 5A MooRE's].
A more radical stance was argued by Professor Blume, who believed that the equity standard
of review should be applied in all judge-tried cases-whether or not credibility of testimony was at
issue. Blume, Review of Facts in Nonjury Cases. Proposed Federal Rule 68, 20 J. Am. JuD. Soc'Y
68, 71 (1936).
749. Clark, Special Problems in Drafting and Interpreting Procedural Codes and Rules, 3
VAND. L. REV. 493, 505-06 (1950); Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of the Appellate Courts, 41
MINN. L. REV. 751, 764 (1957).
750. For the range and details of the debate, as of 1963, see Note, supra note 700, at 516-30.
See also Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 273 (1982), discussed infra notes 768-87, 794-
808 and accompanying text.
751. Note, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) and the Scope of-Appellate Fact Review: Has
Application of the Clearly Erroneous Rule Been Clearly Erroneous?, 52 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 68, 86
(1977).
752. Id at 90-91.
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review. 53 Clark also opposed differentiation of the kind of review
based upon the nature of the evidence presented. With uniformity of
procedure and resource conservation as his goals, he argued that the
"right of appeal should be restricted.
'7 54
Judge Frank and Professor Moore agreed that public respect for
the courts was at issue but concluded that such respect hinged upon
making review available. Believing that opportunities for revision were
important, that the power of the first tier should be confined, and that
different standards of review were not inherently undesirable, they ar-
gued that Rule 52 was intended to and did permit reviewing courts
substantial flexibility in norm enforcement.755
iii. Current rule reform efforts: The intensity of the debate
about federal appellate courts' authority has varied considerably. Ini-
tially, the issue was much discussed. In 1955, the Advisory Committee
proposed amending Rule 52 to incorporate the Clark-Wright view, 75 6
but the Supreme Court declined to promulgate such an amendment.757
Thereafter, interest in the question subsided. In 1957, Professor Wright
wrote of the "doubtful omniscience ' 758  of appellate courts and
bemoaned their tendency to increase their own power by giving less
deference to trial judges' findings. Subsequently, very occasional law
review articles, almost all student notes and comments, 759 discussed the
issue. Circuit courts bickered a bit with each other,760 and trial judges
occasionally complained about the eagerness of overbearing appellate
courts to "do justice" by ignoring the work of the first tier.6 Yet, in
753. Clark & Stone, supra note 700, at 217; Wright, supra note 749, at 778-79.
754. In one of Clark's advocacy articles, he compared review at law and in equity and
claimed that there were few differences in fact; he argued for the test on review at law to be
applied to all cases. However, Clark did not address the question of testimonial versus documen-
tary evidence. Clark & Stone, supra note 700, at 216-17.
755. See supra note 748.
756. ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, REPORT OF PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS
51-54 Rule 52 (1955).
757. 5A MooRE's, supra note 748, at 1 52.02.
758. Wright, supra note 749, at 751.
759. Eg, Comment, An Analysis of the Application of the Clearly Erroneous Standard of Rule
52(a) to Findings of Fact in Federal Nonjury Cases, 53 Miss. L.J. 473 (1983); Note, Federal Rules
52(a) and 60(b)-A Chinese Puzzle, 21 Sw. LJ. 339 (1967); Note, supra note 700.
760. Compare Marcom v. United States, 621 F.2d 142, 144-45 (5th Cir. 1980) (written evi-
dence permits appellate court more leeway in reviewing findings) with Maxwell v. Sumner, 673
F.2d 1031, 1036 (9th Cir.) (findings of fact, even if based solely on documentary evidence, will be
set aside only if clearly erroneous), cert. deniea 103 S. Ct. 313 (1982).
761. Nangle, The Ever Widening Scope of Fact Review in Federal Appellate Courts-Is the
"Clearly Erroneous Rule" Being Avoided 59 WASH. U.L.Q. 409, 426-27 (1981).
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the forty plus years since the Rule's enactment, the Supreme Court did
not perceive the problem to be of sufficient magnitude to require reso-
lution, either by case law or by rule amendment.
In the last few years, however, quiet efforts to amend and to rein-
terpret the Rule have occurred. In the summer of 1983, the Advisory
Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of the Judicial
Conference drafted rule amendments, which were circulated for com-
ments.762 The Committee suggested extending the reach of Rule 52 by
amending the Rule to state that trial judges' factual findings, "whether
based on oral or documentary evidence," cannot be set aside unless
clearly erroneous.7 63 Further, the Committee proposed to add that "due
regard" must be paid to trial judges not only because of their opportu-
nity to assess credibility of witnesses, but also because of "the need forfinality. ''764
I am not suggesting that the proposed amendments work a major
change. As noted, some courts already apply the "clearly erroneous"
rule to all judges' findings.7 65 But the proposed amendments reflect
and confirm prevailing value choices about the desire for closure and
an unwillingness to permit revisionism. The Committee was straight-
forward about the choices it was making. In the notes that accompa-
nied its first proposals, the Advisory Committee acknowledged the
arguments of supporters of a broader role for appellate courts when
trial judges' inferences are based upon documentary evidence; no need
for deference exists when equal information is available to both tiers.766
But the Committee believed that "these considerations" were out-
weighed by "the public interest in . . . stability and judicial econ-
762. Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of the Judicial Conference
of the United States Courts, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 98 F.R.D. 338 (1983) [hereinafter cited as 1983 Preliminary Draft, Civil Rules].
The Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure circulated those proposals for com-
ments. Id at 345. After receiving reactions, the Advisory Committee met in the spring of 1984
and sent its revised proposals to the Standing Committee. The Standing Committee reviewed the
proposals in the summer of 1984 and made recommendations for rule changes to the Judicial
Conference which meets in the fall of 1984. The Judicial Conference, in turn, sends proposed
amendments to the United States Supreme Court, which promulgates final rules that become ef-
fective absent Congressional authorization. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982).
The proposed amendments discussed here are the Advisory Committee's preliminary drafts,
circulated in the summer of 1983. These proposals were under consideration for revision as this
article went to press.
763. 1983 Preliminary Draft, Civil Rules, supra note 762, 98 F.R.D. at 359-60.
764. Id
765. Eg., Constructora Maza, Inc. v. Banco de Ponce, 616 F.2d 573, 576 (1st Cir. 1980)
("clearly erroneous" rule applied to documentary evidence of insolvency).
766. 1983 Preliminary Draft, Civil Rules, supra note 762, 98 F.R.D. at 361.
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omy''7 7 and therefore recommended the narrowing of appellate
review, thus promoting the growth of the Single Judge/Finality Model.
b. Fact or law: The Supreme Court has been less forthright in its
efforts to delineate the scope of appellate courts' authority when factual
disputes involve documentary evidence. In 1982, the Court decided
Pullman-Standard v. Swint,768 which dealt with appellate review of dis-
trict court findings of discriminatory intent under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act.769 Pullman-Standard may have imposed the "clearly erro-
neous" rule on appellate court review of documentary evidence; the
Court's opinion is sufficiently opaque that its reach is difficult to dis-
cern. But its value choices are transparent: in an oddly formalistic
opinion, the Court held that first tier decisions were preferable.
In 1971, a group of black employees of Pullman-Standard, a divi-
sion of Pullman, Inc., that manufactures railway cars, filed a class ac-
tion against the company, the United Steelworkers of America
(U.S.W.), the local union that represented most of the production and
maintenance workers, and the International Association of Machinists
(I.A.M.), the bargaining representative of other Pullman employees.
The employees claimed that the job assignment and seniority system
agreed to by the union and employer discriminated against them. In
1974, after a trial, the district court denied the plaintiffs' claims. On
appeal, a Fifth Circuit panel vacated the decision. 770 The panel con-
cluded that the trial judge had reached his decision on legal standards
that "did not fit this case."77 1 The court ordered further hearings on
the questions of whether job assignments, the selection of work super-
visors, and the seniority system were discriminatory.772
After the district court retried the case, the Supreme Court issued
new interpretations of Title ViI's application to seniority problems.773
The trial judge therefore agreed to a third trial, after which he con-
cluded that Pullman-Standard's assignment and seniority systems were
lawful."7 The Fifth Circuit reviewed the case for a second time in
1980.775 The questions presented were (1) whether after the effective
767. Id
768. 456 U.S. 273 (1982).
769. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
770. Swint v. Pullman-Standard, 539 F.2d 77 (5th Cu. 1976).
771. Id at 82.
772. Id at 95-96.
773. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
774. Swint v. Pullman-Standard, 17 EmpL Prac. Dec. (CCH) 8604 (N.D. Ala. 1978).
775. Swint v. Pullman-Standard, 624 F.2d 525 (5th Cir. 1980).
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date of Title VII, Pullman-Standard continued to make department as-
signments with discriminatory intent, (2) whether the company had a
"bona fide" seniority system under section 703(h) of Title VII, and (3)
whether the company had succeeded in rebutting the prima facie show-
ing of racially discriminatory selection of foremen.776
Are these questions of "law" or "fact"? That Pullman-Standard
assigned employees to departments is "a thing done," "something that
has actual existence," '777 a "fact." However, describing Pullman-Stan-
dard's motives when making such assignments is more problematic.
Legal commentators 778 have long been uneasy about describing moti-
vation as "objective reality." Even if one could posit an individual's
motivation as having an "actual existence," we would have difficulty
conceptualizing Pullman-Standard's motivation. The company itself
cannot form a motive; a corporation is a creature of papers. If one
turns to the motivation of the managers of the company, one enters the
complex tangle of ascertaining and aggregating individuals' motives
and then projecting them onto the fictional entity, Pullman-Standard.
But Congress has enacted legislation prohibiting employees from
making job assignments based upon impermissible motives; to ascer-
tain whether such violations have occurred, courts must therefore as-
sess motivations. One way to approach the question of whether
Pullman-Standard's motives are "facts" is to examine the nature of the
information relied upon by the judges who decided whether a breach of
the law had occurred.
Both the trial and appellate courts thought the company's history
was relevant. Both traced the job assignments of whites and blacks
from the 1940's to 1973, and both studied carefully the assignments
made from 1965 to 1973.771 To clarify for himself the massive data
presented, the trial judge constructed a chart of Pullman-Standard's
subdivisions.780 In this document, however, the judge did not include
all of Pullman-Standard's departments; he selected only those he be-
lieved relevant. The judge also ranked the divisions he included so as
to develop standards, thereby enabling a comparison of job assign-
ments in terms of desirability.8
776. Id at 528.
777. WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEw COLLEGIATE DICrIONAY 298 (1963).
778. Brest, Reflections on Motive Review, 15 SAN Dmco L. REv. 1141, 1143 (1978).
779. 624 F.2d at 527-28; 17 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) at % 8604, 539 F.2d at 82-84.
780. The chart is reproduced in the first opinion of the appellate court, 539 F.2d at 86.
781. Id. at 85-89.
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When the case was first on appeal, the Fifth Circuit described the
trial judge's chart as "the heart" 78 2 of his conception of the case. The
appellate court determined that, although the chart's factual content
was not "clearly erroneous," its structure-the ranking and the selec-
tive exclusion of some departments-was legally deficient.78 3 On re-
mand, once again relying on a chart of his own making, 8 the trial
judge concluded that the company's past practices of having "white
only" and "black only" jobs had not affected the company's post-Title
VII decisionmaking.8 5 When the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case in
1980, the appellate court again referred to the trial judge's chart.
786
This time, the appellate court did not criticize the construction of the
document but instead concluded that the data revealed the continua-
tion of impermissible discrimination. "[T]he total employment picture
indicates that department assignments continued to be infected with
racial considerations, albeit to a lesser degree than during the pre-Act
period. 78 7 In short, while the two tiers considered the same "objective
reality"-what numbers of workers of which race were assigned to
what departments from 1966 through 1973-they each drew opposite
inferences about the meaning of the patterns discerned.
We then reach the problems faced by the United States Supreme
Court. Is the decision about whether to prefer the conclusions of the
trial judge or the appellate court enlightened by a characterization of
either's task as "factfinding"? Whkt does the notion of factfinding have
to do with the acts of interpreting a series of events over several years,
of deciding the comparability of jobs in diverse departments, and of
determining the motivation of the many people who assigned jobs to
hundreds of employees? Is the Supreme Court's decisionmaking in-
formed by constitutional and statutory protections accorded jury and
judge as factfinder at law, by the history of the different techniques for
the taking of evidence at law and in equity, or by a rule that commands
782. Id at 85.
783. Id at 89. The opinion is not completely clear; the court rejected the plaintiff-appellant's
claim that the descriptions in the chart were clearly erroneous-apparently because the trial judge
called the chart a "rough index." Nevertheless, the appellate court found "valid" the plaintiffs'
attacks on the structure of the chart. The court concluded that those defects did "impugn the
credibility" of the trial judge's "ultimate conclusions." Id
784. From the printed opinions and briefs in the case, it is unclear whether the trial judge
constructed a new chart or relied upon the one reproduced id. at 86.
785. 17 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) at 8604.
786. See Swint v. Pullman-Standard, 624 F.2d at 529 ("Although the district court did not
reproduce the chart in its Memorandum Opinion, the court interpreted from the chart... .
787. Id.
1000
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appellate courts to give "due regard" to the trial judge's opportunity to
assess witnesses' credibility?
My view is that the labels, "law" or "fact," formerly used to delin-
eate the spheres of responsibility of juries and other first tier deci-
sionmakers at law, have little current relevance to fashioning models
for decisionmaking in cases such as Pullman-Standard To decide what
role to afford appellate courts in such cases, we ought to examine
whether, by virtue of their distinct processes for obtaining information,
either trial or appellate judges can bring different and better insights
into the disputes and whether, for reasons unrelated to information ac-
cess, one or the other tribunal is to be preferred. Thus, I would aban-
don inquiry into what is law, fact, subsidiary fact, ultimate fact,
undisputed fact, and historical fact. Instead, I would ask questions
about power concentration and diffusion, rationality, norm enforce-
ment, and economy.
There are two principal reasons for discarding the fact/law quest.
First, when the distinction was originally drawn, the world was very
different. Until recently, factfinding was an activity that probed the
memory of individuals, who provided oral recollections or had re-
corded events on paper. As a consequence, the Constitution and the
1865 Congress gave special deference to factfinders, to the individuals
who heard the stories of what had been said, felt, and understood. To
some extent, those factfinders were assumed to have special insights
because they heard firsthand the relevant tales.
In contrast, today, in cases like Pullman-Standard, judges need not
assess individuals' abilities to reconstruct the past. The answers to the
question of whether Pullman-Standard discriminated on the basis of
race are beyond the memories of individuals. Twentieth century tech-
nology, by providing means for amassing quantitative information, has
created both the questions and some answers. Decisions about legal
violations can depend in large measure upon data compilations, con-
structed and stored by computers. As a result, the trial judge in Pull-
man-Standard (unlike the magistrate in United States v. Raddat 88 ),
could make few, if any, claims to special knowledge. s9 Rather, he
compiled a chart summarizing the data that others had provided in an
788. In Raddatz, the question was the credibility of witnesses. The magistrate and trial judge
had different information bases from which to decide that question. The magistrate had heard the
witnesses while the trial judge had not. 447 U.S. at 667.
789. As the court of appeals noted, the trial judge did hear testimony of some witnesses. 624
F.2d at 525; 539 F.2d at 77. But the witnesses testified for the plaintiffs, against whom the district
court found, and the Supreme Court did not rely upon the fact that witnesses had testified when
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effort to capture what might have happened in the Pullman-Standard
Company from 1965 to 1973.
Second, even during eras when "objective reality" resided within
the minds of witnesses, so that first tier listeners might have been pref-
erable to second tier reviewers,790 many were troubled by the difficul-
ties of distinguishing "facts" from legal conclusions. Both judges and
legal commentators admitted that the two forms of decisionmaking
shaded into each other.791 Some writers bemoaned the necessity of
drawing those distinctions and applauded equity for its freedom from
such endeavors.792 Others poked gentle fun at their contemporaries'
efforts to prove the validity of delineating "dry, naked, actual fact"
from legal conclusions.
93
Nevertheless, when deciding Pullman-Standard, the Supreme
Court claimed that the law/fact question was the issue.794 Writing for
the majority, Justice White concluded that trial judges' views about
motivations were preferable to views of appellate judges because the
question of "whether the differential impact of the seniority system re-
flected an intent to discriminate on account of race. . . is a pure ques-
tion of fact. . . .It is not a question of law and not a mixed question of
law and fact. ' 795 While "naked, dry facts" may be out of vogue, courts
the Court held the trial judge's findings were to be preferred to those of the appellate court. See
456 U.S. at 301-02 n.6 (Marshall, J., joined by Blackmun, J., dissenting in part).
790. There is some dispute about whether seeing a witness enables one to better judge the
"truth" of what is said. See R. HARPER, A. WIENS & J. MATARAZZO, supra note 713, at 171-234
(variety of interpretations of nonverbal messages possible); R. ROSENTHAL, supra note 713, at 171-
234 ("We have just begun to learn about the ways in which our nonverbal behavior affects other
people, about differences among people in their abilities to understand and convey nonverbal
messages .. "). See generally R. NISBEaTr & L. Ross, supra note 180, at 65-89, 113-38 (discuss-
ing cause of cognitive errors). For a view skeptical of the value of first tier listeners, see Blume,
supra note 748, at 69-70.
791. See Cook, "Facts" and "Statements of Fact," 4 U. CHI. L. REv. 233, 234 (1936) ("It is
impracticable if not impracticable to make a pure fact statement."); Sunderland, Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law in Cases Where Juries Are Waived, 4 U. CHI. L. REv. 218, 226 (1936)
("[N]o safe test has ever been devised by which to distinguish between" facts, ultimate facts, and
legal conclusions).
792. Orfield, supra note 75, at 593-96.
793. Cook, supra note 791, at 236.
794. 456 U.S. at 286 n.16, 287-88. The Court stated that all it had to decide was whether the
federal appellate courts were "bound by the 'clearly erroneous' rule. . . of Rule... 52... in
reviewing a district court's findings of fact, arrived at after a lengthy trial, as to the motivation of
the parties who negotiated a seniority system." Id. at 276. Compare the Court's more sensitive
approach to the complexities of appellate review in Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United
States, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 1949, 1959 (1984) (application of Rule 52(a)'s clearly erroneous standard to
first amendment cases does not eliminate the appellate court's obligation to undertake an in-
dependent assessment of the record).
795. 456 U.S. at 287-88.
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still are in the business of identifying "pure. . . fact"'7 96 and allocating
decisionmaking responsibilities upon that basis.
The Supreme Court's opinion is weak. The majority admitted that
it knew of no "rule or principle that would unerringly distinguish a
factual finding from a legal conclusion." '7 9 7 Yet, it deemed the question
of racially impermissible intent a "fact" because it, and other courts,
had in the past treated questions of intent as "essentially factual."7 9
Having thus "clarified" the distinction between law and fact, the
Supreme Court examined the standard of review that the Fifth Circuit
had employed and, in the process, engaged in some "factfinding" of its
own. The appellate court had stated that, to the extent the trial court's
decisions were findings of fact, the trial judge had been "clearly errone-
ous." 7 9 9 The Supreme Court was convinced, however, that the Fifth
Circuit had not truly applied Rule 52's "clear error" test.80°
How did the Supreme Court know what really motivated the
judges of the Fifth Circuit? First, Justice White explained that, while
the Fifth Circuit had referred to and correctly stated the Rule 52 clear
error standard, the appellate court's "acknowledgement came late in
the court's opinion ...... [T]he paragraph in which the court finally
concludes that the . . . seniority system is unprotected . . . strongly
suggests that the outcome was the product of the court's independent
consideration of the totality of the circumstances it found in the rec-
ord." The second and "more fundamental" criticism, in the Court's
view, was that, once the Fifth Circuit had stated its conviction that a
"mistake" had been made, the appellate court also "identified. . .the
source of the mistake," rather than remanding the case to the district
796. Id.
797. Id at 288. For struggles over the question of delineating law from fact, see United States
v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 104 S. Ct. 575, 578-79 (1984); Brantley v. McKaskle, 722 F.2d 187, 188-89
(5th Cir. 1984).
798. 456 U.S. at 288. See also Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 621-23 (1982) (whether county
system of at-large election was maintained for discriminatory purposes is factual; lower court's
findings tested under "clearly erroneous" rule upheld); id at 631 (Powell, J., dissenting) (stressing
need for "objective" evidence, rather than subjective thought processes and arguing the objective
factors were "too atenuated as a matter of law to support an inference of discriminatory intent").
799. 624 F.2d at 533 n.6.
800. 456 U.S. at 286 n.16. The Fifth Circuit had not been very artful in its use of language in
the Pullman-Standard case. In determining what standard the Fifth Circuit had applied, the
Supreme Court relied on other Fifth Circuit opinions (also cited by the circuit court in Pullman-
Standard) which had described appellate courts as freer when reviewing "ultimate" facts than
when reviewing "subsidiary" facts. See East v. Romine, Inc., 518 F.2d 332, 339 (5th Cir. 1975)
(appellate court may make independent determination of validity of allegations of
discrimination).
801. 456 U.S. at 290-91.
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court for a fourth trial.802
Employing words that reveal its own "factfinding," the Court con-
cluded that the decision of the Fifth Circuit "seems to us incredible."
80 3
According to Justice White, the only explanation was that the appellate
court had made an "independent evaluation" of the "ultimate facts" 8°4
and thus had undertaken an unlimited review of the case. Because the
appellate court had applied a standard of review appropriate only for
legal issues, and because "facts," not "law," were in dispute, the
Supreme Court reversed and remanded.
80 5
This case is not, at least in the short run, about economy; it is
about power. In Pullman-Standard, as in the many other cases re-
viewed in this paper, the Supreme Court allocated power to the first tier
and diminished, if not abolished, opportunities for revision. The Court
relied upon an arcane formula to achieve its goals and embraced the
very formalism it had disdained in Barefoot v. Estelle.8"6
Further, as I suggested at the outset of this section, the Court may
also, sub silentio, have decided the question of whether the "clearly
erroneous" rule applies when appellate courts consider documentary as
well as testimonial evidence. Although not so described by the Advi-
sory Committee's draft proposal to amend Rule 52,807 nor expressly
discussed in the majority's opinion,80 Pullman-Standard is a case in
which much of the evidence considered by the appellate court was doc-
umentary. Given the Court's sweeping order of deference to trial
judges, Pullman-Standardmay signal the Court's view that, whether in-
formation is documentary or testimonial, trial judges rather than re-
viewing courts should decide its value.8°9
802. Id. at 291.
803. Id at 293.
804. Id at 285-86.
805. See also Inwood Laboratories v. Ives Laboratories, 456 U.S. 844, 855-56 (1982) (Supreme
Court reprimanded an appellate court for reversing a trial court's findings without using the
"clearly erroneous" standard. The Supreme Court then determined that the findings were not
clearly erroneous).
806. Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct. 3383, 3393 (1983).
807. 1983 Preliminary Draft, Civil Rules, supra note 762, 98 F.R.D. at 361 ("The Supreme
Court has not resolved the issue. ) (citing Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 102 S. Ct. 1781
(1982)).
808. The Court did state that it had not decided the "much-mooted issue of the applicability
of the Rule 52(a) standard to mixed questions of law and fact-i e., questions in which the histori-
cal facts are admitted or established." 456 U.S. at 289 n.19.
809. But see Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 1949, 1958
(1984) (appellate courts to review the record independently in first amendment cases).
1004
HeinOnline -- 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1004 1983-1984
Pullman-Standardis not the only case in which the Supreme Court
has endorsed trial judges' decisionmaking powers and has constrained
appellate courts. In general, in cases raising questions of when an ap-
peal may be taken,810 of how much "deference" need be given to trial
judges' rulings on discovery,811 and of when, in habeas claims, state
courts have made factual findings rather than legal conclusions, 812 the
Court has insisted upon limiting the role of the second tier. With the
exceptions of expanding review when indictments are dismissed, 13 oc-
casionally when sentences are challenged,81 4 and when first amend-
ment claims are raised,81 5 the Court has increased the power of the first
tier.
IV. CONCLUSION
A. THE POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS
Interpreting a range of statutory schemes and rules, the Court has
determined to limit decisionmaking as much as possible to a single fo-
rum, to dismantle models involving two fora by interposing multiple
procedural obstacles to the second forum, and to lodge substantial
power in the first tier by contracting the scope of review. Several ap-
proaches might explain the return to the Single Judge/Finality and the
Single Judge plus Limited Review Models of procedure. First, a ma-
jority of the Court might have a theory of correctness-that the first tier
generally produces substantively correct outcomes and that outcome
production is the only purpose of procedure. Alternatively, the justices
810. See Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-57 (1949), limitea Coopers &
Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978) (decisions appealable only after final judgment un-
less they fall within "small class" of cases). But see Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr., 103 S. Ct. 927, 933-35 (1983) (district court's order to stay suit, pending hearing in state
court on same issue, appealable).
811. See National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, 427 U.S. 639, 642 (1976)
(trial judge's discovery decisions may not be overturned unless an abuse of discretion).
812. See Wainwright v. Goode, 104 S. Ct. 378, 382-83 (1983) (state court factual findings must
be accorded presumption of correctness); Marshall v. Lonberger, 103 S. Ct. 843, 850 (1983) (to
overturn, federal court on habeas review must determine that state court's factual findings lacked
even "fair support").
813. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 365 (1981) (absent demonstrable
prejudice, or threat thereof, dismissals of indictments are inappropriate sanctions for government
misconduct). See generally Ponsoldt, supra note 219 (critical of Court's willingness to permit sec-
ond trials after mistrials).
814. Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. 3001 (1983) (proportionality review of sentence). But see
Pulley v. Harris, 104 S. Ct. 871, 875 (1984) (declining to undertake a proportionality review be-
cause claim was "perceived error of state law" and therefore inappropriate for review on federal
habeas corpus).
815. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 1949, 1959-60 (1984).
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might believe that (a) despite an absence of correctness, the cost of ad-
ditional procedural possibilities is not worth a marginal gain in correct-
ness, or (b) even if additional procedural possibilities enhance
correctness, they are unnecessary because achieving correct outcomes is
not particularly important. Another view the majority could hold is
that the procedures in the Single Judge/Finality and Single Judge plus
Limited Review Models are sufficient to express society's concerns
about individuals and their disputes. Finally, the majority may believe
that, although more procedural opportunities do express increased soci-
etal concern, individuals and their disputes are not worth valuing more.
1. Correct Outcomes
If one were confident that the first tier produced correct outcomes
in all, or in a substantial percentage of cases, and if one perceived that
correct outcome production was the only purpose of procedure, then it
would be sensible to eliminate the "waste" of extra, "unnecessary"
procedures.
To explore this possibility, some definition of correctness is
needed. Leaving aside indeterminacy problems and my reservations
about "correctness," decisions could be termed "correct" if the "law" is
properly understood, if the "true facts" are found, and if the appropri-
ate remedy or sanction is applied.
A majority of the Court appears to care little about the first sense
of correctness, that the law be properly applied. In cases like Stone v.
Powell and Wainwright v. Sykes, the Court ignored conflicts between
federal and state holdings; it refused to allow consideration of whether
constitutional rules were "correctly" employed. The second aspect of
correctness, the search for facts, may be of greater importance for the
Court. The Court has devoted many of its habeas opinions to the ques-
tion of "prejudice"-whether, even if legal violations have occurred,
the outcome would have been different. The Court may well be con-
vinced that all criminal defendants are factually guilty and, therefore,
that outcomes and sanctions are "correct" whenever the guilty remain
incarcerated. Similarly, the Court may believe that the other first tier
decisions discussed above were the "right" outcomes: that Mr. Kremer
had not suffered discrimination, that Mr. McCurry's constitutional
rights were not violated, and that Pullman-Standard had not engaged
in illegal employment practices. Thus, by permitting only minimal
procedures, the Court enables "correct" decisions to survive.
Both explanations-that the Court cares little for legal correctness
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and that the Court believes additional procedures decrease factual cor-
rectness-seem odd. Given that the Supreme Court is in the business
of law announcement, must not the Court believe that implementation
of legal rules is important? Moreover, should not the Court, of all insti-
tutions, perceive correctness as tied to legality? And what could be the
basis for the Court's view that Mr. Kremer was not discriminated
against, that Isaac was guilty, and that Raddatz was to be disbelieved?
Does a majority have some general biases against discrimination claim-
ants and criminal defendants and in favor of the government? For a
Court whose charge is to adjudicate, generalized hunches are suspect
bases for decisions. In short, I have some skepticism about whether the
Court has such a theory of correctness. A majority of the Court has
opted for the contraction of procedural opportunities without endors-
ing first tier decisions as substantively correct. In the many cases ex-
amined above, the Court has not concluded that the first tier rulings
were rational, impartial, consistent, or correct applications of law. Nor
has the Court disagreed on the merits with lower federal court opinions
that have overturned first tier rulings as violative of federal norms.
Rather, the Court has forbidden inquiry into the merits.
But to rely upon the Court's judgments and holdings is to oversim-
plify the interpretation of what animates procedural reductions. Some
language in the majority's decisions does suggest that the first tier pro-
duces correct outcomes. Some Supreme Court decisions imply that the
first tier is always staffed by able decisionmakers who render judgments
on the basis of information provided by autonomous, competent, fully
informed litigants and their attorneys, who in turn make well-consid-
ered choices as they wend their way through well-delineated proce-
dural paths. I believe, however, that the Court well knows the falsity of
such depictions.
The view that litigants are rational, deliberate participants is de-
scriptively accurate for only a small but highly visible subset of liti-
gants, such as commercial or institutional litigants. For example, the
assumption that the Parklane Hosiery Corporation's officers were able
to evaluate ample information provided by counsel is consistent with
what is known about sophisticated clients, the career choices of tal-
ented law students, and the role of money in the litigation marketplace.
When clients possess both economic resources and information, clients
can obtain allegiance from their lawyers and exercise some degree of
control over their attorneys' decisions. Further, such clients may need
constraints because they may be tempted to abuse decisionmaking
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processes. In short, such clients may not only be theoretically autono-
mous; they may, in fact, be "competent."
However, the Supreme Court could not genuinely believe that all
clients, including the poor and the uneducated, possess such "litigation
competency." Nevertheless, the Court has declined to inquire into liti-
gant competency as a prerequisite to the application of preclusion rules.
Instead, the Court has relied upon litigant autonomy without checking
for competency. Indeed, the Court has discarded one of its few "com-
petency checks," the "deliberate by-pass" rule of Fay v. Nola.
On the other hand, in some of its opinions, the Court has relied
heavily upon the role of attorneys. Perhaps the Justices assume that
lawyers are "competent," adequately protect the interests of the diverse
litigants represented, and thereby bring about correct outcomes. There
are, however, two difficulties with such assumptions, both of which are
well known to the Justices. First, attorneys and clients have distinct
and sometimes conflicting interests. Second, even when attorneys wish
to further their clients' interests, not all are competent to do so.
Professors Cover and Aleinikoff have exposed the fallacies of
viewing attorneys and their criminal defendant clients as "moral
units." 6 Most criminal defendants are indigent. They do not choose
their attorneys, and the attorneys provided are usually burdened by too
many other clients. Resource constraints on the public side and market
incentives on the private side result in the divergence of attorneys' and
clients' interests at discrete and identifiable points. The Supreme Court
knows this. A few years ago, it allowed appointed defense attorneys to
ignore and contradict nonfrivolous requests made by their clients."1 7
Moreover, although a majority of the Court has displayed its will-
ingness to be "highly deferential" to defense counsel and to "indulge a
strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range
of reasonable professional assistance,"818 members of the Court know
816. Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 13, at 1078-86. See also Comment, Client Services in a
Defender Organization" The Philadelphia Experience, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 448, 456 (1956) (volun-
tary defender association spent little time per client); Note, supra note 207, at 996-98 (time and
work pressures on public defender's office cause attorney mistakes).
817. Jones v. Barnes, 103 S. Ct. 3308, 3312-14 (1983). See also Morris v. Slappy, 103 S. Ct.
1610, 1615 (1983) (over objection of defendant, appointed counsel replaced previously appointed
attorney who had taken ill); The Criminal Court: A System in Collapse, N.Y. Times, June 26, 1983,
at 1, col. 1 (the caseload of courts, prosecutors and public defenders is so large that much unfair-
ness results). See generally D. RosEmNIAL, LAWYER/CLIENr: WHO's IN CHARGE passim (1977)
(clients have minimal control over attorneys).
818. Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. at 2066.
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that all defense attorneys are not competent. The "strong presumption"
that inept trial counsel did not render a criminal trial fundamentally
unfair stems from the Court's efforts to rebuff postconviction collateral
attacks.819 To protect "finality concerns," the Court has refused to im-
pose performance standards on defense attorneys and has made "un-
reasonable," "unprofessional" conduct by defense attorneys insufficient
grounds for reversals of conviction.820 However, from the Court's own
experiences with cases claiming ineffective counsel,8 21 from lower court
opinions, and from the information generated by researchers, 822 the
Justices have been made aware of many criminal defense attorneys
who do minimal or no work on behalf of their clients.823 As a recent
American Bar Association survey of the implementation of Gideon v.
Wainwright's guarantee of lawyers for felony defendants demonstrates,
not even minimally adequate defense services are being provided in
many locales.
8 24
Furthermore, even when lawyers are available, criticism of their
courtroom performance, in both criminal and civil cases, has been ro-
bust. Indeed, the Chief Justice has led the way. 25 The great outpour-
ing of concern has prompted proposals for more restrictive bar
admission requirements and for greater supervision of trial attor-
neys.826 In short, although no data base provides figures by which to
819. See id at 2064 (habeas petitioner must show both that counsel committed serious error
and that error prejudiced the defense).
820. Id at 2071.
821. See, e.g., United States v. Cronic, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 2041 (1984) (court-appointed defense
counsel, a young real estate lawyer who had never before tried a jury case and was permitted only
a short time to prepare for trial); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 353 (1980) (presumption of
ineffective assistance by counsel because of conflict of interest).
There are also many lower court cases chronicling ineffective assistance of counsel. E.g.,
United States v. Tucker, 716 F.2d 576, 595 (9th Cir. 1983); Vela v. Estelle, 708 F.2d 954, 965 (5th
Cir. 1983); Mylar v. Alabama, 671 F.2d 1299, 1300 (11th Cir. 1982). See generally Note, A New
Focus on Prejudice in Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Cases: The Assertion of Rights Standard, 21
AM. CuM. L. REv. 29, 30-31 (1983) (advocating emphasis upon counsel's assertion of defendant's
rights rather than upon outcome of trial).
822. See N. LEFSTEiN, CRIMINAL DEFENSE SERVICES FOR THE POOR 19 (1982) (survey of
criminal defense programs; inadequate compensation for appointed defense attorneys led to attor-
neys' unwillingness to "put forth all necessary efforts on behalf of their clients").
823. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. at 2073 n.3 (Brennan, J., concurring in
part) (citing Javor v. United States, 724 F.2d 831, 834 (9th Cir. 1984), in which the Ninth Circuit
concluded that "unconscious or sleeping counsel is equivalent to no counsel").
824. N. LEFSTEIN, supra note 822, at FI-F68.
825. Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary, A.B.A.J. 66 (1980) at 295.
826. See Final Report of the Committee to Consider Standards for Admission to Practice in
the Federal Court to the Judicial Conference of the United States, 83 F.R.D. 215, 218 (1979)
(recommending several measures to improve federal trial practice) [hereinafter cited as Devitt Re-
port]. See also Lempert, Pilot Court Districts, Bar Split on Attorney Testing, Legal Times of Wash.,
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approximate the frequency, some attorneys commit egregious errors.8 27
The client-attorney unit does not always work as it is theoretically sup-
posed to, and the Court cannot rely unquestioningly upon that unit's
decisions, or lack of decisions, to validate outcomes.
Finally, a third species of litigants remains to be considered. In-
cluded here are litigants like Mr. Kremer, who appeared pro se and
found that, through a procedural error, he had forfeited his opportuni-
ties to receive a federal court decision on the merits. The Court treated
Mr. Kremer, who was obviously naive about procedure, as if he were a
sophisticated litigator. 28 The Court declined to apply relaxed rules to
the pro se litigant-despite extant legal doctrines that recognize the
utility of lenient rules for unrepresented individuals.8 29
But litigant and attorney shortcomings may not be decisive for the
Justices. The Court could assume that a third category of actors, the
decisionmakers of the first tier, compensate sufficiently for the errors of
both litigants and attorneys so that the outcomes are correct. Some of
the Supreme Court's opinions strongly suggest this explanation. In
Strickland v. Washington, a major opinion on assistance of counsel, the
Court concluded that defense attorneys' failures need not "undermine
confidence in the outcome" of cases.8 13  Even when lawyers have been
constitutionally inadequate, the Court is prepared to sustain first tier
decisions. The assumption is that decisionmakers "reasonably, consci-
entiously, and impartially"83' apply legal standards.
Once again, the Court's endorsement of outcome rings hollow.
First, there is history. Procedural developments of the last century, in-
cluding the growth of statutory rights of appeal, the congressional
grants to federal courts of jurisdiction over state judges' decisions, and
the increased reviewability of jury decisions, all indicate that first tier
Apr. 4, 1983, at 2, col. I (discussing implementation of Devitt Committee proposals by 14 United
States federal court districts). An increase in judicial supervisory activities, justified partially by a
need to protect clients from attorney failures, is yet another indication of the uneven performance
of the bar. See, e.g., Schwarzer, Dealing with Incompetent Counsel-The Trial Jrudge's Role, 93
HARV. L. REV. 633, 636 (1980) (arguing desirability of direct intervention by trial judges).
827. See also J. KNITZER & M. SOBIE, LAW GUARDIANS IN NEw YORK STATE, A STUDY OF
THE LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN 13 (1984) ("[A]il the data point to extensive inade-
quacies in the general level of representation accorded to children.").
828. Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982).
829. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 15 (1980) (reversing award of fees to defendants be-
cause prisoner's pro se claim, although unsuccessful, was not frivolous); Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (liberal reading of pro se complaints).
830. 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2068 (1984).
831. Id
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decisions are not always consistent, impartial applications of legal
norms.
Second, nothing has occurred on the empirical or anecdotal fronts
in the last twenty years to lend support to the Court's apparent san-
guinity. Commentators have detailed jurors' lack of comprehension of
legal rules.8 32 Reports on trial courts describe the many burdens and
pressures under which trial judges labor,83 3 and the enormous variety
among judges in all aspects of their functioning-from selection and
salaries to the quality of decisions rendered.83 4 Similarly, investiga-
tions of agencies, such as the New York Human Rights Division
(NYHRD) and the Social Security Administration, reveal inadequate
processes, erratic decisionmaking, lack of resources, and administrative
malfunctioning.835
Perhaps, however, the Court's confidence about outcomes comes
from a belief that the procedures inherent in first tier decisionmaking
compensate for the inadequacies and limitations of the participants.
The notion could be that litigants' autonomy and persuasion opportu-
nities, coupled with power concentration and finality, yield correct re-
sults. But the Court could not genuinely rely upon such procedural
features as the equivalent of correct outcomes. The Court must ac-
knowledge that procedures are mediated by participants, that Mr.
Kremer's autonomy and persuasion opportunities could have led to
correct results only if Mr. Kremer had, in fact, known of his options
and had the resources to exercise them. The availability of procedures
per se does not provide a sufficient basis to believe that procedures
compel correctness. If litigants, attorneys, and first tier decisionmakers
fail, procedures (whether marvelously crafted or crudely worked) can-
not ensure results in which one can have confidence.
Moreover, very similar procedures, such as those in federal and
state courts, sometimes yield different results. Recall that in Stone v.
832. See generally A. ELWORK, B. SALES & J. ALFINI, MAKING JURY INSTRUCTIONS UNDER-
STANDABLE (1982).
833. See V. FLANGO, R. ROPER & M. ELSNER, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, THE
BUsINESS OF STATE TRIAL COURTS 67 (1983) (civil court filings outstripping population growth).
834. See, e.g., Daye v. Attorney Gen., 712 F.2d 1566, 1572 (2d Cir. 1983) (although not un-
constitutional, extent and nature of state trial judge's intervention created risk that jurors thought
judge believed defendant guilty); L. BERKSON, S. BELLER & M. GRIMALDI, supra note 681, at 6
(survey of state judicial selection procedures); Neuborne, supranote 138, at 1115-16 (resources and
other institutional factors making federal district courts preferable to both state trial and appellate
courts for certain categories of litigants).
835. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 660; J. MAsHAw, C. GoETz, F. GooDMAN, W.
ScHwARTz, P. VERKUIL & M. CARow, supra note 91.
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Powell a state court approved a state statute as constitutional, but the
federal appellate court found the very same statute illegal under the
same test. Procedure alone does not reveal which answer to the federal
constitutional question is correct or desirable. Additional concepts are
necessary, such as a theory that state judges' decisions are always to be
preferred because of deference to states, or that federal judges' deci-
sions are preferable because federal judges are more expert in federal
law, are more committed to the implementation of federal rights, or are
sufficiently removed from the front lines so as to be able to apply fed-
eral law even when litigants seem unsympathetic or undeserving.
To summarize, I do not believe that the Supreme Court's proce-
dural modeling is propelled by the Court's belief that the first tier con-
sistently produces legally "correct" outcomes. Neither the Court's
judgments nor the litigation world, as the Court must understand it,
supports that proposition. Further, I do not think the Court is commit-
ted to the proposition that the only goal of procedure is to produce
correct outcomes. Much of the Court's discussion of other concerns-
finality, the import of the ritual of the trial, and the role of state judges'
decisions-suggests the Court's awareness of procedure's other pur-
poses. On the other hand, lack of interest disinterest in legal correct-
ness and beliefs about the relative merits of categories of claims may
well explain why the Supreme Court is in the business of dismantling
complex procedural models.
2. The Utility of Revisionism
The Court may not believe that the Single Judge/Finality or Sin-
gle Judge plus Limited Review Models yield correct outcomes. The
Court may, however, assume that additional opportunities for revision
will yield no better, or only marginally better, outcomes and that the
cost of the improvements are not worth the benefits. Professor Mashaw
has identified this utilitiarian approach in the Court's due process mod-
eling in the administrative context."3 6 Perhaps this "marginal return"
theory has explanatory force here as well. After all, reducing proce-
dural opportunities promises speedy dispute resolution, the rendition of
numerous decisions, and the possibility of inexpensive process. The
complicated, redundant model, embodied in Fay v. Nola and contem-
plated by Title VII, is a development of the 1960's, a decade when re-
sources seemed plentiful and federal rights enforcement imperative.
The current retrenchment is consistent with the reductionist leitmotif of
836. Mashaw, supra note 1, at 47.
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the 1970's and early eighties-to spend less money and to provide
fewer social services.
The difficulty is that the Court has no information about the actual
costs of any procedural models.8 37 The Court's utilitarian calculus is
only pseudoscientific. All the relevant variables are blanks, filled in by
intuition. For example, consider the procedural modeling in state
habeas corpus cases. In Wainwright v. Sykes, the Court claimed that its
Single Judge/Different Forum plus Very Limited Review Model was
preferable to the Fay v. Noia Single Judge/Different Forum plus Un-
limited Review Model. The Sykes majority argued that the decision
would improve trials because sandbaggers would be deterred. In es-
sence, the Court claimed that fewer procedural opportunities would
yield better results.
But the Court had no concrete information on any of the critical
factors-the incidence of sandbagging, the effectiveness of the deter-
rence based on the "cause and prejudice" rule of Sykes, the number of
corrected outcomes under the Fay v. Noia rule, the operating costs
under either the Noia or Sykes rule, or the costs of the transition from
one rule to the other. Further, the Court's rulings in Sykes and other
cases have made habeas decisionmaking complex. The majority can-
not be certain that its rules protect federal judicial resources. Thus, the
majority's theory that "some procedure is enough" and that "less is
better" cannot be based upon economic concerns alone.
Yet another possibility is that a majority of the Court believes that,
even if additional procedures would decrease the number of incorrect
decisions, correct outcomes are themselves not particularly important.
As described above, I have some concern that the Court is not inter-
ested in trying to insure legally correct decisions.
3. The Valuation of Individuals
Whether or not a majority of the Court believes the outcomes are
factually correct, the Justices may believe that the Single
Judge/Finality and Single Judge plus Limited Review Models are
"better" for other reasons. The Court may prefer those models because
those challenging first tier decisions are members of disfavored groups
or are seeking to enforce rights in which the Justices have little interest.
The Court cannot be oblivious to the political implications of its
837. Id at 48.
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"procedural" decisions. With a few exceptions,8 38 the "losers" under
the "new" procedural rules are prisoners, criminal defendants, and civil
rights claimants. In the occasional situation in which the Court has
declined to apply procedural limitations, the "winners" are almost al-
ways federal and state governments, which obtain new opportunities to
retry criminal defendants despite claims of double jeopardy 39 and
which survive motions to dismiss based on collateral estoppel.8 4 ° In
fact, the Court recently created a special exception to collateral estop-
pel rules when the United States is the party to be estopped. 41 Fur-
ther, notwithstanding all of the Court's discussions of federalism and
its consequent enforcement of state contemporaneous objections
rules,142 the Court has assumed the absence of an "independent and
adequate" state ground to assert jurisdiction and to reverse a Michigan
state court's opinion that had extended search and seizure protections
beyond that afforded under the federal Constitution. a3 Perhaps the
return to procedural simplicity is a vehicle by which the Court ex-
presses its views on the worth of the individuals denied opportunities
for review.
Two recent opinions substantiate this view. In one, Patton v.
Yount,"' Justice Stevens' dissent frankly noted the political import of
the Court's opinions. He described Patton v. Yount as one of a series of
cases in which "the Court made sure that an apparently guilty defend-
ant was not given too much protection by the law."' 45 As the Justice
explained, the "string of consecutive victories for the prosecution now
stands at 20.
" 846
838. See, ag., Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank, 104 S. Ct. 2794, 2800-04 (1984) (employment
discrimination claimants not precluded after class-wide discrimination action unsuccessful).
839. See Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 47 (1982) (retrial not barred by the double jeopardy
clause when reversal is based upon the weight of the evidence).
840. United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 104 S. Ct. 1099 (1984); Standefer v.
United States, 447 U.S. 10 (1980).
841. See United States v. Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. 568, 574 (1984) (nonmutual collateral estoppel
not enforceable against federal government). Cf. United States v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 104 S. Ct.
575, 578 (1984) (no special estoppel rule for the United States when estoppel is mutual).
842. Eg., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87-90 (1977).
843. Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3477, 3483 (1983).
844. 104 S. Ct. 2885 (1984).
845. Id at 2900 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
846. Id. See also Florida v. Meyers, 104 S. Ct. 1852, 1855 (1984) (per curiam) (Stevens, J.,
joined by Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting) (Court's recent history indicates that it is "primar-
ily concerned with vindicating the will of the majority and less interested in its role as a protector
of individual's constitutional rights").
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A second case is Tate v. Rose.8 47 The Sixth Circuit held that a
prisoner's conviction was unconstitutional and then denied Ohio's re-
quest for a stay of the habeas relief ordered. Thereafter, Ohio requested
a stay from Justice O'Connor. Despite the Supreme Court's announce-
ment in Barefoot v. Estelle that the Court would give great weight to
appellate court decisions on stays,8 48 Justice O'Connor granted the stay
pending the Court's consideration of the state's petition for certio-
rari.84 9 She held that the "stay equities," the balance of hardship be-
tween the prisoner and the state, favored the state: "[g]ranting the stay
for the time necessary to consider the petition should not cause a signif-
icant incremental burden to respondent, who has been incarcerated for
several years, but doing so will relieve the State of Ohio of the burden
of releasing respondent or retrying him. 850 In other words, an individ-
ual's (or at least a prisoner's) interest in liberty, in being set free once a
court has held a conviction is unconstitutional, is outweighed by a
state's "burden" of release or retrial.851 Individual liberty appears to
count for little in Justice O'Connor's view. Incarceration, however
achieved, may be the goal, and hostility to the rights of individuals, and
particularly of criminal defendants, could well explain much of the
Court's work. 52
4. Preferences Among Valued Features
A final explanation is that the Court believes that the procedures
afforded in the Single Judge/Finality and Single Judge plus Limited
Review Models are sufficient to express society's concerns about
individuals.
In many of the cases chronicled above, the majority's discussion of
procedure centers on three features-finality, economy, and power con-
centration. The Court may believe that the other purposes of proce-
dure-the affirmation of individual dignity, the legitimization of
government control, and the ritual that symbolizes the importance of
847. Rose v. Engle, 722 F.2d 1277 (6th Cir. 1983), stay grantedsub norm. Tate v. Rose, 104 S.
Ct. 2186 (O'Connor, Circuit Justice 1984).
848. Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S. CL at 3393.
849. Tate v. Rose, 104 S. Ct. 2186, 2187 (O'Connor, Circuit Justice 1984).
850. Id
851. Justice O'Connor had an obvious alternative--staying the retrial, but not the release,
pending the Court's consideration of the certiorari petition.
852. See also Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403 (1984) (New York statute authorizing pretrial
detention ofjuveniles upheld). See generally Nowak, Resurrecting Realist Jurisprudence! The Polit-
ical Bias of Burger Court Justices, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 549, 616 (1983) ("IT]he Burger Court
can be best understood in political rather than traditional 'legal' terms.").
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the decisions rendered-are all adequately accomplished by procedural
models that rely heavily upon the Court's three favored features.
If this is the majority's assumption, I think that it is wrong. I do
not believe the last hundred years of increased opportunities for revi-
sionism should be jettisoned so abruptly. We have created opportuni-
ties for revision because we do not want all decisions by individual
judges to endure. We have differentiated the kinds of process available
based upon the rights at stake because we wish to delineate issues of
importance. The Court's refusal to confront the reasons behind the
evolution of models other than the most restrictive ones does not make
the need for complexity disappear.
Finality in a dispute resolution system is a normative conclusion,
not an objective reality. The distribution of power in a procedural sys-
tem is not only a decision about procedure, it is also about political
authority. Economy is not the sole purpose of a court system, nor is it
the hallmark of court systems as contrasted to other forms of decision-
making. Thus, it is an error for any court, Congress, or the drafters of
the Federal Rules to model procedural systems without acknowledging
the impact of those decisions on the distribution of power. This Court
has failed to justify why first tier decisionmakers should be given more,
and in many instances unreviewable, power.
B. SOME ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
I would be the first to admit that the Supreme Court is not alone in
its ignorance about the political, social, and economic costs of revision-
ism and of complex versus simple procedure. As I have noted, empiri-
cal information in these areas is almost nonexistent. But the Court can
be faulted for claiming to know that which is or may be unknowable.
Notwithstanding the absence of information, however, we are in
the business of maintaining courts. Decisions must be made about how
much process we can afford. In my view, the chronic cries of despair
about the viciousness of crime, the exploitation of procedure by liti-
gants, and the costs and volume of caseloads do not sufficiently justify
the contraction or expansion of procedural opportunities. Creators of
procedural systems should consider the realities of litigation opportuni-
ties, the abilities of both litigants and decisionmakers, the techniques
by which to legitimate and to contain the exercise of state power, and
the symbolic and political role of the courts in the United States. With
these concerns in mind, I believe that compelling arguments can be
1016
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made for the deployment of procedural schemes other than the Single
Judge/Finality and Single Judge plus Limited Review Models.
It should be understood, however, that to argue for more complex
decisionmaking is not to suggest that second or third tier deci-
sionmakers necessarily have deeper insights. To realize that litigants
are sometimes ill-informed or poorly represented in the first round is
not to claim that they will necessarily be better equipped in a second or
third proceeding. And to suggest that more procedure should be pro-
vided is not to urge a return to the perspectives of the 1960's and the
Age of Aquarius.
The first step in developing a theory of procedural adequacy, I
believe, is to return to the purposes of court procedure in the United
States: producing acceptable outcomes in individual cases, legitimating
government decisionmaking in the absence of a guarantee of correct-
ness, delineating the social and political import of different kinds of
disputes, cherishing individuals and responding to their complaints of
wrongdoing, and demonstrating the core values of equality, fairness,
democracy, and justice. Procedural features must be evaluated with
the goal of maximizing the possibility of accomplishing these purposes.
While I cannot, at this juncture, set forth a complete description of how
such a procedural system would operate, I can sketch some of its
contours.
1. Criminal Cases and Habeas Corpus Petitions
a. Diminishing litigants' autonomy and deemphasizing finality: A
first step is to improve events in the first tier. Because many criminal
defendants and their attorneys do not merit the description "compe-
tent," I suggest we reassess our current emphasis on litigant autonomy
and reduce its scope. The belief that first tier participants "sandbag"
proceedings is tied to the perception that attorneys, on behalf of liti-
gants, are free to choose whether and when to dispute results. Fear of
"sandbagging," in turn, results in preclusion and forfeiture doctrines.
In my view, sandbagging is mostly a mirage. I do not think that crimi-
nal defendants are aware of and "save" viable defenses to use after
conviction and incarceration. Others, however, think that sandbagging
is a serious problem. The difference in opinions reflects diverse percep-
tions about how the world operates, and the likelihood of reconciliation
is slim.
Various perceptions also exist about the ability of members of the
first tier to enforce legal norms. I believe state court judges and agency
1984]
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decisionmakers do not always implement legal rights. I make that
claim not because I think that most state judges are inept, biased, or
uncaring; rather, I think that the crush of cases, the minimal resources,
and the harshness of the conflicts result in erratic rights enforcement.
In my view, judges need some kind of an ivory tower as an emotional
retreat to enable them to insist on systemic integrity, especially when
despicable individuals may sometimes triumph as a result. 53 Federal
courts, with greater resources and fewer cases, insulate judges more
than do state courts. The entire federal judiciary handled 35,983 fed-
eral criminal cases in 1978;854 in contrast, the criminal caseload of the
state courts for that year was about 13 million.
855
But there are -those who claim that state courts consistently imple-
ment federal law.856 Although I do not understand how these judges
and commentators reconcile their views with data from the federal
habeas case law (70% reversal on capital cases alone since 1976),857 I
am prepared to believe that they will be as unpersuaded by me as I am
by them. Rather than engage in a futile dispute, I would minimize the
factual discord by altering the choices available.
I recommend constraining litigants, lawyers, and trial judges in
criminal cases. Autonomy could be decreased either by giving trial
judges more supervisory obligations in the criminal trial process or by
permitting judges to intervene in the attorney-client relationship to give
clients information about what kinds of choices their attorneys should
be making. I would not permit litigants and lawyers to continue to
make unsupervised choices about whether to contest the admissibility
of evidence, the voir dire, or the grand jury selection process. One ap-
proach would be to prescribe a minimum set of procedures to be fol-
lowed in all criminal defendants' trials and oblige the participants to
implement them. Another would be to educate clients in the hopes that
853. See Patton v. Yount, 104 S. Ct. 2885, 2900 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
majority for considering the case and reversing the grant of habeas relief because the petitioner
was, it seemed, "guilty of a heinous offense").
854. 1979 ANNuAL REPORT, supra note 215, at 129.
855. 1978 STATE STATISTICS, supra note 580, at 450 table B. The figures may be high; not all
cases filed are prosecuted.
856. Justice O'Connor has emerged as a principle spokesperson on the Court for deference to
state court decisions on federal issues. See, e.g., Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. at 128 ("The States
possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law."). See also Bator, supra
note 13, at 481 ("State courts often decide questions which 'involve the construction of the Consti-
tution and the 'determination of rights asserted under it."'); Bator, supra note 140, at 636-37 (argu-
ing that state courts will and should continue to play a substantial role in the elaboration of
federal constitutional principles).
857. Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct. 3383, 3405 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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increased knowledge would improve advocacy. Yet a third alternative
would be to increase clients' control over attorneys by providing
greater resources for defendants. In the current political climate, how-
ever, additional resource commitments are unlikely. The first two sug-
gestions are thus more feasible.
Neither of these two options is as radical or as economically bur-
densome as might first appear. The model for judicial supervision of
criminal trials comes from the ritual that now surrounds the taking of
guilty pleas. Trial judges must assess defendants' pleas of guilty to de-
termine whether there have been "knowing" and "voluntary" waivers
of a variety of rights. 8  Judges must ask a litany of questions about
whether defendants understand that, were they to go to trial, the prose-
cution bears the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and must
establish the elements of the crime. Judges must make sure defendants
know about their rights to a jury and to the provision of counsel, about
fifth amendment protections, and about the direct consequences of
pleas, the maximum length of sentences, and the possibility of fines.
Guilty plea proceedings occur in open court; transcripts are made, and
certain kinds of errors in the taking of guilty pleas are grounds for va-
cating convictions.8 59
Moreover, federal and state courts have already mandated that
judges take charge of other aspects of criminal trials. For example, if a
federal trial judge learns of a defendant's confession, the judge must
inquire into the voluntariness of the statement prior to its submission to
the jury.86° Some states have also imposed substantial duties on trial
judges. In California, concern about attorney conflicts of interest in
criminal cases led the state's Supreme Court to decide that each indi-
gent criminal codefendant must have his or her own attorney ap-
pointed.8 61 A codefendant may only waive that right after independent
counsel has been appointed and has given the client advice.862 The
California court made its decision because it believed that defendants
would be "unlikely to understand the potential risks" that defense at-
torneys engaged in joint representation would be unable to provide
858. Eg. FED. R. CIuM. P. 11.
859. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 468, 469 (1969) (such errors include failure to
address the defendant directly when determining the voluntariness of the guilty plea and failure to
determine that there was a factual basis for the guilty plea).
860. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376-77 (1964).
861. People v. Mroczko, 35 Cal. 3d 86, 115, 672 P.2d 835, 853, 197 Cal. Rptr. 52, 70 (1983).
Cf. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 485 (1978) (federal constitution requires appointment of
separate counsel only if requested by defendant).
862. Mroczko, 35 Cal. 3d at 110-11, 672 P.2d at 849-50, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 66-67.
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"unbiased" advice, and that, given attorney-client privilege rules, the
trial court would not be able to obtain the information necessary to
decide whether to permit joint representation. Further, the court was
concerned about trial courts' incentives to make records invulnerable to
later attacks.863
I suspect that the California solution is economical; it avoids in-
quiry into possible conflicts of interest, and it minimizes reconstruction
of the decisions made. Although the California rule constricts litigants'
choices and requires that more attorneys be provided, it is an appropri-
ate accommodation in light of the record of conflicts among criminal
defendants, the possible pressures (by codefendants or by attorneys) to
share an attorney, and the costs of thinking a lot about whether to al-
low joint representation.
Another example of inroads into litigant autonomy is provided by
those states which mandate automatic appeals in cases where criminal
defendants are sentenced to death.8" In these states, litigants may not
choose whether to die under possibly invalid sentences. Once again,
restrictions on litigant autonomy are relatively inexpensive ways to in-
sure consistent applications of legal norms and to avoid second-guess-
ing whether the actors are competent to make choices.
Installing trial judges as supervisors is not, however, problem-free.
First, judges may go through the ritual of checking into attorney ade-
quacy, but may do so only to protect themselves from reversal. Thus,
the records may look impressive while the process remains unim-
proved. Second, judicial supervision of the trial process enhances
judges' power, and, as I have argued elsewhere,8 65 judges have many
techniques for coercing litigant and attorney "cooperation" to speed
cases to disposition. Unless the duties of trial judges were carefully
delineated, the behavior of judges recorded, and a vigorous appellate
system authorized to supervise closely trial judges' exercises of author-
ity, this suggestion would only achieve further insulation of first tier
powers. Third, the contraction of litigant autonomy may have negative
symbolic effects; it surely diminishes the theoretical freedom and equal-
ity of a subset of litigants. But because I believe that the vast majority
of criminal defendants already have little freedom and even less equal-
863. Id at 115, 672 P.2d at 853, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 70.
864. Eg., Commonwealth v. McKenna, 476 Pa. 428, 439, 383 A.2d 174, 180 (1978). See also
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1239(b) (West 1982) (when such sentence imposed, "an appeal is automati-
cally taken").
865. Resnik, supra note 26, at 376.
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ity, I am prepared to reduce their theoretical autonomy in the hopes of
better outcomes, improved process, and greater supervision by and of
the first tier. I could, however, be accused of inappropriate maternal-
ism; I must admit that my view of the tradeoffs may not be shared by
those whom I hope would benefit under such a system.
An alternative would be to educate criminal defendants and their
attorneys about the trial process in an effort to enhance the ability of
clients to monitor their attorneys' work and to improve the level of
services provided. Because most defendants are poor, they cannot re-
tain attorneys and have no purse strings to pull. The provision of dol-
lars and thus of economic clout would be one option, but, as already
noted, a politically unlikely one. In lieu of dollars, however, clients
could be equipped with information. The government might give crim-
inal defendants detailed information, describing the kinds of defenses
available and the decisions attorneys should be making upon consulta-
tion with their clients. Defendants who are unhappy about their attor-
neys' decisions could complain to trial judges, who would be obliged to
hold hearings about the alleged inadequacies. This approach respects
litigant autonomy; absent defendants' complaints, the attorney-client
relationship remains unexamined. This suggestion is an effort to give
indigent defendants more control over their attorneys' behavior-a di-
rection opposite to that taken by the Supreme Court. 66
Constraining criminal defendants, defense attorneys, prosecutors,
and trial judges in the pretrial and trial process and providing defend-
ants with information and avenues for redress would not be unduly
burdensome. The vast bulk of all criminal cases end in settlement; the
relatively small number that are tried would be subjected to these new
procedural limitations, which are already partially in place when crimi-
nal defendants plead guilty. On the other hand, these suggestions also
have implications for cases currently being settled; if clients had more
information, trial rates might not remain constant.
Another option, again reducing litigant autonomy, is to contract
the number of procedural avenues available. Litigants' tales of inno-
cent mistakes can too frequently be borne out. Rather than leave so
much to discretion or chance, the appropriate paths could be plain, and
some procedural steps could be made mandatory. For example, we
might mandate automatic review in every criminal case, whether re-
solved by trial or plea bargain. Such mandatory review would diffuse
866. E.g., Jones v. Barnes, 103 S. Ct. 3308, 3312-14 (1983); Morris v. Slappy, 103 S. Ct. 1610
(1983).
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the power of the first tier and provide supervision in a systematic fash-
ion. Increased review might also cause judges to be more careful when
implementing rules. If judges' behavior were recorded, and if appellate
standards of review were more demanding, overreaching members of
the first tier would have a greater fear of detection and sanction, while
those who perform properly would be rewarded by increased visibility.
Litigants, served poorly or not at all by counsel, might be comforted by
the prospect of the availability of a new opportunity to persuade, and
we might achieve more consistent application of legal norms.
I do not recommend abandoning litigant autonomy or interfering
with the attorney-client relationship across the litigation spectrum.8 6
7
Rather, I believe in differentiating among kinds of cases, and I am
comfortable with selective incursions into litigant and attorney auton-
omy. Given the defendants' lack of resources, the crush of business,
and most importantly, the extent of state control over individuals, the
criminal process merits special litigating rules. Given the political con-
text of the contact between the state and the criminal defendant, why
not distinguish it from other instances of state intervention in individu-
als' lives? Differentiation is appropriate; autonomy and finality should
be less compelling in criminal cases.868
867. See Resnik, supra note 26, at 440-41 (judges should be hesitant to intervene in the pre-
trial preparation of civil cases unless litigants so request).
868. The Supreme Court should be sympathetic to the request for differentiation. The
Supreme Court has, in other areas, carved out small pockets of differentiation. See, e.g., Bose
Corp. v. Consumer Union of United States, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 1949, 1967 (1984) (special appellate
rules for first amendment cases); United States v. Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. 568, 574 (1984) (special
collateral estoppel rules for the United States).
Moreover, while the Court has insisted upon uniformity of procedures in the cases described
in the text, the Court has taken the opposite tack in many cases. Based upon the issues in litiga-
tion, the Court has drawn distinctions among the kinds of procedures afforded. The Court's "due
process formula," set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), and now reiterated in
almost every case evaluating the adequacy of process, states that the quantum of procedure must
vary depending upon the nature of the private and government interests and the current decision-
making framework. Id. at 332-35. I recommend taking that language seriously. In arenas where
private and public interests are great, such as in criminal prosecutions, greater procedural protec-
tions are appropriate.
Support for increased differentiaion also comes from contemporary understanding about
what procedures "work." Uniformity of procedure, regardless of the kind of case, was a notion
very much in vogue when the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were written in the 1930's. The
drafters aimed to install one set of procedures across the diversity of cases in the federal courts.
Cracks in support for that uniformity are becoming visible. The special rules for habeas litigation
are but one example of the deterioration of uniformity. There is also a manual for complex litiga-
tion, and special rules for bankruptcy proceedings. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (5th ed.
1982); 11 U.S.C. app. Rules 501-515 (1982). Further, many federal district courts have local rules
that deviate substantially from the federal rules. E.g., DIsT. S.C. R. 16(b) (obliging plaintiffs to
answer interrogatories adopted by the Court). Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 16 (no mention of interrogato-
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b. Increasing revisionism: Increased revisionism can also serve to
emphasize the special nature of criminal cases. The use of procedure to
underscore the importance of state deprivations of liberty is not inno-
vative; many constitutional guarantees distinguish the criminal from
the civil process. With its recent opinions, however, the Court erodes
the legitimacy of the criminal justice system by erecting procedural ob-
stacles to a review of the merits and by ignoring systemic failures.
Habeas corpus review in federal courts should be available as of
right upon the demand of any criminal defendant because providing
many tiers in criminal cases underscores the value we place on liberty.
This suggestion would not be unduly burdensome, and it would have
great symbolic import. The estimate is that, in 1983, fewer than 3 per
100 prisoners requested habeas review. Given that the vast majority of
convictions are obtained by settlement and that many of those con-
victed are not sentenced to prison,86 9 the federal courts would not, I
believe, have difficulty responding to the habeas petitions presented.
Further, I would simplify judges' tasks by abolishing all doctrinal limi-
tations on habeas merits review.
I would discard the quasi-res judicata doctrine of Stone v. Powell,
the forfeiture rules of Sykes, Isaac, and Frady, the total exhaustion re-
quirements of Rose v. Lundy, and Rule 9's authorization to dismiss pe-
titions on grounds of delay or abuse. Instead, courts would have to
decide whether constitutional violations rendered convictions "miscar-
riage[s] of justice."
What benefits would flow from this suggestion? First, I believe
some judges' time would be saved because the obstacles to decisions on
the merits would be eliminated. Second, litigant autonomy, and the
arbitrariness that it begets, would be less determinative of outcomes.
Third, courts would need to develop standards by which to measure
reasonable convictions. Judges would have to decide directly, rather
than by avoidance, whether and how the requirements of a constitu-
ries propounded by the Court); Flanders, LocalJRules in Federal District Courts: Usurpation, Leg-
islation, or Information;" 14 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 213 (1981). Moreover, amidst complaints about
discovery "abuse," some commentators propose reforms that differentiate the amount of discovery
permitted by the kind of case. E.g., Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique
and Proposalfor Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1349 (1978).
869. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, FEDERAL OFFENDERS IN
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 1982, at 4 (for defendants convicted in the federal system,
46.3% receive either probation or a fine).
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tional conviction differ after conviction. °70 Given the evident discom-
fort caused by releasing or retrying those perceived as factually
guilty,871 the "harmless error" doctrine might grow.8 72 But such a de-
velopment is preferable to making merits decisions under the guise of
finding procedural errors. We would have to confront whether our
standards of legality vary according to the nature of the crime, other
indicia of culpability, or simply the volume of cases. In short, I would
replace the current minimally useful activity--elaboration of the con-
tours of forfeiture, waiver, and exhaustion doctrines-with decision-
making based upon the validity of convictions. Once again, this is not
a suggestion beyond the pale of contemplation. In several opinions,873
Justice Stevens has urged that the Supreme Court decide the merits
rather than erect yet another procedural obstacle.
What about the downside risks? Chief Justice Burger believes that
finality is important so that prisoners will make "peace" with life in
prison. 74 While I do not claim that the proposed habeas system, with
its postponement of finality, would result in internal "peace" for pris-
oners, many of us outside of prison would gain some comfort in know-
ing that those behind bars remain there not only because they are
inexperienced litigators.
Will first tier judges, both federal and state, feel demoralized be-
cause of the possibility of review in federal court? I doubt it. Almost
all of the hierarchical arrangements inside and outside courts are pre-
mised upon the belief that supervision and review enhance the quality
of both the work and the results. There is no evidence that federal
appellate judges write poor opinions because the United States
Supreme Court might reverse or revise their decisions. Trial judges
will not abandon their oaths of constitutional loyalty because of occa-
sional scrutiny and reversals.
What about safety? Would review of the merits mean a glut of
870. Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2065 (1984) begins such an effort; the ade-
quacy of counsel, after conviction, is tested by a highly deferential standard.
871. E.g., Patton v. Yount, 104 S. Ct. 2885, 2893 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
872. See R. TRAYNOR, THE RMDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR (1970) (analyzing various tests for
appellate courts to employ when attempting to ascertain the gravity of the errors committed be-
low); Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts ofAppeak The Yhreat to the Function of Review
and the National Law, 82 HARv. L. REv. 542, 554 (1969) (time pressures may create tendency to
give greater deference to initial decisionmakers).
873. E.g. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. at 175 (Stevens, J., concurring); Rose v. Lundy, 455
U.S. at 538 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
874. Spalding v. Aiken, 103 S. Ct. at 1797 (Burger, C.3., statement concerning the denial of
certiorari).
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criminals on the streets? Once again, the past suggests that few individ-
uals are released by virtue of habeas corpus. There may, however, be
some people freed or retried who are now barred from being heard on
the merits. That is the price of enforcing constitutionality, and the ben-
efits are worth the cost. If we are unprepared to pay it, we should stop
pretending that our conviction processes are bound by constitutional
limitations.
What about federal court resources? Will federal judges spend all
of their time on habeas cases? My guess is that the time saved by the
demise of inquiries into preclusion questions will exceed the increase, if
any, in the time expended as a result of a growth in the number of
filings. Given that many individuals who are convicted are not incar-
cerated and that most prisoners do not petition for redress, a system
that makes review available is preferable, at least until we obtain infor-
mation that it is unworkable.
What about criminal trial court resources? Will criminal defend-
ants or their attorneys defer claims until the postconviction process?
Again, my guess is no. There are sufficient disincentives to forestall
such problems. Prisoners who file repeatedly, however, could be re-
strained. In a number of instances, courts have identified such prison-
ers and have enjoined these abusive litigants from using court processes
absent specific authorization.87 5 That solution is far preferable to gen-
eral deterrence; specific injunctions are neither overinclusive nor
underinclusive.
What would happen in instances where trial or guilty plea records
were unavailable, or witnesses dead? Rather than a "dismissal of the
writ" because of some notion of litigant culpability for belated filing,
judges should make explicit decisions about who bears the risk of error
in such situations. Let federal courts follow the language of the habeas
statute and do "as law and justice require"-which would sometimes
result in continued incarceration and sometimes result in freedom.
A third purpose of this proposed habeas system is that it limits the
power of individual decisionmakers. The availability of a habeas mer-
its review means that no single individual (an overly aggressive prose-
cutor, an inept defense attorney, or an unconcerned trial judge) could
lock the door on another individual without the possibility of reconsid-
875. See Green v. Warden, United States Penitentiary, 699 F.2d 364, 370 (7th Cir.) (injunc-
tion against filing lawsuits absent court permission), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2436 (1983). See also
Shapiro, supra note 77, at 354 (of 257 petitions studied, only two petitioners had filed four habeas
action or more).
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eration. Diffusion of power is essential when liberty is at stake. Given
my values, the expenditure of resources to accomplish that goal is
worth the costs.
876
Finally, when individuals are sentenced to death, I would not give
them the choice of whether to invoke reconsideration; rather, I would
mandate both automatic appellate processes and federal habeas review.
Given the hostility of state legislatures to Furman v. Georgia877 and the
myriad of statutes found unconstitutional under that decision,78 fed-
eral habeas corpus should be a precondition to the execution of anyone
sentenced to death.
I make these suggestions not because I believe that the second or
third look is "better" in that it produces a more "correct" result; rather,
additional review is desirable because it involves more people, all of
whom have been specially selected. While more people may not get a
more "correct" answer, the more individuals involved, the less power
resides in a single person, and the greater the perception of legitimacy
of the decisions rendered.
2. The Rest of the Docket
Criminal cases and habeas corpus petitions are the "easy" cases
for me. Not only are the decisions of evident importance, but the cate-
gories are more or less coherent; 79 by definition, liberty is at stake.
When I shift to the rest of the docket and the other cases in which the
Court has retreated to simple procedural models, my ability to make
recommendations diminishes because categories are much more diffi-
cult to delineate. While I believe the same concerns about the purposes
of procedure and the deployment of procedural features to accomplish
such ends should guide procedural decisionmaking on the civil side, I
can provide fewer firm suggestions.
First, there are difficulties in categorizing. Parklane Hosiery was a
"private civil dispute," but like all other cases, it involved both sides'
876. But see Tate v. Rose, 104 S. Ct. 2186, 2187 (O'Connor, Circuit Justice, 1984) (too burden-
some for state to release prisoner pending Supreme Court's consideration of habeas petition).
877. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
878. See, e.g., Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 335-36 (1976) (holding Louisiana's death
penalty statute unconstitutional); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (holding
North Carolina's mandatory death penalty statute for first-degree murder unconstitutional).
879. But see Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973) (difficulty in distinguishing habeas
corpus and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 litigation). Moreover, in making a distinction between criminal and
civil cases, I include all kinds of commitment proceedings, including civil contempt and mental
health proceedings, on the "criminal" side.
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invocations of legal norms, and society therefore had some interest in
the outcome. Still, private civil disputes seem of least concern, not be-
cause of any intrinsic unimportance but because the concentrations of
power among litigants is not as consistently disparate in civil cases as in
the criminal context. Given resource constraints, I am less willing to
look again at the results of cases like Parklane Hosiery and am most
comfortable with the Single Judge plus Limited Review Model for
these disputes.88°
Trouble arises when deciding how to characterize cases like Mr.
Kremer's conflict with his employer. Should a Title VII case be called
a private civil dispute? Or should there be a special category called
"civil rights cases" that are processed differently? Ideally, Congress,
which created the right, should also define the remedial structure. But,
in light of the ambiguity or silence in the statute, the Court must decide
how to allocate court resources. My own view of the Title VII scheme
is that Congress gave those who claim employment discrimination two
discrete opportunities to persuade two kinds of factfnders, agency
hearing officers and judges. Thus, I would have had some sympathy
with a decision by the Court to preclude Mr. Kremer if he had received
afacofnding hearing in state court. However, I believe the Court erred
when it precluded Mr. Kremer's access to a second factfinder when the
state court had determined only that a state agency's conclusion was
not "arbitrary and capricious." '881
The question of the distribution of power between magistrates and
federal judges turns on their relative competency. If magistrates are as
competent as federal judges, their decisions should be appealable only
to the circuit courts. There is no need for an additional layer of review,
and the obligation of trial judges to make "de novo determinations"
should be withdrawn. On the other hand, if magistrates are the inferi-
ors of article III judges, then magistrates should be assistants to judges,
880. Cf. Cleary, Res Judicata Reexamined, 57 YALE L.J. 339, 349-50 (1948) (whether res judi-
cata precludes a second action should be decided with reference to the purposes for preclusion,
rather than by theories of what a cause of action is). I do not mean to suggest that civil litigants
always possess equal resources and power. The United States as a civil litigant may indeed de-
serve to be dealt with differently, as the Court did in United States v. Mendoza, discussed supra
note 601. Congress has also recognized the propriety of special rules for the United States as
litigant in the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1982) (permitting awards of costs and
attorneys' fees against the United States, subsection (d) to be repealed, unless extended, on Oct. 1,
1984). Moreover, because of the SEC's presence in the first Parklane case, even Parklane Hosiery
is a problematic example.
881. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 484-85.
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decisions of magistrates should not be substituted for those of judges,
and Raddatz was wrongly decided.
Limiting the scope of appellate review to questions of law is also a
question of competency. I have no reason to assume that trial judges
are more competent than appellate judges. Given my concerns about
the provision of opportunities for individuals to be heard, the propriety
of differentiating among kinds of cases and issues, and the desirability
of limiting individuals' authority, I would opt for granting appellate
court review, unencumbered by presumptions of correctness, when trial
judges render decisions on the basis of data equally available to the
reviewing judges. Both tiers of judges can understand such informa-
tion, and I would rather have more than one appraisal of its import.
My choices give relatively little weight to the need to conserve ju-
dicial resources by curbing the volume of issues presented to the fed-
eral appellate courts. In my view, the federal judiciary's budget is too
small, as compared to other federal expenses,882 and more dollars
should be spent on the court system. I am skeptical about claims that
the federal courts are overworked,883 and I believe quick closure is less
compelling than the comfort derived from believing that the govern-
ment can be responsive to claims of judicial error. I do not insist that
my value choices are the only appropriate ones to make. I am, how-
ever, at ease with the claim that the decision about whether to provide
extensive second tier review in cases like Pullman-Standard should not
turn upon the characterization of the company's discriminatory intent
as "law" or "fact. 884
3. The Question of Appeal
The other side of the arguments made.in these last pages has al-
ready been set forth in the many Supreme Court decisions described
above. Given the Court's emphasis on the need for finality, the conser-
vation of resources, and the appropriate degree of deference afforded
first tier decisionmakers, the logical conclusion to be drawn is that the
Court would prefer the simplest of procedural systems-the Single
Judge/Finality Model. The end of automatic rights of appeal may be
882. In 1982, the Federal Judiciary spent only $700 million. In contrast, the Department of
Education spent $14.1 billion, and the Department of Defense $185.9 billion. EXECUTIVE OFFICE
OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND TmE BUDGET, THE UNITED STATES BUDGET
IN BRIEF, FISCAL YEAR 1984, at 79 (1983).
883. Complaints against courts are longstanding. Eg. C. DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 5-10
(1853).
884. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289-90 (1982).
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the Court's next goal. Indeed, one Supreme Court Justice has just pro-
posed considering the elimination of appeals "as of right" in the federal
courts.88 5
The termination of appellate rights is not inconceivable. Appeal as
of right is a relatively recent innovation that, like habeas corpus, may
be an excess of an age in which resources appeared plentiful. Given
current sensibilities, why permit every aggrieved individual to com-
mand the labors of both a trial judge and also a panel of three appellate
judges? Why not narrow appeal to only a subset of cases? After all,
there is still at least one state in the union that has no appeal for certain
kinds of disputes.88 6 Additionally, empirical studies of appellate courts
reveal that some state appellate courts have "norms of affirmance,"
making the right of appeal almost illusory.
8 7
Of course, my suggestion that a majority of the Court is moving
towards elimination of appeal as of right has a rhetorical function.
Some of us believe that appeal as of right is as much a part of "due
process" as is the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses. We have
come to take for granted the idea that United States citizens can com-
pel the attention of government officials and can do so repeatedly.
Even though historically inaccurate, this notion has normative power.
Whatever the Supreme Court cases may say, the intuition about a
"right of appeal" reflects widely-held conceptions about the function of
courts.
Appellate rights embody revisionism, the basic premise that an in-
dividual (no matter how wise or knowledgeable) should not, without
constraints, act on behalf of the state. Such power concentration is par-
ticularly troubling in a country politically committed to democratic,
rather than autocratic, decisionmaking. Since their inception, courts in
this country have included tiers-levels of decisionmaking. Just as the
triad-the judge and two participants-is definitional of courts, so are
tiers. When we chip away at the tiers, we decrease courts' legitimacy.
Many litigants will experience a single decisionmaker as having
885. Greenhouse, Rehnquist Asks Limit to Automatic Appeals, N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1984, at
15, col. 1 (at a speech at the University of Florida Law School, the Justice was quoted as saying
"Perhaps the time has come to abolish appeal as a matter of right from the district courts to the
courts of appeal....").
886. W. VA. CONsT. art. 8, § 3 Ourisdictional amount a prerequisite to appeal). Cf. AP.
CONsT. art 7, § 4; CAL. CONsT. art. 6, § 4 (mandating appeal as of right).
887. See Davies, supra note 74, at 573-77 (criminal appeals in California have very little
chance of success). Cf. Wald, supra note 23, at 771 (18% reversal rate, all kinds of cases, U.S.
Court of Appeals, District of Columbia).
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"kingly power."888 And, in some instances, that impression will be ac-
curate. Only when litigants can command the attention of more than a
single state official can individual decisionmakers' ruling be
legitimated.
There are no simple, inexpensive answers or any solutions that
come problem free. The history of procedure is a series of attempts to
solve the problems created by the preceding generation's procedural
reforms. Any set of decisions made will produce unforeseen results
that, in turn, will need to be addressed. However, the current "solu-
tion" of finality, achieved by deeming first tier decisions legitimate and
by precluding review, is premised upon the fiction that first tier evalua-
tions of disputes are sufficient to fulfill all the purposes of procedure.
Those close to the courts know that, while there are many first tier suc-
cesses, there are also many failures. To maintain that the system is
generally functioning as it should is to undermine the special ability of
courts to inquire into claims of individual errors, misdeeds, and lack of
concern. If we really want speedy, inexpensive decisions, we should
shift to coin-flipping. If, however, we are committed to features of
court procedure other than power concentration, finality, and economy,
we must permit opportunities for revision. We must construct proce-
dural models that diffuse power and provide differentiation among the
various types of disputes to be resolved.
888. 21 CONG. REc. 3404 (1890) (statement of Mr. Culberson of Texas) (debating the Evarts
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